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ON THE WILLINGNESS OF PERPETRATORS TO APOLOGIZE
Conflict and transgressions are an inevitable part of living and working on groups.
After a transgression there is often a strong need for the conflicting parties to reconcile and
to restore trust. An apology is one of the most common ways for a perpetrator to initiate
the reconciliation process. Indeed, numerous studies have shown the positive effects of an
apology on the reconciliation process. Contrary to the large body of research on the effects
of an apology on a victim, almost no research has investigated when perpetrators are
actually willing to offer such an apology. Given that an apology can only elicit its positive
effects on reconciliation when a perpetrator is willing to offer one, it is imperative to
understand when perpetrators are willing to do so.
This dissertation is the first to systematically investigate the situational and persona -
lity determinants of a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. In this dissertation, I investi -
gate how victims can influence the willingness of perpetrators to apologize. I show how
different types of transgressions influence the both the willingness to apologize and the
congruence between a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize and a victim’s desire to receive
an apology. I also focus on how the type of relationship between victim and perpetrator
influences the willingness to apologize. Finally, in this dissertation, I show how perpetrators
often biased towards overestimating the aversiveness of apologizing can have an important
effect on their willingness to apologize.
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"I understand procedure, I understand war, I understand rules and regulations. I don't 
understand sorry. I don't really know what sorry means.” 
 
 
Charles Manson 
Backporch Tapes Collections, 1969 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
An natural consequence of humans living and working together in groups is that conflicts 
are bound to happen (De Waal, 1996). When a conflict occurs, the parties involved in the 
conflict have basically two options: discontinue the relationship or reconcile (De Waal, 
1996). Because discontinuing the relationship is often impractical or undesirable, it is 
important for the parties involved in the conflict to reconcile. 
 Although scholars have given substantial attention to the causes and 
consequences of conflict, relatively little research has been conducted on the aftermath of 
conflict: the reconciliation phase (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). 
This is unfortunate because as conflicts are such a ubiquitous part of social life, it is 
important to understand how they can be reconciled. One important tool that people have 
at their disposal to initiate the reconciliation process is to apologize. Indeed, apologies 
form an important part of everyday social interactions and are proven to be effective in 
achieving forgiveness and reconciliation (e.g. McCullough et al. 1997; Ohbuchi, Kameda, 
& Agarie, 1989). Although people have a number of strategies that they can pursue to 
initiate reconciliation (e.g. apologies, financial compensations, justifications, etc.), 
apologies provide some unique characteristics that make them highly valuable. This is best 
exemplified by the notion that some transgressions can only be repaired by offering an 
apology (Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986; Tavuchis, 1991). These are the transgressions in 
which social norms have been broken, expectations of others have not been met and trust 
has been damaged. These transgressions are characterized by feelings of injustice but also 
by a lack of clear monetary/material damage, and often it is impossible to somehow 
(materially) correct the past (Tavuchis, 1991). Once an insult has been issued, it cannot be 
undone. After such transgressions, an apology is basically the only instrument that a 
perpetrator has to take responsibility for their past behavior and to repair the damage to the 
relationship with the victim (although this does not mean that apologies are unimportant 
when monetary damage has been done; De Cremer, 2010; Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, 
De Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013). Indeed, other relational repair strategies used after these 
types of transgressions may be highly inappropriate, even insulting, as for instance offering 
your spouse a financial compensation after cheating on him/her. 
 Given that apologies are such an important tool to establish reconciliation, it is 
important to understand when apologies elicit positive and negative effects on the 
relationship between victim and perpetrator, but also when apologies are actually 
delivered. Most research today has examined the psychological effectiveness of apologies 
on the victim. Specifically, this research has investigated whether apologies are effective in 
helping to reconcile a broken relationship and under what circumstances apologies are 
effective.  
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In contrast to the body of literature on the effects of apologies on victims, little research 
has focused on the person offering the apology, namely the perpetrator. This is surprising 
given the fact that apologies can only elicit their positive effects when they are actually 
delivered. As such, it is important to examine more closely when are perpetrators willing 
to apologize and when not. Given the lack of research on the person who apologizes, 
anything is known about this. In this thesis, I report four lines of research aimed at getting 
a better understanding on when perpetrators are willing to apologize.  
 
 
1.1 Apologies: A definition 
 
An apology is a type of social account. A social account is defined as ‘a statement 
made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward behavior - whether that 
behavior is his own or that of others, and whether the proximate cause for the statement 
arises from the actor himself or from someone else’ (Scott & Lyman, 1968). An apology is 
a social account that both entails taking responsibility for a past offense and fully admitting 
that that behavior was wrong (unjustifiable and inexcusable). More formally, an apology is 
generally defined as a combined statement of remorse about a past course of action and an 
admission of responsibility for that transgression (Lazare 2004; Smith 2008; Tavuchis 
1991). Empirical research has also shown that these two components are the indeed most 
important predictors of an effective apology (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Förster, & Montada, 
2004). Moreover, what follows from these two components is that an apology is an 
implicit promise that the transgression will not be repeated in the future (Kim, Ferrin, 
Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). This follows from the fact that when a perpetrator expresses true 
remorse about a past course of action, the perpetrator acknowledges that the behavior 
should not have occurred and should not occur in the future. 
Indeed, it is this combination of account components that sets an apology apart 
from other social accounts of past wrongdoing, such as denials, justifications and excuses 
(Scott, 1968). For instance, a denial is an account in which one denies that one has 
displayed certain behavior. An excuse is a social in account in which responsibility for 
certain behavior is attributed to an external factor (being late due to a traffic jam; one thus 
does not take full responsibility for past behavior such as in an apology). A justification is 
a social account in which certain inappropriate behavior is justified due to circumstances 
(killing someone due to self-defense; thus no true remorse is communicated as in an 
apology). An apology is the only social account in which both responsibility and the 
wrongness of the behavior is acknowledged. 
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1.2 The effects of apologies on victims 
 
Most research to date on apologies has taken a victim perspective. This research has 
investigated whether apologies are effective, and under what circumstances they are 
effective, in fostering forgiveness, addressing feelings of injustice, and helping to reconcile 
a broken relationship. As such, this research has focused on the effects that apologies have 
on their recipients, namely the victim of a transgression. Early research on apologies has 
investigated whether they are indeed effective in managing conflict. A wealth of research 
supports the notion that apologies indeed are effective in this role. For instance, apologies 
help reduce anger in victims (Ohbuchi, et al., 1989) and promote forgiveness and 
constructive behavior (e.g. cooperative behavior in mixed motive settings) of the victim 
towards the perpetrator (Bachman & Guerrero, 2006; Bottom et al., 2002; McCullough, 
1997). 
 Although generally it has been found that apologies are effective, researchers 
have begun to investigate under what circumstances they are most likely to be effective. 
Investigations have zoomed in on the characteristics of the apologizer showing that 
apologies are, for example, particularly effective when they are communicated by a 
respectful authority (De Cremer & Schouten, 2008, see also Tomlinson, Dineen, & 
Lewicki, 2004). These effects were driven by the perception that an apology was more 
sincere and meaningful when they are communicated by a respectful authority. The 
positive role of sincerity in an apology’s effectiveness is also demonstrated by means of 
research on ex ante apologies (i.e. apologizing for a transgression that is about to happen; 
Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004). These types of apologies are perceived as manipulative, 
rather than sincere, thereby actually decreasing constructive behavior towards the 
perpetrator.  
Although sincerity is an important prerequisite of an effective apology, the 
acceptance of an apology is also shaped by intrapsychological biases and normative 
expectations. In a series of studies conducted by Risen and Gilovich (2007; later replicated 
by Jehle, 2012) sincere and insincere apologies, operationalized as voluntary and forced 
apologies, were investigated. These researchers found that forced apologies were in fact 
effective but only on a victim; a third-person bystander did make a difference between a 
forced and voluntary apology interpreting a forced apology as insincere. The reason that 
forced apologies did have a positive effect on victims (but not on a bystander) was that 
victims, compared to bystanders, had a strong motivation to be seen positively by others. 
Furthermore, normative constraints concerning the acceptance of apologies also had a 
stronger influence on victims to accept a forced apology, compared to a bystander (see also 
Bennett & Earwaker, 1994). As such, although sincerity of an apology is an important 
component, intrapsychological biases and normative expectations regarding apologies 
interact with this. 
 An important stream of research on the effectiveness of apologies has investigated 
after which types of transgressions an apology has a positive (i.e. trust restoring) effect. 
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Research by Kim and colleagues, comparing apologies with denials, has made a distinction 
between integrity and competence based transgressions (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 
2007; Kim et al., 2004). The differing effects of apologies and denials after competence 
and integrity based transgressions are explained by how we make dispositional inferences 
about a perpetrator’s level of competence and integrity (Reeder & Brewer, 1979). In the 
domain of competence, negative information has little influence on dispositional 
inferences while positive information does have influence. However, in the domain of 
integrity, negative information has a strong effect on disposition inferences on integrity 
while positive information has relatively little.  
As such admitting to a competence based wrongdoing has relatively little 
influence on how we judge a perpetrators competence. And admittance in the form of an 
apology, in combination with an implicit promise of forbearance on future transgressions, 
leads to trust repair (compared to a denial which does not have this implicit promise of 
forbearance). Because admitting to an integrity based wrongdoing has a strong effect on 
inferences on a perpetrator’s level of integrity, apologies do not work to repair trust after 
integrity based transgression, while denials do because then no inference about a 
perpetrators level of integrity is made. 
 Violations of competence and integrity are one way to categorize transgressions. 
A different stream of research has investigated the effectiveness of apologies in relation to 
the intentionality of the transgression, comparing intentional to unintentional 
transgressions. Research by Struthers and colleagues (2008) replicate this effect: apologies 
elicit less forgiveness and create less positive impressions of the perpetrator after 
intentional compared to unintentional transgressions (see also Leunissen, De Cremer, 
Reinders Folmer, & Van Dijke, 2013). The process that underlies this effect is that an 
apology for an intentional transgression lowers a victim’s impression of a perpetrator (in 
term of benevolence and whether they could count on the transgressor). This is in line with 
the findings by Kim and colleagues that taking responsibility for intentional/integrity 
transgressions leads to strong dispositional inferences about the perpetrator. A closer look 
at the manipulations regarding competence and integrity based transgressions reveal that 
competence based transgression are mainly unintentional (breaking rules due to a lack of 
knowledge) while integrity based transgressions are generally intentional (i.e. knowingly 
breaking rules). Moreover, the relationship between intentionality and apology 
effectiveness can also be explained be the role that the sincerity of the apology plays in 
this. As previously explained, insincere apologies are perceived as manipulative and as 
such less effective (e.g. Skarlicki, et al., 2004). Immediately apologizing after an 
intentional transgression can be perceived as insincere. The reason that in these 
circumstances an apology might be perceived as insincere is that by apologizing one 
acknowledges that a transgression should not have taken place. Indeed, this statement can 
contrast sharply with the intentionality of the transgression. 
 As can be seen, there is a number of reasons that make apologies more or less 
effective in eliciting forgiveness and restoring cooperative behavior towards the 
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perpetrator. The intentionality of the transgression plays an important role in this. 
Apologies are generally more effective after unintentional than after intentional 
transgressions. The effectiveness is also driven by how the victim perceives the apologizer. 
Is his/her apology sincere or insincere? Apologies are more effective when they are 
perceived as sincere. 
 
 
1.3 The willingness of perpetrators to apologize 
 
Given the fairly large literature on the effects of apologies on victims, it is rather surprising 
to see how little attention has been given to the perpetrator perspective. Off course, victims 
play an important role in the reconciliation process because they ultimately decide to 
forgive or not and to continue in a relationship. However, it is often the perpetrator who (is 
at least expected to) initiate the reconciliation process. It is therefore not enough to know 
under what circumstances victims are willing to forgive, we also need to know under what 
circumstances perpetrators are willing to initiate reconciliation. As said before, apologies 
provide an important means for perpetrators to initiate reconciliation, as such knowing 
when perpetrators are willing to apologize provides us with important knowledge on the 
reconciliation process. 
Only a handful of papers has devoted attention to this perspective before my PhD 
project started in 2009. One of the first was a paper by Schlenker and Darby (1981). Using 
a scenario methodology, they manipulated both the responsibility for a transgression 
(bumping into someone due to not paying attention or due to being pushed by someone 
else) and the amount of harm done as a result of the transgression. They showed that as 
both the magnitude of the negative consequences and responsibility for a transgression 
increased, so did the elaborateness of a perpetrator’s apology.  
 In 2007, Exline and colleagues (Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007) published a 
paper in which they investigated both situational factors predicting apologies and feelings 
of regret over apologies and non-apologies issued by a perpetrator. They investigated a 
number of personal and situational characteristics that are associated with apologies. They 
find that perpetrators in general felt more regret over times when they did not apologize 
than over apologies that they had given. Moreover, regret about apologizing was 
associated with different causes than regret over non-apologies. Regret over apologies 
were associated with negative relational outcomes (i.e. the apology did not lead to 
reconciliation), anger and an incorrect image of innocence of the perpetrator (the 
perpetrator did not truly believe that he/she was the perpetrator in this conflict while 
apologizing does suggest this). Regret over non-apologies were associated with remorse 
and continued feelings of guilt. 
In 2008, Shnabel and Nadler published a paper on the need-based model of 
reconciliation. Although not on apologizing per se, this model states that transgressions 
deprive both victims and perpetrators of certain psychological needs that should be 
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addressed in order for reconciliation to take place. They claim and show that a 
transgression threatens a perpetrator’s standing in the (moral) community. Perpetrators 
may fear social exclusion, threatening their need to belong (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). 
Apologizing is a way for a perpetrator to restore their standing in the relationship with the 
victim. Although the needs-based model was originally tested in an interpersonal conflict 
context, it has been mainly applied to the intergroup context since it was published (e.g. 
Shnabel et al., 2009). 
In 2011, a paper on the ‘disposition to apologize’ was published (Howell, Dopko, 
Turowski, & Buro, 2011). This paper presents a measure for the disposition to apologize: 
an individual difference variable that describes how easily people apologize. 
 As can be seen from the rather short review on the perpetrator perspective of 
apologizing, this perspective has received much less attention than the victim perspective. 
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that insights into the perpetrator’s willingness to 
apologize are important because it provides knowledge on when conflicts are likely to be 
reconciled and when it is unlikely that they will be reconciled.  
 
 
1.4 Overview of the present dissertation 
 
The psychology behind a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize remains largely 
unexplored. With this dissertation I aim at furthering our understanding of this. Concerning 
the empirical investigations itself, I have investigated different domains of a transgression 
that are likely to have an influence on the subsequent willingness of perpetrators to 
apologize. These domains entail the victim’s reaction to the transgression, the cause of the 
transgression, the relationship between the perpetrator and victim, and finally, the 
construal of the act of apologizing itself. 
In Chapter 2, I investigate how the reaction of a victim to a transgression shapes 
the perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. Here, I propose that apologizing is a risky 
strategy for a perpetrator. Risky in the sense that an apology may or may not be accepted 
by the victim. If the apology is accepted, it can lead to forgiveness. But when the apology 
is not accepted, apologizing may have aversive consequences for the perpetrator. That is, 
the perpetrator may be worse off by apologizing because by doing so, he/she has accepted 
blame for the event, which may evoke a host of aversive social consequences (e.g. 
humiliation and/or punishment) that would not have occurred if they had not accepted 
blame by apologizing. Therefore, the willingness to apologize may be contingent on 
whether a perpetrator believes that an apology may elicit its intended effects, namely 
forgiveness. Moreover, because a perpetrator has to trust the victim that an apology will be 
reciprocated with forgiveness, I also hypothesized that a perpetrator’s dispositional trust 
moderates the effect of a victim’s reaction on a transgression on a perpetrator’s willingness 
to apologize. In order to test these hypotheses, I designed a novel experimental paradigm 
that elicits a transgression in a lab setting. 
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In Chapter 3, I investigate different types of transgressions. To supplement the 
body of research on intentionality and apology effectiveness on a victim, I investigated 
how intentionality affects the willingness of a perpetrator to apologize. I hypothesized that 
the intentionality of a transgression influences emotions both within a victim and a 
perpetrator that are important predictors for whether a perpetrator wants to offer an 
apology, and a victim desires to receive an apology. I predicted that unintentional 
transgressions, compared to intentional transgressions, cause more feelings of guilt in a 
perpetrator, and guilt in turn positively influences the willingness of a perpetrator to 
apologize. For victims, I expected that intentional, rather than unintentional, transgressions 
cause more feelings of anger about the transgression, and that anger in turn positively 
influences the victim’s desire for an apology. Because intentionality influences the 
emotions of guilt and anger in victims and perpetrators in opposite ways, I expected a 
mismatch between a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize and a victim’s desire to receive 
an apology. Perpetrators are mainly willing to offer an apology after unintentional 
transgressions, while victims do not desire an apology much after unintentional 
transgressions. In contrast, when victims particularly want an apology, after intentional 
transgressions, I expected that perpetrators are actually unwilling to apologize. Apart from 
studying intentionality as an important predictor for emotions and subsequent willingness 
to provide or receive an apology, this design thus allowed me to compare the willingness 
of a perpetrator to give an apology and the desire of a victim to receive one after the same 
types of transgressions.  
In Chapter 4, I zoomed in on how the relationship between perpetrator and victim 
influences the willingness of a perpetrator to apologize. Here, I advance the argument that 
an important reason for perpetrators to apologize is to maintain relationships that are 
valuable to them. As such, perpetrators should be more motivated to apologize when they 
transgress in a valuable relationship. Relational closeness is an important indicator of such 
valuable relationships. As such, I expected that perpetrators would be more willing to 
apologize when they transgress against a close other compared to a more distant other. I 
also continue to build on chapter 3 by investigating the role that guilt plays in this 
willingness to apologize. Because guilt is an emotion that motivates relationship restoring 
action, I expected that feelings of guilt mediate the effect of relational closeness on 
apology behavior. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I took a closer look at an important intrapersonal process 
associated with apologizing. The first 3 empirical chapters all focus on interpersonal 
processes that lead to more or less apologies. In this chapter I aimed at investigating 
another reason that perpetrators do not want to apologize. Specifically, in this chapter we 
investigated how the construal of an apology affects a perpetrators willingness to 
apologize. Based on the affective forecasting literature, I predicted that perpetrators might 
overestimate the experienced aversiveness of an apology when delivering one. As such, I 
predicted that the predicted aversiveness of apologizing is higher than the actually 
experienced avesiveness when actually apologizing. Because people’s decision to engage 
8 
 
in certain behavior is often influenced by how people construe that behavior, I expected 
that this forecasting error regarding the aversiveness of an apology influencing the 
willingness of perpetrators to apologize. 
In Chapter 6, I integrate all these findings. I also discuss implications and 
conclusion for research on apologies and reconciliation. Moreover, I provide an integrative 
theoretical framework and suggestions for future research. It is worth noting that chapters 
2 to 5 are based on papers that have been published or submitted for publication. As such, 
these chapters can be read separately but at the same time will also show some overlap 
between the different chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. AN INSTRUMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON APOLOGIZING IN BARGAINING: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF FORGIVENESS TO APOLOGIZE1 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Bargaining is a breeding ground for unfair allocations. Due to the highly interdependent 
nature of bargaining situations, there is a conflict between self-interest and the bargaining 
partner’s interest (Komorita & Parks, 1996). One important guide that people use to 
balance the conflicting interests in these types of bargaining situations is the equality norm. 
This norm beholds that all bargaining parties receive an equal share of the commodity that 
is to be divided (Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). This fairness rule implies that people do 
not only care about their own outcomes in bargaining, but also value the outcomes of 
others (Blount, 1995; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). Breaking the equality 
norm is not only considered to be unfair and undesirable when one receives less than the 
other party; receiving more is generally considered to be undesirable too (Blount, 1995; 
Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Loewenstein et al., 1989). 
People use the equality norm as a guide in bargaining settings. A guide, not only 
for their own behavior, but also to base their expectations on of what others will do. In 
other words, people expect their bargaining partner to adhere to the equality norm as well 
(Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). For this reason, violating the equality norm does not only 
lead to perceptions of unfairness but also to a decrease in trust (Desmet, De Cremer, & 
Van Dijk, 2011). Trust is defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of 
another (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395).  Based on this definition, it 
follows that trust can be violated after deviation from the equality norm because this 
deviation violates the positive expectations of the victim that the other party will act in line 
with the equality rule. Research indeed suggest that people are aversive towards such an 
equality violation as people have been shown to make costly choices in order not to violate 
fairness norms (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006). 
After a trust violation, perpetrators can feel motivated to reconcile with the 
victim. Reconciliation can be valuable to the perpetrator because successful reconciliation 
leads to a continuation of a cooperative relationship with the victim. Despite the 
importance of this reconciliation process, research on bargaining has devoted almost no 
attention to examining the aftermath of unfair offers (De Cremer, 2010). Rather, most 
studies have examined how trust develops or how it plays a role in maintaining 
cooperation. As such, hardly any studies – at least to our knowledge - have looked at how 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on Leunissen, De Cremer, & Reinders Folmer (2012). 
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violated trust can be repaired. In fact ever since Elangovan and Shapiro (1998, p. 548) 
noted at the end of the nineties that, “research on the violation of trust has significantly 
lagged behind interest in the phenomenon of trust”, more recent articles have articulated 
that despite the need to focus on this topic “surprisingly few studies have directly 
examined how trust may be repaired” (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006, p. 50). 
Because trust is considered to be one of the most essential lubricants of our social and 
economic exchanges (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Kramer, 1999), it is 
important for research to address the kind of actions that are required for reconciliation 
efforts to succeed. 
One important reconciliation tool, available to the perpetrator, is an apology. Apologies 
address the experienced injustice of the victim (Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 
2002; Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). An apology 
is a combined statement of both and admission of wrongdoing and regret for the violation 
(Lazare, 2004; Kim, et al., 2009). Apologies directly address the violated positive 
expectations (i.e. trust) of the victim by implicitly promising that the transgression will not 
be repeated and thus suggesting that the perpetrator is worthy of being trusted again (Kim 
et al., 2009). 
Research outside the bargaining literature has revealed evidence that relationships 
can be reconciled more effectively if an apology is given and thereby responsibility for the 
trust violation is acknowledged (De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Kim et al., 2004; Lewicki 
& Bunker, 1996; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). To date, only a few published 
studies have addressed whether the specific use of apologies has an effect within more 
economically-based exchanges such as social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining games 
(see Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002; De Cremer, 2010; De Cremer, van 
Dijk, & Pillutla, 2010; for an interesting field study, see Cohen, 1999). These studies did 
indeed reveal that apologizing for unfair allocations led to increased cooperation and 
higher future trust behavior.  
What all these studies have in common is that they adopted the perspective of the 
victim. That is, these studies examined whether and when apologies delivered by the 
perpetrator have a positive effect on the party suffering from the trust violation. This 
approach is a first good step towards identifying the important value of apologies in the 
reconciliation process (De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer, 2011). The most 
important step, however, is to examine whether or not perpetrators are willing to apologize, 
and when they are most likely to do so. This perpetrator perspective is virtually lacking in 
the literature and particularly so in the bargaining literature. Consequently, we know very 
little about whether perpetrators are actually willing to make use of an apology when 
resources are allocated in unfair ways. Because reconciliation of relationships is a bi-
directional issue, only knowing whether victims desire an apology is of limited value. 
Therefore, we need to promote our insights into the motives that make perpetrators 
apologize.  
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In the present paper, we adopt the perspective of the perpetrator. We study under 
which conditions perpetrators choose to apologize to the victim. We examine apologizing 
as a behavior in the context of a modified trust game in which the second party (the one 
receiving the tripled money send by party 1) violates the fairness norm of equality and thus 
hampers the trust of the first party. In predicting whether perpetrators would apologize or 
not, we adopt an instrumental perspective, meaning that the choice to apologize by the 
perpetrator will be motivated by the likelihood that an apology will elicit its intended 
effect. The effect that we assume that perpetrators strive for when apologizing is to be 
forgiven by the victim. We consider this approach to be instrumental because the decision 
to apologize or not becomes conditional on the likelihood of whether the victim will 
forgive or not. 
 
 
2.1.1 Apologies: An instrumental perspective 
 
We propose that an important reason to apologize is to restore the relationship with the 
victim, which usually implies that the perpetrator will be forgiven. The desire for 
forgiveness has been identified as an important motive to initiate the reconciliation process 
(Schnabel & Nadler, 2008). After a transgression, a perpetrator may feel moral inferiority, 
guilt, or shame. These feelings can lead to an intrinsic motivation to be forgiven by the 
victim (Schnabel & Nadler, 2008). Indeed, the motive to be forgiven becomes even more 
important if the perpetrator wants to continue a cooperative relationship with the victim 
(Bottom et al., 2002). 
It is important to note, however, that while achieving reconciliation may be 
desirable, perpetrators also take a substantial social risk by apologizing. By apologizing, 
perpetrators accept blame for their actions (Kim et al., 2009). Hence, perpetrators risk a 
host of aversive social consequences - like rejection, humiliation and punishment - that 
would not be the case if they had not accepted blame by apologizing (Exline et al., 2007). 
An instrumental motivation perspective therefore suggests that perpetrators will be careful 
to apologize and become strategic when it comes down to apologizing. That is, the 
decision to apologize by the perpetrator will be conditional on the likelihood that victims 
are willing to forgive that perpetrator.  
Based on this instrumental perspective, it thus stands to reason that perpetrators 
will be less willing to apologize when the victim seems unforgiving than when the victim 
seems forgiving. In this case, the decision to apologize should be driven by perceptions of 
the perpetrator that the victim is indeed willing to restore the relationship. This line of 
reasoning therefore suggests that when the victim seems forgiving, perpetrators should 
reason that an apology on their behalf will be instrumental in restoring trust in the 
relationship. When the victim does not seem forgiving, perpetrators should perceive the 
delivery of an apology to be less instrumental in achieving reconciliation. As such, 
expectations that an apology will restore the relationship with the victim should underlie 
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the relationship between perceived forgiveness of the victim and apologizing behavior of 
the perpetrator.  
 
 
2.1.2 Perpetrator’s trust moderating the instrumental approach 
 
Will perpetrators, however, always employ such an instrumental kind of thinking towards 
apologizing? We argue that whether perpetrators will let their decision to apologize be 
influenced by the likelihood of whether the victim is motivated to forgive or not, be 
depend on their level of dispositional trust. The extent to which people differ in 
dispositional trust is directly related to how people approach interpersonal behaviors in 
more versus less instrumental ways. We believe there is good reason to expect that 
particularly low trusters will adjust their apologetic behavior as a function of the perceived 
likelihood to be forgiven.  
One important reason for this hypothesis is that low trusters, in contrast to high 
trusters, tend to harbor less positive impressions of others, require more reassurance before 
cooperating, and are less inclined to believe that cooperation will be reciprocated 
(Tazelaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, 2004). High trusters are open towards others and 
more willing to take initial risks. High trusters tend to harbor benign impressions of others, 
tend to display more immediate cooperation, and are more likely to believe that 
cooperation will be reciprocated (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001 ; Tazelaar et al., 
2004). As such, high trusters’ will initially be more willing to give the benefit of the doubt 
towards their interaction partner and show more socially risky behavior (Stouten, De 
Cremer, & van Dijk, 2006). Therefore, high trusters will be more willing to take the risks 
associated with apologizing while low trusters are less inclined to do this. As such, low 
trusters can be considered as more strategic in assessing whether an apology will be 
responded to favorably and will thus apologize more easily if forgiveness is likely to be 
given (De Cremer et al., 2001; Tazelaar et al., 2004).  
To summarize, we predict that low trusters will be particularly influenced in their 
apologizing behavior by perceptions of the victims’ inclination to forgive, while high 
trusters will be less influenced by the perceived forgiving intentions of the victim 
(Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we predict that expectations that an apology will restore the 
relationship with the victim will mediate the interactive relationship between perceived 
forgiveness of the victim and perpetrators’ dispositional level of trust on apologizing 
behavior (Hypothesis 2). 
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2.1.3 The Present Research 
 
To test our hypotheses in a controlled manner, we conducted an experimental lab study to 
investigate actual apologetic behavior. To date, the small number of studies examining the 
delivery of apologies relied primarily on recall tasks or imagined scenario settings (Meijer, 
1998). At least to our knowledge, research has not tested actual apologetic behavior. The 
use of scenarios and free recall tasks is an important first step in understanding apologetic 
behavior of perpetrator. However, because behavioral intentions and actual behavior do 
not always correspond, it is necessary to test our predictions with respect to actual 
apologetic behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977).  
Therefore, in our study, we designed a novel paradigm in which participants were 
induced to commit a transgression against another participant, upon which they were given 
the opportunity to apologize to the victim. Specifically, to make participants commit a 
transgression, we modified a standard trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). The 
trust game is a coordination game in which players can increase their earnings by trusting 
each other, at the risk of being exploited. In this game, Player 1 starts with an initial 
endowment and can decide to transfer any part of his/her endowment to Player 2. 
Whatever Player 1 transfers to Player 2 is tripled. Subsequently, Player 2 has to decide 
how much of the tripled sum he/she wants to return to Player 1. Thus, the more Player 1 
trusts Player 2 to return a fair amount, the more likely Player 1 will be to transfer his/her 
endowments. We modified this game to induce unfair behavior by the participant, who was 
allocated to the Player 2 position. We did this by creating uncertainty about the original 
endowment of player 1; thereby licensing the participant to keep a larger share of the 
endowment that player 2 could divide (for the full experimental procedure, see the 
Procedure section).  
 
 
2.2 EXPERIMENT 2.1 
 
2.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and design. A total of 153 participants (55 women, 98 men; M(age) 
= 19.82, SD(age) = 1.59) were randomly assigned to either the forgiving or unforgiving 
condition.  
Procedure. Participants were placed in individual cubicles in front of a computer. 
Participants’ dispositional trust was measured beforehand, using the 8 item interpersonal 
trust scale by Yamagishi (1988; α = .78)1. Participants were then asked to engage in a 
series of tasks together with another person present in the lab. They would play the 
previously mentioned modified version of the trust game. The game was presented as a 
task on social decision-making, and all participants were told that they would be Player 2 
in the study. Participants were told that they would be playing an investment game with 
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another person who was in the lab: Player 1 (all the behavior by Player 1 was 
preprogrammed). It was explained that Player 1 had to decide how much of his/her 
endowment to transfer to the participant. Participants were clearly told that the amount that 
Player 1 would send would be tripled, and that they had to decide which amount to return 
to Player 1. Subsequently, the task started, and participants learned that Player 1 had 
transferred 10 chips of significant monetary value, which were tripled to 30 chips. They 
then had to decide how many of these 30 chips to return to Player 1. 
We modified the game in such a way that participants were likely to make an 
unfair decision towards Player 1 (i.e., more likely to keep more chips for themselves than 
to give back to Player 1). We did so by raising uncertainty over Player 1’s initial 
endowment. It was explained that the initial endowment of Player 1 could be anything 
from 10 to 30 chips; however, the exact endowment was unknown to the participant. 
Because 10 chips was the lowest endowment possible, we expected that most participants 
would infer that the original endowment of Player 1 would be larger than 10 chips. To 
check this assumption, we asked participants to estimate the initial endowment of Player 1 
at this point: overall, participants thought the original endowment of Player 1 was 20.41 
chips (SD = 5.57) large. Because participants estimated the original endowment of player 1 
to by larger than 10 chips it meant that Player 1 had chosen not to transfer all his/her chips. 
From this point of view, we expected that participants would feel justified to keep a larger 
share of the 30 chips. 
After participants had made their decision how to divide the 30 chips, we revealed 
that the initial endowment of Player 1 was in fact only 10 chips. Player 1 had thus 
transferred his/her entire endowment. Participants who had divided the 30 chips unequally 
(74%) had violated the equality rule and acted unfairly towards Player 1. Participants who 
had divided the chips equally or returned more than 15 chips (26%) had not committed a 
transgression. After this feedback concerning the final division of the chips, we asked 
participants two questions regarding their perceptions of the fairness of the final division 
and whether participants thought they violated Player 1’s trust. For the group who had not 
committed a transgression the experiment ended at this point. The majority of the 
participants, who did commit a transgression, proceeded to the forgiveness manipulation. 
Forgiveness manipulation. Participants who committed a transgression received 
a message from Player 1. In the not forgiving condition this message was: “I have fewer 
chips than you! I simply do not accept this! I know that I am not the kind of person who 
forgives this kind of behavior so I will not forgive you this time”. In the forgiving 
condition, this message was: “I have fewer chips than you! That is too bad. But I will give 
you the benefit of the doubt for now. I will forgive you for now but please be cooperative in 
the future”. 
Apology behavior was assessed after this message. Participants were given the choice 
between two messages to send back to Player 1:“I want to apologize” or “I do not want to 
apologize”.  
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Participants’ instrumentality perceptions were assessed using three questions (all 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much so): (1) To what extent do 
you think an apology is important for Player 1?, (2) How effective do you think an apology 
will be to restore your relationship with Player 1?, (3) To what extent do you think an 
apology will repair the damaged trust between you and Player 1? These items were 
combined into an average instrumentality perceptions score (α = .85). 
We used three items to check our forgiveness manipulation (7-point scale, ranging from 1 
= not at all, 7 = very much so): (1) Do you think that Player 1 is somebody who easily 
forgives?, (2). Do you think Player 1 is somebody who does not easily forgive? (Recoded), 
and (3). Do you think Player 1 is forgiving? These items were combined into an average 
forgiveness score (α = .95). 
 
 
2.2.2 RESULTS 
 
Perceptions of initial endowment size and endowments returned. To check 
whether participants indeed overestimated Player 1’s initial endowment, we asked 
participants how many chips they thought Player 1 had originally been endowed with. 
Overall, participants thought the original endowment of player 1 was 20.41 chips large (SD 
= 5.57). Participants who committed the transgression thought the original endowment was 
significantly larger (M = 21.63, SD = 5.00) than participants who did not committed the 
transgression (M = 16.95, SD = 5.73; t(151) = 4.89, p < .001). In line with these 
perceptions, participants who transgressed returned less chips (M = 7.88, SD = 3.62) than 
participants who did not transgress (M = 16.55, SD = 3.31; t(151) = 13.31, p < .001). 
Perceptions of fairness and violated trust. We modified our trust game in such 
a way that our participants would commit a transgression. To check whether participants 
indeed perceived the final division as unfair and as violating trust they were required to 
respond to three questions. First we asked them “To what extent do you think the final 
division is fair?” (1 = not at all, 7 = completely). A t-test showed that participants who 
committed the transgression considered the final division to be less fair (M = 2.73, SD = 
1.40) than participants who did not committed a transgression (M = 6.00, SD = 1.80, t(151) 
= 11.749, p < .001). Moreover, a 95% confidence interval of the mean fairness perceptions 
of the participants who committed a transgression showed the mean was significantly 
lower than the scale mean (95% C.I.: 2.47 – 2.99), providing further support that 
participants who committed the transgression considered the final division to be unfair. 
In order to check whether participants regarded the unfair offer as a trust violation 
we asked them: “To what extent do you think you violated Player 1’s trust?” (1 = not at 
all, 7 = completely). Again, participants who committed the transgression thought they 
violated Player 1’s trust significantly more (M = 5.41, SD = 1.22) than participants who did 
not committed a transgression (M = 2.10, SD = 1.69, t(151) = 13.27, p < .001). A 95% C.I. 
showed that the mean perception of the trust violation was significantly higher than the 
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scale mean (95% C.I. 5.18 – 5.64), providing evidence that the participants who committed 
the transgression indeed perceived the unfair division to be a trust violation. 
Finally, we checked the extent to which participants thought that player 1 still trusted them 
“To what extent do you think Player 1 still trusts you?” (1 = not at all, 7 = completely). 
Again, participants who committed the transgression thought Player 1 trusted them less (M 
= 3.08, SD = 1.50) than participants who did not commit the transgression (M = 6.15, SD = 
1.17, t(151) = 11.77, p < .001). A 95% Confidence Interval of the mean trust perception of 
the participants who committed the transgression again showed that these participants 
thought that Player 1 was distrustful towards them (95% C.I.: 2.80 – 3.36).  
Forgiveness manipulation check. A linear regression analysis on our 
manipulation check scale with the forgiveness manipulation and trust as independent 
variables revealed a main effect of forgiveness (β = .85, t = 16.72, p < .001). No other 
effects reached significance. Participants indeed perceived Player 1 to be more forgiving in 
the forgiving condition (M = 5.57, SD = .79) than in the unforgiving condition (M = 2.40, 
SD = 1.20). 
Apology behavior. Because our main dependent variable was categorical in 
nature (either apologize or not apologize) we used logistic regression to test our 
hypotheses. Logistic regression uses odds to test whether a specific response is 
significantly more likely than chance to be picked by participants. If an odd is significantly 
higher than 1, this means (within the context of this experiment) that it is significantly 
more likely that an apology is given instead of no apology. If an odd is significantly 
smaller than 1, it means that no apology is significantly more likely to be given than an 
apology. When an odd does not differ significantly from 1, it means that it is equally likely 
that either an apology or no apology is given (i.e. there is no pattern). Because proportions 
have more intuitive appeal than odds, we present, together with the odds, the proportions 
of apologies given in each condition. Although these proportions give the same 
information as the odds, we believe it helps in interpreting the results.  
For our simple effects tests, we followed procedures as outlined by Jaccard 
(2001). Simple effects are tested by means of odds ratios. An odds ratio is the ratio 
between two odds from two different cells (i.e. conditions). If the odds ratio is significantly 
larger or smaller than 1, this means that the odds from those two cells differ significantly 
from each other. We conducted a stepwise logistical regression with the forgiveness 
manipulation as a categorical independent variable and trust as a continuous independent 
variable. The analysis with the main effects of the forgiveness manipulation and trust in 
step 1 revealed, first of all, a significant main effect of the forgiveness manipulation (B = -
1.74, Wald = 12.79, p < .001) but no main effect of trust (B = .17, Wald = .53, p = .23). In 
step 2 the main effect of forgiveness remained significant (B = -2.08, Wald = 12.34, p < 
.001), as was the main effect of trust (B = -1.43, Wald = 3.43, p = .03), but more 
importantly and in line with Hypothesis 1, the interaction between forgiveness and trust 
was significant (B = 1.19, Wald = 4.46, p = .04; see Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1 
Odds and odds ratios of an apology per condition in Study 2.1 
 Trust Odds ratio for 
trust within each 
forgiveness 
condition 
Forgiveness manipulation Low trust (-1 SD High trust (+1 SD)  
Forgiving Odds: 25.918** 
(Prob: 96%) 
Odds: 3.797** 
(Prob: 79%) 
6.826* 
 
Not Forgiving 
 
Odds: .982 
(Prob: 50%) 
 
Odds: 1.566 
(Prob: 61%) 
 
0.627 
 
Odds ratios for 
forgiveness within low 
and high trust 
 
26.393** 
 
2.425 
 
Note. Proportions that an apology will be given. * = p < .05, ** = p <.01. 
  
We compared the forgiveness conditions between high trusters (+1 SD) and low trusters (-
1 SD). Low trusters were more sensitive to the forgiving communication as they were 
significantly more likely to apologize when the victim seemed forgiving (proportion of 
.96) rather than unforgiving (proportion of .5; B = 3.27, Wald = 11.16, p = .001; odds ratio 
= 26.393). High trusters did not differ in their apologetic behavior when the victim seemed 
forgiving (proportion of .79) or unforgiving (proportion of .61; B = .87, Wald = 2.06, p = 
.15; odds ratio = 2.425). The results further showed that when the victim did not seem 
forgiving, trust had no significant impact on apologetic behavior (B = .23, Wald = .59, p = 
.44; odds ratio = 0.627). When the victim seemed forgiving, low trusters were significantly 
more likely than high trusters to apologize (B = -.96, Wald = 4.04, p = .04; odds ratio = 
6.826).  
Instrumentality of an apology. A regression analysis revealed significant main 
effects of the forgiveness manipulation (β = .40, t = 4.72 p < .001) and of trust (β = -.17, t 
= -1.96 p = .03 (one-sided)) on the perceived instrumentality of an apology. Importantly, 
we also found the predicted interaction between perceived forgiveness and trust on 
perceived instrumentality of the apology (β = .15, t = -1.77, p = .03 (one-sided)). A simple 
slopes analysis showed that trust was a significant predictor when the victim seemed 
forgiving (β = -.32, t = -2.88, p = .005) but not significant when the victim did not seem 
forgiving (β = -.02, t = -.12, p = .90). 
Mediation analysis. To test our second hypothesis, we examined whether 
perceived instrumentality of an apology mediated the interactive relationship between trust 
and perceived forgiveness on apologies. Specifically, we expected that perceived 
instrumentality would mediate the effect of forgiveness information on apologies, but only 
18 
 
for those low in trust and not for those high in trust. A bootstrap procedure (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008) which tested the simple indirect effect of perceived forgiveness on apologies 
through perceived instrumentality showed a significant indirect effect for low (-1 SD) 
trusters (b = .93, S.E. = .30, 95% C.I. -1.44  –  -.50) while no significant indirect effect was 
present for high (+1 SD) trusters (b = -.41, S.E. = .27, 95% C.I. -.87 – .02). This result 
shows that instrumentality perceptions explained the decision of low trusters to apologize 
as a function of the likelihood that the victim will forgive, whereas this was not the case 
for high trusters. 
 
 
2.3 DISCUSSION 
 
Dividing valuable resources in an unfair manner can lead to violated trust between the 
parties involved, which makes future interactions less productive and pleasant. Because 
unfair allocations easily arise, it is important to understand the mechanisms by which we 
can repair violated trust in such interdependent settings. Prior research has identified an 
apology as an effective trust repair strategy (e.g. Bottom et al. 2002; Ohbuchi et al., 1989). 
However, research to date has neglected to study whether perpetrators are also willing to 
actually apologize and if so, when they are most likely to do this. Our present findings 
show that perpetrators use apologies in a strategic way. That is, they apologize 
significantly more when the likelihood that the victim will forgive is high. If the likelihood 
is low, perpetrators are less willing to apologize. How can these findings be 
understood? One important reason may be that apologizing entails a considerable social 
risk. Apologies are often regarded as an acceptance of blame for the transgression, which 
can give rise to a host of aversive social consequences - like rejection, humiliation and 
punishment (Kim et al., 2009). This would suggest that it is important for perpetrators to 
deliver apologies only when they are likely to be met with favorable consequences. One 
important and favorable consequence in interdependent settings is whether the other party 
(the victim) will forgive. Forgiveness holds the idea that subsequent interactions will be 
cooperative and will not include blame of one’s prior unfair behavior (McCullough, 
Fincham, & Tsang, 2003). Thus, apologizing behavior is much more likely to occur if it 
pays off in terms of being forgiven. 
This relationship between anticipated forgiveness and apologetic behavior is 
further substantiated by the finding that dispositional trust influenced perpetrators’ 
sensitivity to the victim's forgivingness. Trust entails a willingness to be vulnerable to 
others, and therefore is strongly related to the extent to which people are willing to take 
social risks (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Indeed, we find that low trusters (who do not 
generally tend to believe people will reciprocate cooperative behavior) are especially 
sensitive to the perceived forgiveness of the victim, while perceived forgiveness has less 
impact on decisions to apologize among high trusters, who generally already harbor 
impressions of benign intent of others. These findings therefore further suggest that 
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perpetrators' tendency to base decisions to apologize or not on instrumental motives may 
be rooted in the desire to prevent the social risks associated with apologizing.  
It is important to stress that the present findings were obtained by inducing actual 
transgressions and examining actual apology behavior. This approach – to our knowledge 
– is the first effort to examine actual apology behavior and transgressions in a controlled 
bargaining setting. Looking at the actual deliverance of apologies by a perpetrator is 
important because intentions to apologize may not necessarily correspond with actual 
apologetic behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). We thus urge future research on apologies 
to examine actual deliveries of apologies as a response to actual transgressions. Our study 
provides a useful tool to achieve this aim. 
Our paradigm succeeded in inducing transgressions with the majority of the 
participants. By inducing transgressions we needed to rely on deception. Although we are 
sensitive to the controversies regarding deception in experimental research (for a 
discussion on the topic, consult Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001), we believe with this type of 
research it is inevitable to use deception. As participants are motivated to behave in 
socially appropriate ways, especially when they believe they are being watched, 
transgressing against another participant in a lab is something that rarely occurs naturally. 
To create a situation, equal to all participants, under which participants were most likely to 
transgress, we relied on deception. Because none of the participants expressed any 
objection to our experimental procedure during the debriefing, we believe our paradigm 
enables researchers to create real transgressions without being too psychological 
distressing. 
It is important to note that our instrumental hypothesis regarding apologizing 
includes the notion of reciprocity. As we have mentioned earlier and as our results show, a 
perpetrator is more willing to apologize when it is likely that this gesture will be 
reciprocated with forgiveness. A stronger form of this instrumental hypothesis could, 
however, also be formulated. That is, if it is likely that you are going to be forgiven 
anyway, perpetrators could also think that there is no reason to apologize anymore. From 
an economic point of view (i.e. maximizing one’s own pay-off) it would indeed make little 
sense to admit culpability by apologizing if you have already acquired the insurance of 
your valued good, that is, forgiveness. This ‘strong’ instrumentality hypothesis can also be 
considered to be in line with research on moral credentials (Monin & Miller, 2001). 
Research on moral credentials has shown that once people establish themselves as a moral 
person, they are more likely to behave in ways that could be interpreted as immoral. If the 
victim is likely to forgive the perpetrator, the perpetrator can interpret this as an 
affirmation of his/her morality (Schnabel & Nadler, 2008). Our results contradict this 
framework, as perpetrators decided to increase their display of moral behavior by 
apologizing, rather than feeling freed not to apologize (a prediction that would be in line 
with the moral credentials framework). In line with our findings, research by Wallace and 
colleagues (Wallace, Exline & Baumeister, 2008) also shows that expressions of 
forgiveness deter future offences against the victim. Future research should investigate the 
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relationship between moral credentials and expressions of forgiveness in order to further 
our understanding of both the consequences of showing forgiveness and the regulation of 
moral behavior. 
Future research might zoom in on this interesting question on when our 
instrumentality hypothesis would be valid and when the strong version of the 
instrumentality hypothesis would apply more. One possible way of testing this may be to 
include personality variables that could help us tease apart in what way these 
instrumentality perspectives influence people’s apologetic behavior. Social value 
orientation predicts whether people approach interpersonal situations as more instrumental 
versus more social. It could very well be that proselfs deem an apology unnecessary when 
they interact with a forgiving victim (i.e. they behave accordingly the strong instrumental 
perspective), while prosocials are more inclined to reciprocate.  
 Importantly, by focusing on the perspective of perpetrators, our findings also 
provide a much needed extension to the apology literature, calling previous findings into 
question. As noted, previous research on apologies has mainly focused on how victims 
respond to apologies and thus has largely overlooked the perspective of perpetrators. As a 
result, hardly any research exists examining whether perpetrators actually are willing to 
deliver apologies, and when they may be likely to do so. Our findings are among the first – 
at least to our knowledge – to reveal some insights into this question and thus demonstrate 
the need to also consider the perspective of the perpetrator to arrive at a better 
understanding of the reconciliation process through the use of apologies. 
The present findings contain a hopeful message. Our findings suggest that 
expressions of forgiveness have the potential to limit a possible downward spiral of 
unconstructive behaviors that can take place after a transgression. That is, when victims 
take the initiative to communicate forgiveness, perpetrators are likely to reciprocate by 
actually apologizing and taking responsibility for their misdeeds. Thus, an initial positive 
signal by the victim may elicit the kind of behavior by the perpetrator that is needed to 
start the reconciliation process. However, there is also a downside to this effect: 
perpetrators may actually be less willing to apologize when it seems unlikely that 
apologies will be reciprocated with forgiveness. In other words, if no positive feedback 
with respect to forgiveness is communicated by the victim, apologies will most likely not 
be given. This finding challenges the true value of apologies as a trust repair tool. Take, for 
example, the situation of serious transgressions where victims are likely to be angry, and 
not very motivated to forgive. Under such circumstances, victims have the strongest need 
and request for apologies (Exline et al., 2007). However, given the negative reactions on 
behalf of the victim, our results suggest that perpetrators will be unwilling to apologize. 
 In conclusion, our findings show that apology behavior by perpetrators is driven 
by the forgiveness tendencies of victims, thus pointing out the somewhat paradoxical 
message that the desired response of an apology by the victim actually depends on the 
positive reaction (i.e. showing forgiveness) of that same victim towards the perpetrator. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. THE APOLOGY MISMATCH: ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN VICTIM’S NEED 
FOR APOLOGIES AND PERPETRATOR’S WILLINGNESS TO APOLOGIZE2 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Apologizing is an effective and widely supported response to transgressions 
(Cohen, 1999; Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Kellerman, 2006; Meijer, 1998; Tavuchis, 1991; 
Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011). From an early age, people learn to apologize when they 
are responsible for a transgression (Schlenker & Darby, 1981). Victims of transgressions 
are, in turn, socialized into graciously accepting such apologies (Bennet & Dewberry, 
1994; Risen & Gilovich, 2007). The process where apologies lead to reconciliation is 
known as the “apology-forgiveness cycle” (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). 
The apology-forgiveness cycle is collectively rational because normative 
prescriptions for perpetrators to apologize and for victims to respond with forgiveness help 
to preserve social relationships after conflict. Whether these normative prescriptions 
actually describe an empirical reality is a question that prior research has largely failed to 
address. The apology-forgiveness cycle seems to assume (at least implicitly) that victim 
and perpetrator are both motivated to reconcile. However, empirical studies show that 
victims and perpetrators  often differ in their interpretations of critical aspects of 
transgressions, such as who is responsible for the transgression, its significance and its 
long-term effects (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Feeny & Hill, 2006; 
Mikula, Athenstaedt, Heschgl, & Heimgartner, 1998). If interpretations of conflict differ so 
much between victim and perpetrator, then are their views on the need for apologies 
congruent? 
In this paper, we suggest that different emotions underlie the victims’ and 
perpetrators’ need for apologies: anger for the victims and guilt for the perpetrators. Since 
these emotions serve different functions and are activated by different types of situations, 
victims’ and perpetrators’ need for apologies may often be mismatched. This mismatch, 
we argue, can have important consequences for subsequent forgiveness and reconciliation 
between victim and perpetrator.  
 
 
3.1.1 Need for apologies among victims and perpetrators 
 
An apology is generally defined as a combined statement of an acknowledgement 
of wrongdoing and an expression of guilt (Lazare, 2004; Smith, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). 
                                                          
2 This Chapter is based on Leunissen, De Cremer, Reinders Folmer, & Van Dijke (2013) 
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Since communicating such sentiments implies that the perpetrator believes that the 
transgression should not have happened and should not happen again, apologies also 
represent an implicit promise that the transgression will not be repeated (Kim, Dirks, & 
Cooper, 2009; Smith, 2008). Apologies, therefore, imply that perpetrators distance 
themselves from their prior actions and admit being wrong. The effectiveness of apologies 
in promoting trust and forgiveness among victims has been supported by a wealth of 
research (see e.g., Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; De Cremer & Schouten, 
2008; Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; van Dijke & 
De Cremer, 2011). 
It is important to note that apologies have rather different meanings for victims 
and perpetrators, and they fulfill different psychological needs. According to the needs-
based model of reconciliation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), transgressions deprive victims 
and perpetrators of different psychological needs. Victims may experience feelings of 
inferiority and anger in response to transgressions (Miller, 2001; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). 
Perpetrators may suffer from fear of exclusion (Exline & Baumeister, 2000), and may 
therefore experience guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Apologies provide 
a means for addressing these impaired needs (De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer, 
2010; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). However, as victims and perpetrators require different 
needs to be restored, apologies serve a different function for either party.  
For victims, apologies represent a compensation for having been victimized; a 
symbolic compensation for the injury suffered due to the offense (Tachuvis, 1991), and 
thus apologies address the state of inequity that arises when people are transgressed against 
(Exline et al., 2007). Anger is an emotion that is closely linked to a need for compensation 
and retribution (Darley and Pittman, 2003). We therefore expect that anger, which is 
central to the experience of injustice and victimization (Miller, 2001), drives victims’ need 
for apologies. To our knowledge, no research has directly tested whether anger predicts a 
victim’s need for apologies. However, there is some indirect evidence that supports this 
link. Anger has been linked to reconciliation attempts (Fischer & Roseman, 2007): a 
negative emotional reaction towards the perpetrator still leaves the possibility for 
reconciliation open. Since an apology is a reconciliation tool, one would expect that 
victims’ need for apologies is positively related to anger. 
For perpetrators, apologies are means for distancing themselves from their 
misdeeds (Goffman, 1971), and for restoring the relationship with the victim (e.g., Bottom, 
et al., 2002; Leunissen, De Cremer, & Reinders Folmer, 2012). We believe that guilt may 
play a central role in the process that makes perpetrators apologize. Perpetrators may 
experience guilt in response to having committed an interpersonal transgression because 
such a transgression poses a threat to the relationship between the victim and perpetrator 
(Cryder, Springer, & Morewedge, 2012). The emotion of guilt, which is strongly related to 
the motivation to reconcile and improve the relationship with the victim (Baumeister, et 
al., 1994), is likely to be central to the perpetrators’ perception of the need for apologies. 
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One would therefore expect that the guiltier the perpetrators feel, the more likely they will 
apologize. 
In sum, apologies provide a means to fulfill the different needs of victims and 
perpetrators in the aftermath of transgressions. However, are the victim’s and perpetrator’s 
respective needs for apologies necessarily aligned with each other, as suggested by the 
apology-forgiveness cycle? Or in other words, are apologies provided by perpetrators 
when they are required by victims? We suggest that this may not be the case. Since the 
necessity of apologies for victims and perpetrators are linked to different emotions, we 
suggest that the need for apologies may often be mismatched: apologies are given when 
victims require them least, and not when they require them most. This notion is best 
exemplified by considering the role of the intentionality of transgressions.  
 
 
3.1.2 Intentionality 
 
Intentionality refers to an individual’s desires, beliefs, awareness, and abilities to 
perform a particular action (Malle & Knobe, 1997; Malle & Nelson, 2003). An act is 
regarded as intentional if the actor sets out to perform the action and succeeds. In the case 
of transgressions, this means that the actor has willfully harmed the victim. 
Intentionality is of particular interest for the present research because it is a central element 
in the experience of transgressions and injustice. Perceptions of intentionality influence 
attributions of culpability and blameworthiness for transgressions, and people’s tendency 
to respond to them with forgiveness or retribution (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Fincham, 
2000; Struthers et al., 2008). Importantly, intentionality has also been shown to influence 
the emotions that underlie victims’ and perpetrators’ apology needs, namely anger and 
guilt (McGraw, 1987). Therefore, intentionality may reveal when victims’ and 
perpetrators’ need for apology do or do not align. 
How may intentionality affect the emotions that underlie the victims’ and 
perpetrators’ need for apology, and, consequently, their perceptions of that need? 
Intentional transgressions indicate that the harm suffered by the victim was due to the 
perpetrator (rather than to external circumstances). Hence they evoke more feelings of 
injustice (Darley & Pitman, 2003; Miller, 2001) and anger than unintentional 
transgressions do (Berkowitz & Heimer, 1989; Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Leary, Springer, 
Negel, Ansell, & Evans, 1998; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). Indeed, the relationship 
between the intentionality of the transgression and anger is one of the best-established 
findings in the justice literature (Miller, 2001). Intentional transgressions consequently 
lead to a victim having a stronger desire for compensation and retribution (Darley & 
Pittman, 2003). As such, it is likely that victims desire an apology particularly after 
intentional transgressions. 
For perpetrators, the intentionality of a transgression is closely linked to guilt, 
being particularly experienced by perpetrators after unintentional transgressions (McGraw, 
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1987). According to Baumeister and colleagues (1994), there are two important sources of 
guilt. First, guilt is experienced as a result of anxiety for social exclusion. After an 
unintentional transgression, a valuable relationship is distorted beyond the perpetrators’ 
will, as such, the perpetrator experiences anxiety over social exclusion as the victim might 
decide to end the relationship with the perpetrator. This anxiety results in feelings of guilt 
(Baumeister et al., 1994). When a perpetrator transgresses intentionally, the relationship 
with the victim is less likely to be important to him/her and relational deterioration is more 
likely to have been anticipated and considered acceptable. Thus, the perpetrator 
experiences less anxiety for social exclusion. 
Intentionality also has important consequences for feelings of guilt because the 
former influences the empathy that perpetrators feel towards the victim. In the case of an 
intentional transgression, perpetrators are aware beforehand that they will commit the 
transgression (i.e., it is expected; McGraw, 1987). The perpetrator thus has had time to 
rationalize the transgression beforehand, thereby guarding him/herself against feelings of 
guilt (Baumeister, 1999; Tsang, 2002). In contrast, unintentional transgressions come 
unexpected to the perpetrator. Therefore, he/she does not have any rationalizations ready to 
guard him/herself against feelings of guilt. In short, these processes, anxiety for social 
exclusion and rationalizations, suggest that perpetrators will experience guilt particularly 
after unintentional transgressions and as a consequence, will want to apologize particularly 
after unintentional, rather than intentional transgressions. 
In sum, these arguments lead us to predict a mismatch between the victims’ and 
the perpetrators’ need for apology. Because victims and perpetrators may desire apologies 
after different types of transgressions, this apology mismatch could have important 
consequences for reconciliation after different types of transgressions. Because 
perpetrators ultimately decide whether to apologize or not, it seems likely that apologies 
will be issued mainly after unintentional transgressions as perpetrators have the highest 
need to apologize after unintentional transgressions. In contrast, this mismatch would also 
suggest that victims are unlikely to receive apologies for transgressions for which they 
particularly desire apologies, namely intentional transgressions. Because apologizing has 
been shown to have positive effects on forgiveness (e.g., McCullough, Worthington, & 
Rachal, 1997; Ohbuchi, et al., 1989), it stands to reason that unintentional transgressions 
are forgiven more often than intentional transgressions. 
 
 
3.1.3 The present research 
 
The aim of the present paper is to study the incongruence between perpetrators’ 
willingness to apologize and victims’ desire to receive an apology and the subsequent 
effects of this incongruence on reconciliation. We argue that the emotional processes that 
underlie the victims’ and perpetrators’ respective needs for apologies – that is guilt on the 
part of perpetrators and anger on the part of victims – may not be complementary, and as a 
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consequence victims and perpetrators desire an apology at very different instances. We 
suggest that intentionality, which is uniquely associated with each of the above-mentioned 
emotional process, may reveal this mismatch. This incongruence in turn may have 
important consequences for forgiveness after the transgression. We tested these predictions 
in three studies. Study 1 was an initial test of our ideas using an autobiographical narrative 
task, similar to the task designed by Baumeister and colleagues (1990). In study 2, we 
introduced another manipulation of perspective and intentionality relying on a vignette 
methodology. In study 3, we again relied on an autobiographical narrative tasks but this 
time we also included measures of actual apology behavior and forgiveness after the 
transgression in order to explicitly show the effects of the mismatch both on needs for 
apologies and behavior and subsequent forgiveness. 
 
 
3.2 EXPERIMENT 3.1 
 
3.2.1 Method 
 
Participants and design. In total, 202 undergraduates (97 women, M(age) = 20.00, 
SD(age) = 1.72) participated in return for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned 
to a 2 (perspective: victim vs. perpetrator) × 2 (intentionality: intentional vs. unintentional 
transgression) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to recall an intentional or unintentional 
transgression of which they were either a victim or a perpetrator. 
Victims were asked: Please recall a situation in which somebody else did 
something (unintentionally / intentionally) to you that you experienced as unpleasant or 
unjust. Perpetrators were asked:  Please recall a situation in which you did something 
(unintentionally / intentionally) that this other person experienced as unpleasant or unjust. 
Next, participants were asked to write a small paragraph describing the transgression. 
Afterwards, we assessed our manipulation check, mediating variables, and dependent 
variable. 
Measures. All questions were answered on a 1 (= not at all), to 7 (= very much) 
scale. 
Manipulation check. We checked our intentionality manipulation in the 
autobiographical narratives by asking “To what extent was it the other’s / your intention to 
do something unpleasant or unjust?” 
Mediating variables. We asked participants in the victim conditions: “How 
angry were you after this other person did something unpleasant or unjust?” and 
participants in the perpetrator conditions: “How guilty did you feel after you did something 
unpleasant or unjust?” 
26 
 
Dependent variable. We assessed the need for an apology with (victim): “To 
what extent did you want to receive an apology from this other person?” and 
(perpetrators). “To what extent did you want to offer an apology to this other person?” 
 
 
3.2.1 Results 
 
In all the analyses of Studies 1, 2, and 3, categorical predictors were effect-coded 
(unintentional = -1, intentional = 1; victim = -1, perpetrator = 1). 
Manipulation check. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of perspective (b = -.51, t(198) = -4.54, p < 
.001) and a main effect of intentionality (b = .92, t(198) = 8.15, p < .001). The interaction 
effect was not significant (b = -.16, t(198) = -1.38, p = .17). Participants in the 
unintentional conditions perceived transgressions as less intentional (M = 2.22, SD = 1.46) 
than participants in the intentional conditions (M = 4.05, SD = 1.88). Moreover, victims (M 
= 3.65, SD = 1.93) perceived the transgression as more intentional than the perpetrators did 
(M = 2.65, SD = 1.77). 
Need for apologies. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = -.26, t(198) = -2.09, p = 
.04), but not of perspective (p = .62). The main effect of intentionality showed that the 
need for apologies was generally higher after unintentional (M = 5.32, SD = 1.66) than 
after intentional (M = 4.81, SD = 1.99) transgressions.  
More importantly, this effect of intentionality was qualified by the predicted 
interaction between perspective and intentionality (b = -.41, t(198) = -3.25, p = .001; for 
cell means, see Table 3.1).  
 
 
Table 3.1 
Means (SD’s) for need for apologies, anger, and guilt in Study 3.1 
 Need for apologies Anger Guilt 
 Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator 
Unintentional 4.86 (1.77) 5.81 (1.39) 5.00 (1.46) 5.81 (1.14) 
Intentional 5.16 (1.85) 4.46 (2.08) 5.67 (1.53) 5.04 (1.79) 
Note: anger was only measured among victims; guilt was only measured among 
perpetrators 
 
 
Planned comparisons revealed that after an unintentional transgression, 
perpetrators were more willing to apologize than victims desired an apology (b = .47, 
t(198) = 2.63, p = .009). Conversely, when the transgression was intentional, victims 
desired an apology significantly more than perpetrators were willing to apologize (b = -.35, 
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t(198) = -1.96, p = .05). Perpetrators wanted to give an apology more after an unintentional 
transgression than after an intentional transgression (b = -.68, t(198) = -3.76, p < .001). For 
victims, we did not find a significant difference in the need for apologies after intentional 
and unintentional transgressions (b = .15, t(198) = .83, p = .41).  
Mediation analyses. We hypothesized that specific emotions (i.e., anger on the 
part of the victim and guilt on the part of the perpetrator) would mediate the relationship 
between intentionality and willingness to give / receive an apology. We only measured 
anger among victims and guilt among perpetrators. We thus split our sample into victims 
and perpetrators and analyzed separately whether these specific emotions mediate the 
effect of intentionality on willingness to give/receive an apology. Mediation was tested 
using the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes (2012), using 5000 bootstrap resamples. 
The reported confidence intervals are bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals of the 
probability distribution of the indirect effect. 
Victims. A regression analysis revealed a significant (total) effect of intentionality 
on anger (b = .33, t(100) = 2.25, p = .03): victims were angrier after intentionally 
transgressions than after unintentional transgressions. We also obtained a significant 
positive effect of anger on the willingness to receive an apology (b = .52, t(100) = 4.87, p 
< .001). Finally, the indirect effect of intentionality on the willingness to receive an 
apology, via anger, was significant (b = .17, S.E. = .10, 95% CI (two-sided): [.03; .42]), 
while the direct effect was not significant (b = -.03, S.E. = .17, t(99) = -.16, p = .87). This 
analysis shows that there is an indirect effect of intentionality through anger on the 
willingness to receive an apology. 
Perpetrators. Our analysis obtained a significant (total) effect of intentionality on 
guilt (b = -.39, t(98) = -2.55, p = .01), meaning that perpetrators felt less guilty after 
intentional than after  unintentional transgressions. Guilt also significantly influenced the 
willingness to offer an apology (b = .88, t(98) = 10.31, p < .001). Moreover, the total 
indirect effect of intentionality on apologies through guilt was significant (b = -.32, S.E. = 
.13, 95% CI (two-sided): [-1.19; -.1]). The direct effect of intentionality on need for 
apologies was also significant (b = -.36, S.E. = .13, t(97) = -2.69, p = .008). This analysis 
thus supports our prediction that perpetrators are more willing to offer an apology after an 
unintentional transgression than after an intentional one because they feel guiltier in the 
former instance than in the latter one. 
 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 
Study 1 was largely in line with our predictions. Perpetrators wanted to apologize 
after unintentional transgressions more than after intentional ones. This effect was 
mediated by guilt. Moreover, we found evidence for our proposed mismatch in the sense 
that perpetrators wanted to apologize significantly more than victims wanted to receive an 
apology after unintentional transgressions, while perpetrators wanted to apologize 
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significantly less than victims wanted to receive an apology after intentional 
transgressions. We did not find a significant difference between the intentional and 
unintentional conditions for victims (although the mean difference was in the right 
direction). However, the indirect effect of intentionality on victims’ need for apologies, 
mediated by anger, was significant, showing that for victims, the need for apologies is 
predicted by anger. 
 
 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 3.2 
 
Study 2 was designed to extend the findings of Study 1. To experimentally 
control the type of transgression, we employed a scenario study in which participants were 
either the victim or the perpetrator of the same transgression. Moreover, we wanted to 
provide a more stringent test of the emotional processes that underlie this mismatch. While 
Study 1 revealed that the relationship between intentionality and need for apologies is 
mediated by anger (victims) and guilt (perpetrators), we were unable to rule out that anger 
could also play a role in the perpetrators’ willingness to apologize, and that guilt could 
influence a victims’ desire for apologies. To show conclusively that anger mediates only 
the victims’ need for apology, and that guilt mediates only for perpetrators, we measured 
both emotions in both the victim and perpetrator conditions in Study 2. 
 
 
3.3.1 Method 
 
Participants and design. A total of 248 undergraduate students (126 women, 
M(age) = 19.68, SD(age) = 1.94) participated in exchange for course credit. They were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (perspective: victim vs. perpetrator) × 2 (intentionality: 
intentional vs. unintentional transgression) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with a short scenario. The scenario for 
the victims was (manipulation between brackets): Imagine the following situation. Your 
colleague (accidentally/intentionally) breaks your coffee mug by pushing it off your desk. 
You were very fond of this coffee mug.For the perpetrator, the scenario was (manipulation 
between brackets):  
You (accidentally/intentionally) break your colleague’s coffee mug by pushing it off your 
colleague’s desk, causing it to break. Your colleague was very fond of this coffee mug. 
After the participants read the scenario, we assessed the manipulation checks, mediators, 
and the dependent measure3. 
                                                          
3 A potential methodological problem of the current scenario is that participant find it hard to 
imagine the scenario happening. We included a measure for how well the participant could imagine 
the scenario from happening: “How hard was it for you to imagine the described situation?” (1 = not 
at all, 7 = very much). We included this item as a control variable in our moderated multiple 
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Measures. All questions were answered on a 1 = not at all to 7 = very much scale. 
Manipulation check. We checked our manipulation of intentionality with the 
following item: “To what extent was it (your intention / the intention of your colleague) to 
break the coffee mug?” 
Anger and guilt. We measured anger in both perspectives by asking: “How angry 
would you feel about your mug being broken?” Guilt was measured in both perspectives 
by asking: “How guilty would you feel about your mug being broken?” 
Need for apology. The need for apology was measured by asking perpetrators: 
“To what extent would you want to offer an apology to your colleague?”, and victims: “To 
what extent would you want to receive an apology from your colleague?” 
 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 
Manipulation check. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = 1.57, t(244) = 14.01, p < 
.001) and a main effect of perspective (b = -.37, t(244) = -3.26, p = .001). The interaction 
effect was not significant. Participants in the unintentional conditions perceived 
transgressions as less intentional (M = 1.46, SD = .87) than participants in the intentional 
conditions (M = 4.69, SD = 2.25). Moreover, victims (M = 3.25, SD = 2.31) perceived the 
transgression as more intentional than perpetrators did (M = 2.57, SD = 2.34). 
Need for apologies. A regression analysis with intentionality and perspective as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = -.24, t(244) = -2.64, p = 
.009), but not of perspective (p = .42). The main effect of intentionality showed that the 
need for apology was generally higher after unintentional (M = 5.96, SD = 1.31) than after 
intentional (M = 5.79, SD = 1.55) transgressions. 
More importantly, the effect of intentionality was qualified by the predicted cross-
over interaction between perspective and intentionality (b = -.46, t(244) = -5.00, p < .001; 
see Table 3.2 for cell means).  
 
Table 3.2 
Means (SD’s) for need for apologies, anger, and guilt in Study 3.2 
 Need for apologies Anger Guilt 
 Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator 
Unintentional 5.71 (1.46) 
6.49 
(.64) 
3.38 
(1.75) 
3.34 
(1.70) 
3.17 
(1.94) 
5.39 
(1.66) 
Intentional 6.15 (1.24) 
5.08 
(1.85) 
4.91 
(1.80) 
3.25 
(1.97) 
3.20 
(1.98) 
4.55 
(2.10) 
                                                                                                                                                  
mediation model. Including this control variable did not significantly change the results of our 
analysis, the indirect effects through anger for victims and guilt for perpetrators were still significant. 
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Planned comparisons revealed that after an unintentional transgression, 
perpetrators were more willing to apologize than victims desired an apology (b = .39, 
t(244) = 3.00, p = .003). Conversely, when the transgression was intentional, victims 
desired an apology more than perpetrators were willing to apologize (b = -.53, t(244) = -
4.07, p < .001). Perpetrators wanted to give an apology more after an unintentional 
transgression than after an intentional transgression (b = -.71, t(244) = -4.66, p < .001). 
Victims wanted to have an apology more after an intentional than after an unintentional 
transgression (b = .22, t(244) = 2.07, p = .04)4, 5. 
Anger. Regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as independent 
variables and anger as dependent variable revealed main effects on anger of perspective (b 
= -.22, t(244) = -3.50, p < .001) and intentionality (b = .19, t(244)  = 2.97, p = .003). After 
a transgression, victims were angrier (M = 4.11, SD = 1.93) than perpetrators (M = 3.30, 
SD = 1.83), and both were angrier after intentional transgressions (M = 4.36, SD = 2.01) 
than after unintentional ones (M = 3.37, SD = 1.72).  These effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction effect (b = -.21, t(244) = -3.34, p = .001). Simple effects analyses 
                                                          
4 In this study, we included a measure of harm severity: (perpetrators) “To what extent would you 
feel that you harmed your colleague?”; (victims) “To what extent would you feel that you are harmed 
by your colleague?” (both on a 1 = not at all, to 7 = very much scale). A regression analysis with 
perspective and intentionality as independent variables and harm severity as dependent variable 
indicated a significant main effect of perspective (b = .68, t(242) = 6.62, p < .001), intentionality (b = 
.56, t(242) = 5.45, p < .001), and a significant interaction between perspective and intentionality (b = 
−.27, t(242) = −2.63, p = .009). The main effect of perspective indicated that perpetrators (M = 4.36, 
SD = 1.54) considered that they harmed the victim more severely than victims felt that they were 
harmed (M = 2.98, SD = 1.71). Moreover, intentional transgressions (M = 4.11, SD = 1.71) were 
generally perceived as more harmful than unintentional transgressions (M = 2.80, SD = 1.60). The 
interaction effect indicated that only victims differed in their perceptions of harm severity depending 
on the intentionality of the transgression: they considered intentional transgressions (M = 3.84, SD = 
1.76) significantly (b = .82, t(242) = 7.03, p < .001) more harmful than unintentional transgressions 
(M = 2.19, SD = 1.21). Perpetrators considered intentional (M = 4.65, SD = 1.48) and unintentional 
(M = 4.07, SD = 1.56) transgressions equally (b = .29, t(242) = 1.73, p = .09) harmful. We added 
harm severity both as a covariate and as an extra mediator in our moderated multiple mediation 
model. For neither of the perspectives was the indirect effect through harm severity significant. 
Moreover, in both analyses, a significant indirect effect through anger and guilt remained. These 
analyses show that harm severity does not explain our effects. 
 
5 An alternative explanation for why perpetrators are less willing to apologize after intentional than 
after unintentional transgressions is that perpetrators might fear that their apology will be rejected by 
the victim particularly after an intentional transgression. In order to test this alternative explanation, 
we measured whether fear of rejection of the apology was a concern to perpetrators with “Would you 
feel worried that your colleague might reject your apology in this situation?” (1 = not at all, 7 = 
completely). A regression analysis with intentionality as independent variables did not show a 
significant main effect of intentionality. Hence, our data do not provide evidence that perpetrators 
were more worried about an apology being rejected after intentional compared to unintentional 
transgressions. Moreover, inclusion of this item in as an extra mediator did not indicate a significant 
indirect effect through this fear of rejection item, while the indirect effect through guilt was still 
significant. 
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(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) indicated that the intentionality of the transgression 
significantly influenced anger among victims (b = .40, t(244) = 5.52, p < .001) but not 
among perpetrators (b = -.02, t(244) = -.22, p = .82). Victims were angrier than 
perpetrators after intentional transgressions (b = -.43, t(244) = -4.78, p < .001), but equally 
angry after unintentional transgressions (b = -.001, t(244) = -.11, p = .91). 
To test whether anger indeed predicts the victims’ need for an apology but not the 
perpetrators’, we conducted a regression analysis with anger and perspective as 
independent variables and need for an apology as the dependent variable. We obtained a 
significant main effect of anger (b = .65, t(244) = 7.20, p < .001), but  no significant main 
effect of perspective (b = .07, t(244) = .81, p = .42), or a significant interaction (b = .005, 
t(244) = .05, p = .96). 
Guilt. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as predictor 
variables and guilt as dependent variable yielded a significant main effect of perspective (b 
= .42, t(244) = 6.81, p < .001), indicating that after a transgression, perpetrators felt guiltier 
(M = 4.98, SD = 1.92) than victims (M = 3.19, SD = 1.95) did. We did not obtain a 
significant main effect of intentionality (b = -.10, t(244) = -1.55, p = .12), and also no 
significant interaction effect (b = -.10, t(244) = -1.66, p = .10). Simple effects analyses 
indicated that intentionality only affected guilt among perpetrators (b = -.20, t(244) = -
1.95, p = .05), and not among victims (b = .006, t(244) = .09, p = .93). Hence, although the 
interaction term is not significant, the simple slopes analyses show a pattern on guilt 
consistent with our hypotheses. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
To test whether guilt predicts perpetrators’, rather than victims’ need for an 
apology, we conducted a regression analysis with guilt and perspective as independent 
variables and the need for apology as dependent variable. We obtained a main effect of 
guilt (b = .28, t(244) = 6.21, p < .001) and of perspective (b = -1.46, t(244) = -6.56, p < 
.001). Importantly, we also obtained the predicted interaction effect between guilt and 
perspective (b = .28, t(244) = 6.12, p < .001). Simple effects analyses indicated that guilt 
only predicted perpetrators’ need for apologies (b = .56, t(244) = 7.47, p < .001), but not 
the need for apologies among victims (b = .003, t(244) = .07, p = .94).  
Mediation. Mediation was tested using the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes 
(2012), using 5000 bootstrap resamples. The reported confidence intervals are bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence intervals of the probability distribution of the indirect 
effect. 
We tested our model by using intentionality as the independent variable, anger 
and guilt as mediators in parallel, need for apologies as dependent variable and perspective 
as moderator, moderating the path from intentionality to anger and to guilt. In line with our 
hypotheses, we obtained for victims a significant indirect effect of anger (b =.24, S.E. = 
.06, 95% CI (two-sided): [.15; .38]) but not of guilt (b =-.001, S.E. = .02, 95% CI (two-
sided): [-.03; .04]). For perpetrators, we obtained a significant indirect effect of guilt (b =-
.04, S.E. = .03, 95% CI: [-.12; -.0007]), but not of anger (b = -.01, S.E. = .07, 95% CI 
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(two-sided): [-.15; .12]). While the conditional direct (unmediated) effect of intentionality 
on victims’ need for apologies was not significant (b = -.05, S.E. = .09, t(240) = -.50, p = 
.62), it was for perpetrators’ apology needs (b = -.51, S.E. = .13, t(240) = -3.86, p < .001). 
The total effect of intentionality on the need for apologies was not significant (b = -.06, 
t(246) = -.93, p = .35). 
 
 
3.3.3 Discussion  
 
The results of Study 2 are consistent with our mismatch hypothesis. Victims have 
a significantly higher need for apologies than perpetrators after intentional transgressions, 
while perpetrators have a significantly higher need for apologies than victims after 
unintentional transgressions. Moreover, we find that guilt only mediates the relationship 
between intentionality and need for apologies for perpetrators, while anger mediates only 
the victims' need for apologies. 
Two findings were not in line with our hypotheses. First we did not find a 
significant interaction effect between anger and perspective on the need for apologies, 
meaning that in this study anger was predictive for the need for apologies for both victims 
and perpetrators. This might just result from testing the same effect across multiple studies. 
Even if an effect exists objectively, statistical logic dictates that some replication attempts 
will not show the effect (Schimmack, in press). A more substantial post-hoc explanation 
for this finding relates to the specific nature of this study. Specifically, perpetrators may 
have interpreted this question as being angry at themselves for the coffee mug being 
broken. This would be in line with our finding of a positive effect of anger on the 
willingness to apologize of perpetrators. A second finding that was not in line with our 
hypotheses was that, although guilt mediated the relationship between intentionality and 
need for apologies for perpetrators, there was still a significant direct (i.e., unmediated) 
effect of intentionality on the need for apologies. This finding suggests that other 
mechanisms, besides guilt, may also play a role in the effects of intentionality on the 
willingness to apologize. Moral disengagement might be a likely mechanism, such as 
victim derogation. 
 
 
3.4 EXPERIMENT 3.3 
 
We conducted Study 3 to test whether the results of Study 1 and 2 can be 
generalized to a different population (i.e., working adults). This would strengthen the 
relevance and scope of the mismatch between victim’s and perpetrator’s need for 
apologies. A second reason for conducting Study 3 is our aim to gain more insight into 
actual apology behavior and subsequent forgiveness. As explained in the introduction, 
apologies generally lead to forgiveness (e.g., McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). 
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As such, we predicted that the transgression would more likely be forgiven after an 
apology than when no apology is given. Because apologies are more likely to be offered 
after unintentional than after intentional transgressions, this would also imply that 
unintentional transgressions are more likely to be forgiven than intentional transgressions.  
 
 
3.4.1 Method 
 
Participants and design. A total of 383 working adults (286 women, M(age) = 
37.36, SD(age) = 10.5) were recruited through an online research participation scheme of a 
European distance-learning university. They participated for course credit. The participants 
were randomly assigned to a 2 (victim vs. perpetrator) × 2 (intentional vs. unintentional 
transgression) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. This study was conducted on the Internet and we used the same 
instructions as for the autobiographical narratives in Study 1, but in this case, we asked the 
participants to recall a transgression from their own workplace. 
Measures. Unless otherwise specified, all measured were answered on a 1 = not 
at all, to 7 = very much scale. The manipulation check and the need for apologies were 
measured in the same way as in Study 1. Anger and guilt were measured for both victims 
and perpetrators. In order to measure anger, we asked: “How angry were you after you/this 
other person did something unpleasant or unjust?” To measure guilt, we asked: “How 
guilty did you feel after you/this other person did something unpleasant or unjust?” 
Apology behavior. To measure whether an apology was issued or not after the 
transgression, we asked victims: “Did you receive an apology from this other person?”, 
and we asked perpetrators: “Did you offer an apology to the other person?” The answer 
scale was dichotomous: Yes or No. 
Forgiveness. To check whether the transgressions were eventually forgiven or 
not, we asked victims: “I have forgiven the other person for what he/she did.” and 
perpetrators: “The other has forgiven me for what I did.” 
 
 
3.4.2 Results 
 
Manipulation check. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = 3.27, t(379) = 5.89, p < 
.001). The main effect of perspective was not significant (p = .45). Participants in the 
unintentional conditions perceived transgressions as less intentional (M = 1.81, SD = 1.43) 
than participants in the intentional conditions (M = 3.54, SD = 2.10). We also obtained an 
interaction between intentionality and perspective (b = -1.03, t(379) = -2.93, p = .004). 
This effect revealed the intentionality manipulation to be stronger among victims 
(M(intentional) = 4.35, SD = 1.94; M(unintentional) = 2.11, SD = 1.49) than among perpetrators 
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(M(intentional) = 2.72, SD(intentional)  = 1.94; M(unintentional) = 1.51, SD(unintentional) = 1.32). 
Nevertheless, both victims (b = 2.24, t(379) = 9.02, p < .001) and perpetrators (b = 1.21, 
t(379) = 4.90, p < .001) rated the intentional transgressions as clearly being more 
intentional than the unintentional transgressions. Our hypotheses imply variations in the 
direction of the effect of intentionality for victims versus perpetrators. Hence, we do not 
consider these results for the manipulation check to be problematic because they indicate 
variations in the strength of an effect that is in the same direction for victims and 
perpetrators. 
Content coding of the perpetration stories. As an additional manipulation 
check for the perpetrator conditions, we had all the perpetrator stories of Study 1 and 3 (the 
two autobiographical narrative studies) coded by a coder blind to the original conditions 
and our hypotheses. An additional 20 percent was coded by a second coder to check for 
inter rater reliability.  
The stories were coded in four categories, in line with the categorization of 
Darley and Pittman (2003): accidental, negligent, reckless, and intentional. In addition to 
this forced-choice categorization, we also had the coders rate each story on a 1 to 7 scale 
on the extent to which the transgression was accidental, negligent, reckless or intentional. 
A Chi-square analysis on the categorization of the transgression stories between the two 
coders showed a highly significant relationship between the two coders (Χ2(9) = 126.23, p 
< .001). Correlations between the Likert scales were all high: accidental: r = .86, p < .001; 
intentional:  r = .92, p < .001; negligent: r = .79, p < .001; reckless: r = .74, p < .001. 
Of the stories, 74 were coded as accidental, 164 were coded as intentional, 24 
were coded as negligent and 14 were coded as reckless;  16 were uncodable. These 16 
cases were omitted from further analyses. This left a total of 276 cases. Of the stories 
written in the intentional experimental conditions, 85% was coded as intentional, 1% was 
coded as accidental, 3% was coded as negligent and 4 % was coded as reckless. Of the 
stories written in the unintentional conditions, 52% was coded as accidental, 25% was 
coded as intentional, 15% was coded as negligent and 6% was coded as reckless. 
Excluding those participants whose stories were not in line with the experimental condition 
(e.g. described an intentional transgression in the unintentional condition), did not change 
the data patterns presented hereafter. 
Need for apologies. A regression analysis with intentionality and perspective as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = -.26, t(379) = -2.55, p = 
.01) and perspective (b = -.32, t(379) = -3.11, p = .002). The main effect of intentionality 
showed that the need for apologies was generally stronger after unintentional (M = 4.52, 
SD = 2.08) than after intentional (M = 4.00, SD = 2.14) transgressions. The main effect of 
perspective indicated that victims (M = 4.60, SD = 2.08) generally had a stronger need for 
apologies than perpetrators (M = 3.89, SD = 2.21). 
More importantly, we also obtained the predicted interaction between perspective 
and intentionality (b = -.58, t(379) = -5.64, p < .001; see Table 3.3 for cell means).  
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Table 3.3 
Means (SD’s) for need for apologies, anger, and guilt in Study 3.3 
 Need for apologies Anger Guilt 
 Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator 
Unintentional 4.26 (2.04) 
4.78 
(2.10) 
4.94 
(1.56) 
3.03 
(1.91) 
2.09 
(1.45) 
4.56 
(1.95) 
Intentional 4.89 (1.88) 
3.10 
(2.00) 
5.89 
(1.07) 
3.33 
(1.89) 
2.20 
(1.69) 
3.59 
(1.87) 
 
 
Planned comparisons revealed that victims wanted to receive an apology more 
after an intentional than after an unintentional transgression (b = .32, t(379) = 2.18, p = 
.03). Perpetrators wanted to give an apology more after unintentional than after intentional 
transgressions (b = -.84, t(379) = -5.80, p < .001). In line with the mismatch hypothesis, we 
found that perpetrators were somewhat more willing to apologize than victims desired an 
apology after an unintentional transgression (b = .26, t(379) = 1.74, p = .08). Although, the 
pattern in is the hypothesized direction, the difference is not significant and should be 
interpreted with caution. Conversely, when the transgression was intentional, victims 
desired an apology significantly more than perpetrators were willing to apologize (b = -.90, 
t(379) = -6.40, p < .001). 
Anger. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as independent 
variables and anger as dependent variable revealed main effects on anger of perspective (b 
= -.56, t(379) = -13.33, p < .001) and intentionality (b = .15, t(379)  = 3.72, p < .001). 
After a transgression, victims were angrier (M = 5.45, SD = 1.40) than perpetrators (M = 
3.19, SD = 1.90), and both were angrier after intentional (M = 4.61, SD = 2.00) than after 
unintentional transgressions (M = 3.98, SD = 1.99).  These effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction effect (b = -.08, t(379)  = -1.93, p = .05). Simple effects analyses 
indicated that victims were significantly angrier after intentional than unintentional 
transgressions (b = .24, t(379)  = 3.99, p < .001). We did not find any effect on anger 
among perpetrators (b = .07, t(379)  = 1.27, p = .21). 
To test whether anger indeed predicts the need for an apology for victims but not 
for perpetrators, we conducted a regression analysis with anger and perspective as 
independent variables and need for an apology as the dependent variable. We obtained a 
significant interaction of anger and perspective (b = -.50, t(379)  = -5.67, p < .001). A 
simple effects analysis indicated that anger only predicted the need for an apology for 
victims (b = .59, t(379)  = 5.99, p < .001), and not for perpetrators (b = -.10, t (379) = -
1.44, p = .15). We also obtained a main effect of anger (b = .24, t(379)  = 3.97, p < .001), 
indicating that participants generally perceived a greater need for apologies as they became 
angrier. 
Guilt. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as predictors and 
guilt as dependent variable yielded significant main effects of perspective (b = .48, t(379) 
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= 10.74, p < .001) and intentionality (b = -.11, t(379)  = -2.40, p = .02). After a 
transgression, perpetrators felt guiltier (M = 4.04, SD = 1.96) than victims (M = 2.15, SD = 
1.58), and both felt guiltier after unintentional (M = 3.33, SD = 2.11) than after intentional 
transgressions (M = 2.89, SD = 1.91). These effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction effect between perspective and intentionality (b = -.13, t(379) = -2.99, p = .003; 
see Table 3 for cell means). Simple slopes analyses indicated that perpetrators felt guiltier 
after unintentional than after intentional transgressions (b = -.24, t(379) = -3.81, p < .001). 
We found no effect on guilt among victims (b = .01, t(379) = .47, p = .64). 
To test whether guilt predicts the need for an apology for perpetrators but not for 
victims, we conducted a regression analysis with guilt and perspective as independent 
variables and need for an apology as dependent variable. We obtained the predicted 
interaction effect between guilt and perspective (b = .40, t(379)  = 9.15, p < .001). Simple 
slopes analyses indicated that guilt only predicted the need for apologies for perpetrators (b 
= .77, t(397)  = 12.47, p < .001), and not for victims (b = -.13, t(379)  = -1.71, p = .09). We 
also obtained a main effect of guilt (b = .32, t(379)  = 6.49, p < .001), indicating that 
participants perceived a greater need for apologies as they felt guiltier. 
Mediation analyses. Mediation was tested using the PROCESS macro developed 
by Hayes (2012), using 5000 bootstrap resamples2. Like in the previous studies, the 
reported confidence intervals are bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals of the 
probability distribution of the indirect effect. 
We tested our model by using intentionality as the independent variable, anger 
and guilt as mediators in parallel, need for apologies as dependent variable and perspective 
as moderator, moderating the paths from intentionality to anger and to guilt and the paths 
from anger to need for apologies and guilt to need for apologies. In line with our 
hypotheses, for victims, we obtained a significant indirect effect of anger (b = .14, S.E. = 
.04, 95% CI (two-sided): [.07; .22]) but not of guilt (b = -.003, S.E.  = .008, 95% CI (two-
sided): [-.03; .008]). For perpetrators, we obtained a significant indirect effect of guilt (b = 
-.18, S.E. = .05, 95% CI (two-sided): [-.28; -.08]), but not of anger (b = -.01, S.E. = .01, 
95% CI (two-sided): [-.04; .008]). The conditional direct (unmediated) effect of 
intentionality on need for apologies for victims was not significant (b = -.03, S.E. = .12, 
t(382) = .28, p = 78), while the conditional direct effect for perpetrators was significant (b 
= -.41, S.E. = .11, t(382) = -3.63, p < .001). The total effect of intentionality on the need 
for apologies was also significant (b = -.12, t(381) = -2.43, p = .02). 
Need for apologies predicting apology behavior. One of the reasons to conduct 
Study 3 was to investigate the behavioral implications of the apology mismatch. As 
explained in the introduction, because perpetrators have the highest need for apologies and 
unintentional transgressions and perpetrator ultimately decide whether to apologize our 
not, we expected that a perpetrator’s need for apologies would be predictive of whether an 
apology was issued or not. A logistic regression analysis with perspective and need for 
apologies as independent variables and apology behavior as dependent variable indicated a 
main effect of need for apologies (b = 1.19, Wald = 56.24, p < .001) and perspective (b = 
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.45, Wald = 11.35, p = .001). We also found a significant interaction between need for 
apologies and perspective (b = -1.75, Wald = 30.51, p < .001), showing that need for 
apologies was only predictive for whether an apology was issued for perpetrators (b = 
2.06, Wald = 59.73, p < .001), but not for victims (b = .31, Wald = 3.36, p = .07). 
Intentionality predicting apology behavior. Because perpetrators have the 
highest need for apologies after unintentional transgressions, we expected that apologies 
are mainly issued after unintentional transgressions. A  logistic regression analysis with 
perspective and intentionality as independent variables and apology issued as dependent 
variable yielded a main effect of intentionality (b = 1.15, Wald = 14.53, p < .001). Neither 
the effect of perspective nor the interaction effect was significant.  
Because in logistic regression analysis lower order “main effects” are contingent 
upon the interaction term (Jaccard, 2001), we tested a model without the interaction term 
between perspective and intentionality. This analysis showed that compared to 
unintentional transgressions, the chance of an apology being issued after an intentional 
transgression becomes significantly smaller (b = 1.18, Wald = 29.04, p < .001, odds ratio = 
3.25): the likelihood of an apology being issued after an intentional transgression is 
significantly less than 50% (b = -.94, Wald = 35.84, p < .001, odds = .39, percentage 
likelihood 28%). After an unintentional transgression, the likelihood of an apology being 
issued was equivalent to an apology not being issued at all (b = .24, Wald = 2.47, p = .12, 
odds = 1.27, percentage likelihood 56%). 
Effect of apologies on forgiveness. As previous research has shown that 
apologies aid in being forgiven, we expected that perpetrators who apologized would be 
forgiven more than perpetrators who did not apologize. A regression analysis with apology 
issued (effect coded: no = -1; yes = 1), perspective, and intentionality as independent 
variables and forgiveness as dependent variable showed a significant main effect on 
forgiveness of apology issued (b = .81, t(375) = 8.81, p < .001), of intentionality (b = -.27, 
t(375) = 2.93, p = .004), and of perspective (b = -.21, t(375) = -2.33, p = .02). 
Transgressions were generally forgiven more after an apology was issued (M = 5.92, SD = 
1.36) than if an apology was not issued (M = 4.2, SD = 1.90); unintentional transgressions 
are generally forgiven more (M = 5.44, SD = 1.71) than intentional transgressions (M = 
4.44, SD = 1.94); and victims indicated they had forgiven the perpetrator more (M = 4.99, 
SD = 1.86) than perpetrators indicated that they were forgiven (M = 4.83, SD = 1.94). 
Neither the two-way interactions nor the three-way interaction were significant (p > .25). 
 
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
 
The results of Study 3 extend our model in a number of ways. First, we replicated 
our previous findings in a different population (i.e., employees). Second, in line with our 
model, we could also show that the mismatch has consequences for actual apology 
behavior and subsequent forgiveness. Whether an apology is issued or not is predicted by 
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the perpetrator’s need for apologies and not by the victim’s needs. Indeed, since the 
perpetrator’s need for apologies is higher after unintentional transgressions than after 
intentional ones, apologies were issued more often after unintentional than after intentional 
transgressions. This also means that victims are unlikely to receive an apology when they 
have a high need for an apology and that the victim’s need for an apology is not taken into 
account by the perpetrator when deciding whether to apologize or not. Finally, we were 
able to show that the apology mismatch has consequences for whether perpetrators are 
forgiven or not. Perpetrators are forgiven more when they apologize. As such, 
unintentional transgressions are forgiven more than intentional transgressions. 
 
 
3.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
We showed across three studies that perpetrators and victims have different needs 
for apology, depending on the intentionality of the transgression. Victims have a stronger 
preference for an apology after intentional transgressions than after unintentional ones. 
This effect is mediated by anger: victims become angrier after intentional than after 
unintentional transgressions, and therefore desire apologies more. For perpetrators, 
intentionality affects the need for apology in the opposite direction: perpetrators prefer to 
apologize after unintentional than after intentional transgressions, partly because they feel 
guiltier after unintentional transgressions. Moreover, in Study 3 we showed that apologies 
are indeed issued more after unintentional than after intentional transgressions; behavior 
that is in line with the perpetrator’s need for apologies but has no relationship to the 
victim’s need for apologies. An apology in turn does lead to more forgiveness by the 
victim, as such perpetrators are forgiven more after unintentional than after intentional 
transgressions. 
In the introduction of this paper, we argued that the apology-forgiveness cycle 
may not always represent an empirical reality as the victim’s and perpetrator’s perspectives 
on transgression are so divergent. Our findings highlight that the initiation and success of 
the apology-forgiveness cycle is highly dependent on the intentionality of the 
transgression. Perpetrators are particularly motivated to initiate the apology-forgiveness 
cycle by apologizing after unintentional transgressions. As such, unintentional 
transgressions are forgiven more often than intentional ones. However, in these situations 
(i.e., unintentional transgressions) victims are not very angry. Hence, the increased 
forgiveness after unintentional transgressions seems to be a joint effect of an apology and a 
relatively mild emotional reaction on the part of the victim. In situations where victims 
experience the greatest injustice and particularly desire apologies – after intentional 
transgressions – perpetrators are far less likely to apologize. Yet, after intentional 
transgressions, a victim’s need for apologies seems to have little influence on whether an 
apology is issued or not. Indeed, in these situations, the absence of an apology may even 
increase victims’ anger (Ohbuchi et al., 1989). This in turn increases the risk of further 
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escalation of the conflict. As such, intentional transgressions pose the greatest challenge 
for mediation and reconciliation initiatives because of the strong emotional reactions of 
victims combined with very incongruent reconciliatory motivations of the perpetrator. 
It is interesting to note that although we find that victims generally want an 
apology more after intentional than after unintentional transgressions, related research on 
the effects of apologies paradoxically shows that that apologies may be of little value or 
even be counterproductive after intentional transgressions (Struthers et al., 2008). As such, 
victims particularly desire an apology after intentional transgressions but at the same time, 
apologies seem to have limited impact in those situations. What is a possible explanation 
for these incongruent findings regarding the need for apologies and the actual effect of 
apologies on victims after intentional transgressions? One potential explanation may be 
found in the role of forecasting errors in the apology process, whereby victims believe that 
they will be content if they receive an apology, but when they have actually received one, 
are less satisfied than they thought they would be (De Cremer et al., 2010). These findings 
again demonstrate the challenge of reconciliation after intentional transgressions: even 
when victims receive an apology after an intentional transgression (i.e., the perpetrator 
initiates the cycle), this may not necessarily mean that the apology is reciprocated with 
forgiveness. 
 
 
3.5.1 The role of guilt in the perpetrator’s willingness to apologize 
 
Our studies showed a clear connection between feelings of guilt and the 
perpetrator’s willingness to apologize after interpersonal transgressions. This is in line with 
recent conceptualizations of guilt, which have stressed the interpersonal effects of guilt, 
arguing that guilt motivates people to take relationship-restoring action (Baumeister et al., 
1994; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Our findings connect well with this research, showing that 
indeed apologies as a tool for reconciliation are predicted by feelings of guilt. Focusing on 
the relationship between guilt and apologies therefore seems to be a promising avenue for 
future research on apologizing.  
In this context, it is also important to distinguish guilt form other emotional 
reactions that perpetrators may feel after a transgression, such as compassion or sympathy. 
Guilt can arise when a people feel causally responsible for the harm inflicted upon the 
victim (Baumeister, et al., 1994). As such, guilt differs from feelings of compassion or 
sympathy, which may arise when someone sees a victim suffer (i.e., from a third party 
perspective; Gayannee, 2008; Regan, 1971). Guilt only arises when people feel personally 
responsible for the harm. 
In the current set of studies, we showed that feelings of guilt have an important 
influence on the perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. The emergence of guilt in a 
perpetrator is however complex. For instance, in this research we showed that the 
intentionality of the transgression is an important predictor for feelings of guilt. 
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Sometimes, however, transgressions are not easily categorized as either intentional or 
unintentional, having both intentional and unintentional characteristics. Since the 
premeditated nature of intentional transgressions provides the perpetrator with an 
opportunity to guard him/herself against feelings of guilt by means of a priori 
rationalizations (e.g., Tsang, 2002), it seems likely that unanticipated effects of 
transgressions will make a perpetrator feel guilty. For instance, intentionally throwing a 
friend into the pool during a party probably does not make the perpetrator feel guilty as 
this was a premeditated act. However, suppose the friend unbeknownst had his new mobile 
phone in his pocket, which then broke as a result of getting wet. This unexpected effect of 
the transgression is likely to make the perpetrator feel guilty. Indeed, depending on the 
rationalizations and foreseen effects of an intentional transgression, the perpetrator may 
feel guilty for specific aspects of the transgression and may decide to either apologize or 
not. 
In the present studies, we focused on guilt experienced directly after the 
transgression. However, when taking a longer time frame, the relationship between 
intentionality and guilt may become more complex. Perpetrators may guard against 
feelings of guilt with certain rationalizations. However, it seems likely that some of those 
rationalizations are reinterpreted later by the perpetrator and then deemed inadequate. As 
such, intentional transgressions may have the potential to cause guilt at a later time. Since 
these rationalizations are not present with unintentional transgressions, we would predict 
that in the long run, perpetrators may feel guiltier about intentional than unintentional 
transgressions, and if given the choice, would want to apologize more for something they 
had done intentionally than for something they had done unintentionally. It could therefore 
be that the apology needs of victims and perpetrators become more aligned longer after the 
conflict. How long this may take is of course open to empirical investigation. 
 
 
3.5.2 Strengths and limitations 
 
One of the strengths of the present research is the use of a combination of 
different methodologies for answering our research questions. We combined scenario 
methodology, which gives control over the transgression and thus increasing internal 
validity (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998), with autobiographical narrative 
methodology, which is more emotionally involving and has a higher ecological validity 
(Baumeister, et al., 1990; Gonzales, Manning, & Haugen, 1992; Zechmeister, & Romero, 
2002). In addition to this pluralistic methodological strategy, we sampled both students and 
employees to test the generalizability of our results. The fact that we showed similar 
findings across these different methodologies and populations increases our confidence in 
the proposed mismatch between victims’ and perpetrators’ need for apologies.  
A possible limitation of the present study is that we cannot be certain whether the 
task of remembering a victim episode is significantly different from remembering a 
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perpetrator episode. Previous research comparing these perspectives also mentions this 
limitation (e.g., Baumeister, et al., 1990). Participants might have had self-presentational 
concerns, selecting episodes that present themselves rather positive in their role of a 
considerate victim (after an unintentional transgression) or a misunderstood perpetrator 
(after an intentional transgression).  Yet, given that we find the same effects across 
different types of methodologies (i.e., scenario methodology and autobiographical 
narrative), we feel confident that this limitation of the autobiographical narrative 
methodology has had no significant effect on our findings. 
Another important issue that must be addressed is that we only focused on a 
specific type of transgression, that is, anger-provoking transgressions. Victims can respond 
to transgressions in a number of different ways, not only with anger but also, for instance, 
with contempt and estrangement (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; McCullough, Worthington, & 
Rachal, 1997). We focused on anger-provoking transgressions because anger is 
conceptualized as an emotion that can drive reconciliation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). As 
such, the apology-forgiveness cycle seems to mainly refer to anger-inducing 
transgressions. Yet, studying how reconciliation can be achieved after contempt-inducing 
transgressions would be an interesting extension of the apology-forgiveness cycle. Indeed, 
after unintentional contempt-inducing transgressions, forgiveness may not follow as the 
victims are unwilling to reconcile. 
On the methodological side, we relied on two different items in our analyses of 
our main dependent variable: one for victims and one for perpetrators. Although a direct 
comparison between the means on these different items (i.e., comparing perpetrator’s and 
victim’s need for apologies after intentional or unintentional transgressions) was important 
for testing our proposed mismatch, this might be problematic because these were in fact 
two different items. Nevertheless, by looking only at the data pattern within the victim and 
perpetrator conditions, it is clear that intentionality influences the need for apologies of 
victims and perpetrators in opposite directions. Since these effects are in line with our 
hypotheses, we feel confident that this comparison across the different items does not pose 
a serious threat to the validity of our findings. 
A final limitation of the current set of studies is the absence of behavioral data 
after experimentally induced transgressions. Although this would be an important 
extension of the current findings, there are some important ethical and methodological 
problems with such a design. We can experimentally create unintentional and intentional 
transgressions with the participants as victims. However, creating situations in which 
participants are the perpetrators presents important challenges due to the rather active role 
of a perpetrator compared to the passive role of a victim (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). From a 
practical perspective, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to create situations in which 
participants intentionally transgress against one another in the lab (there are methods for 
creating unintentional transgressions; Leunissen et al., 2012). Moreover, creating a 
situation in which one intentionally transgresses against another individual might be 
ethically undesirable as this would induce a substantial amount of stress on the research 
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participants. Due to these considerations, we decided to test our hypotheses in scenario and 
autobiographical narrative methodologies only. 
 
 
3.5.3 Concluding remarks 
 
Due to the interpersonal nature of conflict and reconciliation between the 
perpetrator and the victim, apologizing is a dynamic social process. Unfortunately, the 
psychological underpinnings of this dynamic process have not yet been investigated in 
much detail. Our present results show that victims and perpetrators do not necessarily 
share the same perspective regarding the function of an apology, thereby making 
reconciliation efforts more difficult than initially anticipated. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. THE RELATIONAL MAINTENANCE FUNCTION OF APOLOGIZING 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
One of the most common and expected ways for perpetrators to respond to a transgression 
is to apologize (Goffman, 1971; Lazare, 2004). Research shows that apologies generally 
have positive effects on victims’ responses, leading to less anger (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & 
Agarie, 1989) and more forgiveness from the victim (Leunissen, De Cremer, Reinders 
Folmer, & Van Dijke, 2013; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). Regretfully, we 
know very little about factors that motivate perpetrators to apologize (Leunissen, De 
Cremer, & Reinders Folmer, 2012; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). This forms a serious gap in 
our knowledge on reconciliation, because normally it is the perpetrator who is expected to 
initiate the reconciliation process (Leunissen et al., 2013). 
 In the present paper, we take a functional approach to apologizing. This means 
that perpetrators have a goal when they apologize (i.e. relational repair) and that this goal 
should be predictive of whether they are willing to apologize or not. For perpetrators, an 
apology is an instrument that can be used to reconcile, that is, to repair a damaged 
relationship (Leunissen et al., 2013). 
As apologies repair a damaged relationship, it stands to reason that, in order for 
perpetrators to be motivated to reconcile, they should consider the damaged relationship 
itself valuable. This idea is based on the “valuable relationship hypothesis” (De Waal, 
2000). This hypothesis holds that reconciliation between individuals is more likely when 
the relationship is valuable to the individuals involved in the conflict (Aureli, Cords, & 
Van Schaik, 2002; McCullough, Root, Luna, Berry, Tabak, & Bono, 2010; Silk 2002). 
Although the valuable relationship hypothesis has been developed primarily in the field of 
primate biology, it is arguably particularly relevant to conflict resolution in humans 
because of our strong reliance on close relationships. A wealth of evidence indicates that 
forming and maintaining close relationships is a fundamental human need (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). Indeed, the dissolution of close relationships is a consistent cause of anxiety 
and people go to great lengths in order to prevent existing relationships from falling apart 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The idea that reconciliation is facilitated by relational 
closeness has received some attention in the forgiveness literature (i.e. the victim 
perspective in conflict). For instance, research has shown that people are more likely to 
forgive close others (Karremans & Aarts, 2007; McCullough, Luna, Berry, Tabak, & 
Bono, 2010). Likewise, revenge following a transgression is less likely in close 
relationships (Burnette, McCullough, Van Tongeren, & Davis, 2012). 
To our knowledge no research has investigated how relational closeness influences 
reconciliation attempts by perpetrators. Yet, in line with our idea, previous research has 
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shown that perpetrators become worried about their public image, ostensibly due to a fear 
of being excluded from the moral community (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Arguably, fearing 
that one is excluded from a relationship should only be a strong motivator to reconcile 
when that relationship is important to the perpetrator. 
If people perceive a transgression as a threat to a close relationship, then one would expect 
that perpetrators will undertake actions that promote reconciliation particularly after they 
have transgressed against a close other. Because an apology forms an important 
reconciliation tool, we suggest that perpetrators will be more willing to apologize for a 
transgression to a victim of which the perpetrator feels he/she has a close relationship with 
than a less close relationship. 
Furthermore, we predict that the process by which relationship closeness leads to a higher 
willingness to apologize is the experience of guilt. Guilt has been conceptualized as an 
emotion that people experience when an important relationship is damaged; motivating 
people to take relationship restoring action over the anxiety of social exclusion 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). As close relationships are more important to 
people than less close relationships, one would expect that people feel guiltier when 
transgressing against someone they feel close to than someone they do not feel close to. 
What is interesting about this is that the experience of guilt is not due to the (severity of 
the) transgression itself but is mainly predicted by the relationship between the perpetrator 
and victim. Thus, the same transgression should evoke more guilt when it is committed 
against a close other than against a more relationally distant other. Indeed, research has 
shown that guilt is experienced more frequently in close relationships (Baumeister, 
Stillwell, Heatherton, 1995). Moreover, other research provides some indirect evidence on 
the relationship between relational closeness and feelings of guilt about a transgression. 
Research by Leunissen and colleagues (2013) shows that perpetrators feel less guilty about 
intentional than about unintentional transgressions. The authors explain this finding by 
pointing out that when someone commits a transgression intentionality, the relationship is 
less likely to be important to the perpetrator (Leunissen et al., 2013; see also McGraw, 
1987).Because guilt motivates people to take relationship restoring action, one would 
expect that the guiltier someone feels about a transgression, the more willing that person 
must be to apologize for a transgression. Previous research on apologizing has indeed 
found that feelings of guilt are a reliable predictor for apologizing (Leunissen et al., 2013). 
 
 
4.2 THE PRESENT STUDIES 
 
 The present research was aimed at examining the hypothesis that perpetrators are 
more willing to apologize for a transgression when they transgressed against someone they 
feel close to than someone they feel less close to. We expect this to happen because close 
relationships are more valuable to perpetrators and therefore they are more strongly 
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motivated to reconcile. We expected guilt, as a motivator of relationship restoring 
behavior, to mediate the relationship between relational closeness and apology behavior. 
In three studies, we either measured relational closeness or manipulated it. Moreover, we 
use both student and employee samples to show the relevance of our relational closeness 
effect to professional, as well as private relationships, showing that this is a very general 
effect. 
 
 
4.3 EXPERIMENT 4.1 
 
 
4.3.1 Method 
 
Participants. A total of 157 participants (54 women; M(age) = 20.47, SD(age)  = 
2.17) participated for course credit. 
Materials. The study was introduced to the participants as a study on social 
experiences with a focus on negative experiences. Participants were asked to recall and 
describe a situation in which they did something unjust or immoral towards another person 
(autobiographical narrative methodology is commonly used in interpersonal conflict 
studies; e.g. Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Leunissen et al., 2013). After 
participants had described this situation we asked how close they felt to the victim before 
they committed the transgression with 6 relational closeness items (based on items by 
Arriaga & Agnew, 2001): 1) I felt emotionally attached to this other person, 2) The other 
meant a lot to me, 3) I would have found it very hard if I would not have any more contact 
with this other person, 4) I hoped that my relationship with this other person would never 
end, 5) I thought that in the future I would have to deal a lot with this other person, 6) I 
assumed that in the future I had to deal a lot with this other person (α = .97; a principal 
component analysis indicated that all 6 items loaded on a single factor with an Eigenvalue 
of 5.14, explaining 85.60% of the variance). 
Guilt was measured with “how guilty did you feel in this situation?” Apology 
behavior was measured by asking participants whether they had apologized to this other 
person (either yes or no). 
 
 
4.3.2 Results 
 
Logistic regression analysis with relational closeness as independent variable and whether 
the participant had apologized as the dependent variable indicated a significant effect of 
relational closeness (b = .38, Wald = 16.79, p < .001).  
Linear regression analysis with relational closeness as independent variable and guilt as 
dependent variable indicated a significant effect (b = 3.96, t(155) = 28.29, p < .001). 
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Moreover, logistic regression analysis with guilt as the independent variable and whether 
the participant had apologized as the dependent variable indicated a significant effect of 
guilt (b = .40, Wald = 15.78, p < .001). Mediation analysis, using the PROCESS macro 
developed by Hayes (Hayes, 2012), showed a significant indirect effect of relational 
closeness through guilt on apologies (b = .13, S.E. = .07, 95% CI (two-sided): [.02; .30])6. 
 
 
4.4 EXPERIMTENT 4.2 
 
4.4.1 Method 
 
Participants. A total of 104 participants (54 women; M(age) = 35.84, SD(age)  = 
11.97) participated though the online participation system MTurk. Participants were paid $ 
1.00 for completing the survey. Participants were randomly assigned to a close or distant 
condition. 
Materials. Participants were presented with a scenario in which they were asked 
to imagine that were in a romantic relationship. One night, they went to party without their 
romantic partner. At this party they ran into an attractive acquaintance. After this party, 
they walked home together with their acquaintance. When home, they engage in some 
moderate infidelity (“you start making out for a little while”). Later on, it turns out that the 
partner found out what happened. We manipulated relational closeness by stating in the 
close relationship that the relationship was going great and that you feel very close to your 
partner. In the distant relationship condition we stated that the relationship was not going 
very well and that you feel more and more distant from your partner. 
Measures. We checked our closeness manipulation with two items which were 
averaged 1) How close do you feel to your partner? And 2) how valuable is this 
relationship to you? (r = .68, p < .001). We measured the willingness to apologize with: 
Would you apologize to your partner about what happened after the party? Feelings of 
guilt were measured with: Would you feel guilty about what happened after the party? (all 
on a 1 = not at all, 7 = very much scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 An alternative explanation for this finding is that perpetrators commit less severe transgressions 
against close others and therefore apologize more easily. In order to control for transgression 
severity, we measured it by asking: “The situation just described was very serious”, “the situations I 
just described was very intense”, and “The situation I just described was really bad” (α = .84; all on a 
1 = not at all, to 7 = very much scale). Including this scale as a covariate in the mediation model did 
not change the presented findings; there was still a significant effect of relational closeness through 
guilt on apology behavior. 
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4.4.2 Results 
 
Manipulation check. An ANOVA with our relational closeness manipulation as the 
independent variable and the closeness check as the dependent variable indicated a 
significant effect of our closeness manipulation (F(1, 102) = 35.63, p < .001, η2 = .26). As 
expected participants in the close condition, participants felt closer to their partner (M = 
5.37, SD = 1.31) than participants in the distant condition (M = 3.60, SD = 1.71).  
Willingness to apologize. An ANOVA with our relational closeness 
manipulation as the independent variable and the willingness to apologize as the dependent 
variable indicated a significant main effect (F(1, 102) = 17.08, p < .001, η2 = .14). 
Participants were more willing to apologize when they were in a close (M = 6.38, SD = 
1.01) than in a distant relationship (M = 5.24, SD = 1.74). 
Guilt. An ANOVA with our relational closeness manipulation as the independent 
variable and feelings of guilt as the dependent variable indicated a significant main effect 
(F(1, 102) = 13.39, p < .001, η2 = .12). Participants who were in a close relationship felt 
more guilty about the infidelity (M = 6.31, SD = 1.10) than participants in a distant 
relationship (M = 5.22, SD = 1.86). Moreover, a linear regression analysis with guilt as the 
independent variable and the willingness to apologize as the dependent variable indicated a 
significant positive effect (b = 1.15, t(186) = 12.04, p < .001). 
Mediation analysis. Mediation analysis, using the PROCESS macro developed 
by Hayes (Hayes, 2012; 5000 bootstrap samples), showed a significant indirect effect of 
relational closeness through guilt on apologies (b = -.37, S.E. = .11, 95% CI (two-sided): [-
.63; -.17]). 
 
 
4.5 EXPERIMENT 4.3 
 
4.5.1 Method 
 
Participants. A total of 80 employees (32 women; M(age) = 33.45, SD(age)  = 
10.34) participated though the online participation system MTurk. Participants were paid $ 
1.00 upon completion of the survey. They were employed for an average of 3.76 (SD = 
2.88, range: [.5; 18]) years in their respective organizations. 
Materials. We employed a similar design as in Study 1: participants were asked 
to recall a situation in which they did something unpleasant, unfair or unjust towards 
someone else. It was stressed that this situation must have occurred at work. Participants 
were asked to write down a short paragraph on what happened 
Measures. Relational closeness was measured using the high-quality relationship 
measure (Carmeli & Gittell, 2009). This is 10-item scale measures relational quality 
between coworkers at work. The items were adapted slightly to fit the interpersonal 
context of our study. An example item is “There is a great deal of respect between me and 
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this other person [the person to whom was transgressed]”. The scale had an excellent 
reliability (α = .90). Guilt was measured with “How guilty did you feel about what you had 
done?” Apology behavior was measured by asking the participants whether or not they had 
apologized for what they had done (either yes or no). 
 
 
4.5.2 Results 
 
A logistic regression analysis with the high-quality relationship measure as independent 
measure and apology behavior as the dependent variable indicated a significant effect of 
high-quality relationship (b = 1.62, Wald = 14.57, p < .001, odds ratio: 5.056)7. High-
quality relationship was also positively related to feelings of guilt about the transgression 
(b = .77, t(78) = 3.88, p < .001) and guilt in turn was positively related to apologizing (b = 
.98, Wald = 10.69, p = .001, odds ratio: 2.67). Finally, a mediation analysis (Hayes, 2012), 
indicated a significant indirect effect of high-quality relationship through guilt on apology 
behavior (b = .22, S.E. = .14, 95% CI: [.005; .56]). 
 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION 
 
Across 3 studies, we showed that relational value reliably predicts whether perpetrators are 
willing or not to initiate reconciliation by means of an apology. We showed this effect 
using different measures of relational value (relational closeness, quality of relationships) 
and by manipulating relational closeness. Moreover we showed this effect across private as 
well as professional relationships. 
As reconciliation is a necessary step to continue in a damaged relationship, we 
predicted that perpetrators would be motivated to reconcile when the damaged relationship 
was valuable to the perpetrator. This is indeed what we found. In support of our argument 
that perpetrators are more willing to reconcile in valuable relationships, we showed that 
transgressing against a close other creates stronger feelings of guilt than transgressing 
against someone more distant. As guilt is an emotion that motivates people to take 
relationship restoring action, one would indeed predict that transgressing against someone 
you feel close to creates stronger feelings of guilt. Moreover, in line with the idea that 
apologies provide an important means to restore a relationship for perpetrators (Leunissen 
et al., 2013), we showed that guilt positively influences a perpetrator’s willingness to 
apologize. 
 
                                                          
7 As in Study 1, we included a measure of transgression severity: “How severe was the unpleasant, 
unfair or unjust act that you just described?” (1 = not at all, to 7 = very much). Including this 
measure as a covariate did not change the reported effect. High-quality relationships was still a 
significant predictor for whether an apology was offered or not. 
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4.6.1 Implication for research on apologies 
 
The nature of apologies as a tool mainly aimed at preserving valuable relationships is 
further underscored by the findings that the transgression itself had no influence in the 
willingness to apologize. Relational closeness was a predictor for the willingness to 
apologize after the same transgression (Study 2) and also after statistically controlling for 
transgression severity (Study 1 and 3). Indeed, from a normative perspective perpetrators, 
should apologize for a transgression independent of the quality of the  relationship with the 
victim because an apology is mainly a mechanism to restore social and moral order 
(Tavuchis, 1992). Additionally, from this normative perspective, perpetrators should be 
more willing to apologize as the transgression severity increases (as more severe 
transgression represent a greater challenge to the moral order). These normative 
perspectives are not supported by our findings. In contrast, we showed that perpetrators are 
rather instrumental in their decision to reconcile by means of an apology. Only when the 
relationship with the victim is important are perpetrators willing to take the first step by 
apologizing. Interestingly, normative perspectives on apologizing do not capture these 
motivations to reconcile and therefore they are seen as being of little predictive value of 
actual behavior (e.g. Bennett & Earwaker, 1994; Tavuchis, 1992). Empirical research on 
reconciliation, however, has shown that victims and perpetrators have their own 
motivations to reconcile (e.g. Leunissen et al., 2013; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) and that 
victims’ and perpetrators’ perspective on when reconciliation should be initiated can differ 
substantially (Leunissen et al., 2013). For this reason it is important to zoom in more 
closely on the perpetrators’ motivations as they are the ones who are expected to initiate 
the reconciliation process. 
 
 
4.6.2 Theoretical contributions 
 
Research on apologizing and reconciliation lacks an overarching theoretical 
conceptualization of perpetrator behavior. Importantly, there is not theory that predicts and 
explains when and why perpetrators are willing to apologize or reconcile with a victim. 
We believe that the “valuable relationship hypothesis” provides important theoretical 
framework through which reconciliation can be studied. First of all, it provides an ultimate 
explanation of why reconciliation occurs (Scott-Philips, Dickins, & West, 2011). For 
primates who live in groups, social relationships are important for reproduction, survival 
and access to important resources. Reconciliation helps to perverse these relationships 
when a conflict occurs (De Waal, 1996). It is in this light not surprising that individuals are 
more motivated to reconcile when those relationships that are important to them are 
threatened due to a conflict. Our research indeed shows that the threat to those important 
relationships motivates people to reconcile.  
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Although the valuable relationship hypothesis provides are simple predictive framework, 
the basic idea is applicable to a host of social situations and relational indicators. In this 
paper, we have zoomed in on two indicators of relational value (i.e. relational closeness 
and relational quality). However, other social variables can also influence relational value. 
For instance power, defined as ‘the capacity to alter others’ states by providing or 
withholding resources and administering punishments’ (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 
2003, p. 267), likewise provides relational value, especially for those in a low power 
position. A straightforward prediction, based on this theoretical framework, is that when a 
perpetrator transgresses against a high-power person, he/she is more motivated to reconcile 
than when the perpetrator transgress against a low-power person. This can be predicted 
because the relationship of a low power perpetrator with a high power victim is valuable as 
the victim can provide valuable resources to the perpetrator. In contrast, when a high 
power perpetrator transgresses against a low power victim, initiation of reconciliation by 
the perpetrator is much less likely as the relationship is of less value to a high power 
perpetrator. Interdependence is another indicator of relational value. As a perpetrator is 
more interdependent on a victim for valued outcomes, the more this relationship is 
valuable to a perpetrator. As such, when a transgression threatens a relationship that is 
characterized by high interdependence between perpetrator and victim, perpetrators are 
more likely to initiate reconciliation, as for instance by apologizing. As such, we believe 
that the valuable relationship hypothesis provides an important theoretical framework that 
helps us to understand why perpetrators initiate reconciliation (i.e. to preserve valuable 
relationships) and when they initiate reconciliation (when a transgression threatens a 
relationship that is valuable to them). 
 
 
4.6.3 Strengths and limitations 
 
An important strength of the current set of studies is that we show the same effects when 
using autobiographical narrative methodology, which has a high external validity with 
scenario methodology in which we could control for the type of transgression. Moreover, 
we operationalized relational closeness in a number of different ways: as a generalized 
need; as specific to the victim of a recalled transgression; and manipulated using a scenario 
methodology. Indeed, the fact that we find the same results over a number of different 
methodologies and measurements gives us confidence in the presented results and 
conclusions. 
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4.6.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Interpersonal conflict is an inevitable part of living and working together in groups. It is 
therefore important to understand when people are willing to reconcile following a 
conflict. A functional approach to this phenomenon can help us understand when and why 
people are willing to do so. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5. SORRY SEEMS TO BE THE HARDEST WORD: FORECASTING ERRORS IN 
THE AVERSIVENESS OF APOLOGIZING8 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of a transgression, perpetrators are typically expected to respond to their 
misconduct by apologizing (Goffman, 1971). Indeed, apologies serve an important 
function in the regulation of the aftermath of conflicts. For instance, they help to foster 
forgiveness between victim and perpetrator (Leunissen, De Cremer, Reinders Folmer, & 
Van Dijke, 2013; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997), reduce anger towards the 
perpetrator (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989), and they help reestablish cooperation 
between victim and perpetrator (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002). 
 Despite these positive effects of apologies (including many effects that also 
benefit the perpetrator), perpetrators are generally reluctant to apologize (Lazare, 2004; 
Leunissen, De Cremer, & Reinders Folmer, 2012). Recent advances in research on 
apologizing and reconciliation have revealed a number of reasons why perpetrators may 
not apologize. Perpetrators might see their behavior as justified, therefore not willing to 
apologize (Baumeister, 1999; Leunissen et al., 2013). Moreover, apologizing means 
surrendering power by providing the victim with the choice to forgive or not, and risking 
subsequent demand for reparations (Leunissen et al., 2012; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). 
Additionally, by admitting blame for a transgression, perpetrators might lose their positive 
standing in the community (Schönbach, 1990) and reduce feelings of positive self-worth 
(Okimoto, Wenzel, & Hedrick, 2013). 
 Therefore, it may not be surprising that perpetrators hold negative associations with the 
act of apologizing, and therefore may not easily apologize (Lazare, 2004). But are these 
associations accurate? Anecdotal evidence suggests that perpetrators are generally content 
with the apologies they have offered (Lazare, 2004), and empirical research shows that 
they feel more regret over the apologies they have not offered than over apologies they 
have offered, suggesting that perpetrators look back positively at apologies they have 
offered (Exline et al., 2007). These findings are not in line with the negative associations 
that perpetrators hold with apologizing. Perpetrators predict a strong aversiveness towards 
apologizing (Lazare, 2004), but this aversiveness is not present when looking back at 
apologies that were given. Could it be that perpetrators make a forecasting error when 
predicting the aversiveness of apologizing? 
Research on affective forecasting shows that people are usually inaccurate in predicting the 
intensity of the hedonic consequences of future events (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; Wilson et 
                                                          
8 This chapter is based on Leunissen, De Cremer, Van Dijke, Reinders Folmer, (under review) 
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al., 2000). For example, people overestimate the intensity of regret they will experience 
when just missing the subway (Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004), and they 
overestimate the intensity of happiness that they will experience when their favorite 
football team wins (Wilson, et al., 2000). 
Although apologizing has both negative and positive effects for perpetrators, it is likely 
that a perpetrator’s forecast on the act of apologizing is disproportionately influenced by 
the negative effects associated with apologizing. This prediction follows from research 
showing that the potential for negative effects causes more distress than the potential for 
positive effects (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 1991; Taylor, 1991), 
thus giving negative effects a greater impact on forecasting errors (Gilbert et al., 1998). At 
the same time, perpetrators may underestimate the psychological mechanisms that 
ameliorate distress once it is experienced (i.e. the psychological immune system; Gilbert et 
al., 1998). This results in a forecasting error in which perpetrator overestimate the 
experienced aversiveness of an apology. 
In the present paper, we aim to provide more insight into a perpetrator’s decision to 
apologize by investigating whether perpetrators accurately construe the act of apologizing. 
It is important to know whether perpetrators indeed overestimate the aversiveness of 
apologizing because people’s decisions to take a certain course of action are often based on 
how people predict the future hedonic consequences of those actions. Most research up till 
now has investigated interpersonal processes that predict a perpetrators willingness to 
apologize. We aim to increase our understanding of the apology process by looking at 
intrapersonal variables, which are arguably also important in this process (Okimoto, et al., 
2013). In Studies 1 we show that people make a forecasting error by overestimating the 
predicted aversiveness of an apology compared to the experienced aversiveness in a 
controlled laboratory experiment. In Study 2, by using an autobiographical narrative 
methodology, we show the same effect using naturally occurring apologies in 
organizational settings. Finally, in Study 3 we show this forecasting effect with a within-
subjects design and also show that the forecasts have an effect of apology behavior. 
 
 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 5.1 
 
In this study, we aim to show our proposed forecasting effect by showing that the predicted 
aversiveness of an apology is higher than the aversiveness people actually experience 
when apologizing. To test this forecasting effect, we had participants commit an 
interpersonal transgression. We compared responses of participants who were asked to 
imagine apologizing for the transgression with those of participants who were asked to 
actually apologize. We also included a third condition in which participants imagined 
committing a transgression and imagined apologizing for the transgression. As we expect 
that people’s perceptions of an apology are already shaped before they commit a 
transgression, we included this condition to show that the forecasted aversiveness of an 
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apology is not contingent upon whether a perpetrator has already committed a 
transgression or not, but rather on the act of apologizing. 
 
 
5.2.1 Method 
 
Participants & design. A total of 118 students (58 women; Mage = 21.4; SDage = 2.7) 
participated for partial course credit. They were randomly assigned to a imagined 
transgression & imagined apology, a real transgression & imagined apology or a real 
transgression & real apology condition. 
Procedure. The first part of the experiment was designed to create a 
transgression. After the participants had committed the transgression we introduced our 
forecasting manipulation and finally we assessed the dependent variables. 
Transgression. We used a paradigm developed by SimanTov-Nachlieli and 
Shnabel (in press) to experimentally create a transgression. The study was introduced to 
participants as a study on performance-contingent pay. It was explained that participants 
could win points in this experiment. These points earned participants tickets for a lottery 
for a 50 euro gift voucher. Participants would play a pub quiz against another participant 
who was ostensibly also in the lab (in reality, the interaction with this other ‘player’ was 
preprogrammed). Before participants played the game, they were asked to divide 60 points 
between themselves and the other player (the other player could also divide 60 points). 
After the pub quiz, the 60 points would be divided in accordance with the proposed 
division of the winner of the pub quiz. 
 After participants proposed a division of the points, they continued to the pub 
quiz game. This game consisted of 5 multiple choice questions and 5 questions on which 
participants had to estimate the correct answer (e.g. How many moons does the planet 
Mars have?). Participants would receive 1 point for each correctly answered question. The 
player who was closest to the correct answer would receive the point for each ‘estimate 
question’. The quiz was rigged by telling participants afterwards they were closer to the 
real answer than their opponent was on the estimation questions. As such, we could tell 
every participant that they were the winner of the quiz and that the points would be divided 
as they had decided at the beginning of the experiment. 
Forecasting manipulation. Participants in the real transgression conditions were 
told that they had divided the points less fairly than the other player and not in accordance 
with the social norms in these kinds of situations. Participants in the real transgression & 
imagined apology condition were asked to imagine apologizing to the other player for this. 
Participants in the real transgression & real apology condition were told that they had to 
apologize for this to the other player. On the next screen, they could type in the apology 
and send it to the other player. Participants in the imagined transgression & imagined 
apology condition were asked to imagine they had divided the point unfairly and not in 
accordance with social norms in these situations, and were asked to imagine apologizing 
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for this. After the manipulation, (forecasted) aversiveness towards apologizing was 
measured with: How “stressful”, hard”, “unpleasant”, “humiliating” it was (would it be) to 
apologize? (α = .89). These 4 items loaded on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 3.03, 
explaining 75.84% of the variance. 
 
 
5.2.2 Results 
 
 An ANOVA showed a main effect of the forecasting manipulation (F(2, 115) = 
6.30, p = .003, η2 = .10). Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the real 
transgression & real apology condition experienced less aversiveness towards apologizing 
(M = 2.55, SD = 1.50) than participants predicted in the forecasted transgression & 
forecasted apology condition (M =3.74, SD = 1.47; p = .001) and participants in the real 
transgression & forecasted apology condition (M =3.33, SD = 1.55; p = .03). There was 
no difference in predicted aversiveness between the imagined transgression & imagined 
apology condition and the real transgression & imagined apology condition (p = .45). 
 
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
 
These results support our hypothesis that perpetrators make a forecasting error when 
predicting how aversive it is to apologize9. Perpetrators in both imagined apology 
conditions overestimated the aversiveness of apologizing compared to the aversiveness 
that perpetrators experienced in the real apology condition. Perpetrators also overestimated 
the aversiveness of an apology when imagining both committing a transgression and 
imagining apologizing for it. This shows that the forecasting error does not only emerge 
when people have already committed a transgression but rather that aversiveness is 
generally associated with apologizing. 
 
 
5.3 EXPERIMENT 5.2 
 
 Study 2 was designed to test whether these effects also generalize to meaningful 
interpersonal settings. In Study 1, the interpersonal offense and the apology were situated 
                                                          
9 We replicated this study in order to address a possible alternative explanation. Participants received 
specific instructions about how to actually apologize (by typing the apology into the pop-up screen, 
which would then be communicated via the computer network) whereas participants who imagined 
apologizing did not receive such specific instructions. Therefore, it could be that participants’ 
imagined apology actually took a more aversive form (e.g., having to do it in public) compared to the 
apology in the real apology condition. To address this, we added in the two forecasting conditions 
the instructions: Imagine that you were told to apologize for this by means of typing a message on the 
next screen. The results (N = 89) showed the exact same pattern as reported in Study 1. 
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in a (preprogrammed) computer network setting, allowing for strong experimental control. 
Yet, this relatively anonymous setting may also have minimized identity effects of the 
apology, thus potentially limiting our conclusions to offenses of low severity. Study 2 was 
designed to address this. This time, we asked participants to remember an apology episode 
or to imagine an apology episode in the context of their daily work (taken from Leunissen 
et al., 2013). 
 
 
5.3.1 Method 
 
Participants & design. A total of 74 participants (29 women; M(age) = 32.31; SD(age) = 
9.23) participated in this study. Participants were recruited through the online system 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were asked to participate only if they had a job. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a forecasting or experience condition. 
Procedure. This study was introduced as a study on social experiences at work. 
In the forecasting condition, participants were asked: Please imagine the following 
situation: In the near future you do something that somebody else in your organization 
experiences as unpleasant or unjust. This can be an error you made, a (serious) 
disagreement of opinion, or a personal conflict. Imagine that you would apologize for this. 
Participants in the experience condition were asked: Please remember a situation from the 
near past in which you did something that somebody else in the organization that you work 
in experienced as unpleasant or unjust and for which you apologized. This can be an error 
you made, a (serious) disagreement of opinion, or a personal conflict. Participants in the 
experience condition were also asked to write down a paragraph on the incident. 
Averseness of apologizing was measured with the same items as in Study 1 and 2 (α = .89; 
the 4 items loaded on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.87, explaining 71.63% of the 
variance). 
In order to control for potential differences in severity of the imagined versus real 
transgressions, we asked: “How severe is the situation that you imagine apologizing for?” 
(Forecast condition) and “How severe was the situation that you just described?” 
(Experience condition). All items were measured on a 1 (not at all), to 7 (very much) scale. 
We also assessed the communication channel that was used to deliver the apology: “How 
do you imagine apologizing?” or “How did you apologize?” (Answer options: Face-to-
face, through email, through telephone, by letter, other). 
 
 
5.3.2 Results 
 
Across the two conditions, the mean transgression severity was 4.27 (SD = 1.50), there was 
no significant difference between the forecast and experience condition on this measure (p 
= .10). A regression analysis our forecasting manipulation (effect coded: forecast condition 
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= -1, experience condition = 1) and transgression severity (standardized) as independent 
variables showed a significant effect of our forecasting manipulation on apology 
averseness (b = -.34, t(70) = -2.25, p = .03, r2 = .07). As expected participants in the 
forecast condition predicted that it would be more averse to apologize (M = 4.34, SD = 
1.18), than participants in the experience condition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.68). We also 
obtained a significant effect of transgression severity (b = .70, t(70) = 4.45, p < .001, r2 = 
.22), indicating that the more severe a transgression was perceived to be, the more aversive 
participants considered apologizing to be. The interaction effect between our forecasting 
manipulation and transgression severity was not significant (p = .91), thus revealing no 
evidence that the forecasting effect is limited to offenses of low severity. 
Inspection of the apology communication channel showed that 93% of participants 
imagined apologizing, or had apologized, face-to-face. An analysis on this subsample 
showed the same effect of our forecasting manipulation (p = .009), even when controlling 
for transgression severity (p = .049). 
 
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
 
In Study 2, we replicated our forecasting effect using naturally occurring apologies. This 
study adds to the ecological validity of the reported effects in this paper. Additionally, it 
shows that the forecasting effect that we find in Study 1 is not limited to anonymous 
situations that potentially have low identity effects but also emerges in the case of face-to-
face apologies. Finally, the forecasting effect was found regardless of the severity of the 
offense, also suggesting that potential identity effects do not influence the forecasting 
effect. 
 
 
5.4 EXPERIMENT 5.3 
 
Study 3 was designed to show that the forecasted averseness of apologies had an effect on 
people’s apology behavior. Do people who generally consider apologies averse, apologize 
less than those who consider apologies less averse? Moreover, we wanted to test our 
forecasting error prediction in a field setting using naturally occurring transgressions and 
apologies. To do this, we conducted an organizational field study using two measurements 
separated in time. 
 
 
5.4.1 Method 
 
Participants & design. This study was part of a larger multi-wave study. We invited 834 
employees from a variety of occupations in the Netherlands to participate in the study. A 
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total of 673 employees responded at the first measurement, and 446 employees responded 
again at the subsequent measurement point (there were 22 days between the last day that 
employees could respond at T1 and the first day that employees could respond at T2). Of 
the employees who completed both surveys, 264 were male (59.2%). The mean age was 42 
years, 11% had a college degree and the respondents worked on average 11.89 years in 
their organization. 
Materials and procedure. The instructions for the first measurement (i.e. the 
forecasting measurement, T1) were the same as the forecasting condition in Study 2. 
Forecasted averseness of apologizing was also measured with the same 4 items as in the 
forecasting condition of Study 2 (α = .91; a principal component analysis indicated that all 
four items loaded on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 3.16, explaining 79.9% of the 
variance). 
The instructions for the second measurement point of the study (T2) were the same as the 
instructions of the experience condition of Study 2. After this, participants were first asked 
to write a (short) paragraph on what happened. Whether participant had apologized or not 
in this period was used as our first dependent variable. The experienced averseness 
towards apologizing was measured using the same 4 items as in the experience condition 
of Study 2 (α = .88; a principal component analysis indicated that all four items loaded on 
a single factor with an eigenvalue of 3.16, explaining 79.2% of the variance). 
Data analysis strategy. To test our prediction that people who forecasted high 
averseness towards apologizing are less likely to apologize, we tested whether forecasted 
apology aversion is a predictor for whether people had apologized or not. Second, to test 
whether people make a forecasting error when predicting the averseness of apologizing, we 
contrasted the forecasted and experienced averseness towards apologizing in the 
subsample of those respondents who had apologized. 
 
 
5.4.2 Results 
 
Of the 446 employees who responded at the second measurement point, 186 (41.7%) 
employees indicated they had not apologized. A logistic regression analysis with 
forecasted averseness of apologizing as continuous independent variable and apology 
behavior as dependent variable indicated a significant effect of forecasted averseness (b = -
.23, Wald = 5.71, p = .02). The likelihood of apologizing among respondents who did not 
consider it aversive to apologize (-1 SD) was significantly higher than 50% (b = .59, Wald 
= 16.59, p < .001, Odds: 1.80, percentage likelihood of an apology: 64%). For respondents 
who forecasted that it would be relatively aversive to apologize (+1 SD), the likelihood of 
actually apologizing did not significantly differ from 50% (b = .13, Wald = 1.00, p = .32, 
Odds: 1.14, percentage likelihood of an apology: 53%). A paired sample t-test on the 
subsample of respondents who had indicated that they had apologized, overestimated the 
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averseness of an apology at T1 (M = 2.84, SD = 1.38) compared to the actual averseness at 
T2 (M = 2.64, SD = 1.41; t(259) = 2.15, p = .03). 
 
 
5.4.3 Discussion 
In study 3, we showed that the forecast on apology aversiveness has consequences for 
apology behavior. The more aversive people forecasted apologizing to be, the less likely 
they were to have apologized. Moreover, among those who had apologized we still find 
our proposed forecasting effect, showing that the predicted aversiveness of apologizing is 
higher than the actual experienced aversiveness. 
 
 
5.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Perpetrators are usually aversive towards apologizing, but is it really such an aversive 
thing to do? Based on the affective forecasting literature, we predicted that perpetrators 
might overestimate how aversive apologizing is (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). In Study 1 we 
showed that perpetrators commit a forecasting error by overestimating the aversiveness of 
an apology. Moreover, we showed that this forecasting error does not depend on whether 
people have already committed a transgression. Thus, this process is not specific to the 
psychological state that is activated by having done wrong (e.g., guilt, identity concerns); 
rather, it seems to reflect a more generalized negative belief about the aversiveness of 
apologizing. In Study 2 and 3, we extended these controlled laboratory results to 
meaningful real-world offenses and apologies.  
 
 
5.5.1 Implications  
 
This research suggests that the reconciliation process is often hindered because of the way 
perpetrators misconstrue the delivery of an apology. That perpetrators make this 
forecasting error regarding the aversiveness of an apology is important because people’s 
decision to pursue a certain course of action is often based on affective forecasts (Wilson 
& Gilbert, 2003). Therefore, the decision to apologize is likely to depend also on how 
perpetrators construe the act of apologizing itself. Overestimating how aversive an apology 
will be thus leads to an underutilization of apologies (Study 3). As withholding apologies 
has negative consequences for the aftermath of conflict, such as increased anger among 
victims (Ohbuchi et al., 1989), this forecasting error thus contributes to conflict 
escalations.  
These studies also shows that research on reconciliation and apologies can benefit from 
studying intra-psychological processes that influence a perpetrators willingness to 
apologize in addition to interpersonal processes. Intrapsychological processes regarding 
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the willingness to apologize and the effect of apologies on the perpetrator is an area that is 
largely unexplored (Okimoto et al., 2013).  
 
 
5.5.2 Future directions 
  
As the studied forecasting effect does have a negative impact on a perpetrators willingness 
to apologize, future research should investigate how this forecasting effect can be 
ameliorated. This might not be an easy task given people’s preoccupation with negative 
over positive effects of behavior (Baumeister et al., 2001). Because perpetrators seem to 
focus mainly on the negative implications that apologies have for them, and give to little 
weight to the positive effects that apologies have, informing perpetrators on the positive 
side of apologizing may be a simple and effective way of motivating them to apologize, 
thereby aiding reconciliation between victim and perpetrator. Indeed, by stressing the 
positive effects of apologizing, it may shift the balance in favor of apologizing. 
Victims may likewise have an influence on the positive and negative expectations 
regarding the effects of an apology. Previous research has shown that more forgiving 
victims are more likely to receive an apology (Leunissen et al., 2012). Indeed, if the victim 
takes a forgiving stance towards perpetrator, this may influence the forecasts that 
perpetrators have regarding an apology. As forgiveness is more likely to follow in close 
relationships (Rusbult, Verette,  Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991), the type of relationship 
between perpetrator and victim may also have an important influence on the reported 
forecasting error. 
 
 
5.5.3 Strengths and limitations  
 
By using an online environment in Study 1, we were able to keep the setting in which an 
apology was offered constant within the real apology condition (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & 
Manstead, 2004). Yet, this controlled setting also implies a limitation because participants 
did not apologize face-to-face, thereby potentially minimizing the identity costs of an 
apology. We therefore replicated the effect obtained in Study 1 in a naturalistic setting in 
which the overwhelming majority of respondents apologized in a face-to-face manner 
(Study 2). A limitation of such a face-to-face setting is that changes in how victim react 
and behave towards the perpetrator also have an influence on the experienced averseness 
of the apology, thus potentially making the imagined and real apology setting less directly 
comparable. A limitation of Study 2 and 3 is that participants both imagined a 
transgression and imagined apologizing for it. Although the results of two lab studies 
showed that the forecasting effect was driven by the (imagined) apology and not whether 
the transgression was imagined or not, this remains a limitation of the field studies. In sum, 
to validly answer our research question, it is important to achieve both high levels of 
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experimental control and ecological validity by combining different research 
methodologies  
 
 
5.5.4 Conclusion 
 
Apologies are an important instrument for victim and perpetrator to reconcile. 
However, perpetrators have negative associations with apologies, therefore often choosing 
to withhold an apology. Our studies revealed that perpetrators overestimate the averseness 
of apologizing, focusing too little on the positive effects that apologies also have for a 
perpetrator. Indeed, when it comes to apologizing, sorry seems to be the hardest word. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In this thesis, I have aimed at providing a better understanding of an important and 
understudied aspect of reconciliation and trust repair, namely a perpetrator’s willingness to 
apologize. In order to do this, I investigated a number of components of a transgression 
and post-transgression period that are likely to influence this willingness to apologize: the 
role of the victimized party, the intentionality of the transgression, the relational value of 
the relationship for the perpetrator, and finally the construal of apologizing itself. 
 
 
6.1 Summary of the empirical findings 
 
In Chapter 2, I investigated how a victim’s reaction to a transgression influences the 
perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. Here, I advance the argument that apologizing is a 
socially risky strategy for a perpetrator. Apologies may have positive effects for a 
perpetrator, such as being forgiven and a victim being more willing to reestablish 
cooperation with the perpetrator. However, apologizing may also have negative effects. By 
admitting blame, a perpetrator risks the possibility of a host of aversive social 
consequences such as rejection, humiliation and punishment, which would not be the case 
if they had not accepted blame by apologizing. As such, if the victim is willing to forgive, 
the perpetrator is better off by apologizing. However, if the victim is not willing to forgive 
a perpetrator is better off by not apologizing. Based on this instrumental approach to 
apologizing, I predicted that perpetrators would thus be influenced by how likely they 
think it is that a victim will reciprocate an apology with forgiveness. Cues like how the 
victims reacts towards a perpetrators after a transgression are likely to influence this. 
Additionally, because perpetrators have to trust the victim to reciprocate their 
apology with forgiveness, we expected that dispositional trust would moderate the effect of 
a victim’s reaction to a transgression on the willingness to apologize. While people high in 
dispositional trust generally expect that others are trustworthy and willing to reciprocate 
cooperative behavior, people low in dispositional trust base their expectations more on 
environmental cues of a person’s trustworthiness. As such, I expected that the effect of a 
victim’s reaction to a transgression would be particularly pronounced among people low in 
dispositional trust. 
  In order to test this hypothesis, I designed a new lab paradigm in which 
participants were induced to commit a transgression against another participant who was 
ostensibly also in the lab. After participants had committed this transgression, the 
likelihood of forgiveness was manipulated by means of a message that participants 
received from the other participant. This message indicated that the victim was either 
likely to forgive or unlikely to forgive. The results showed that perpetrators were indeed 
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more willing to apologize when it was likely that the victim would reciprocate with 
forgiveness. Moreover, this effect was particularly pronounced among participants low in 
dispositional trust, and not among those high in dispositional trust. We also found evidence 
of our proposed mechanism. The moderated relationship between a victim’s reaction to a 
transgression and the willingness to apologize was mediated by the perception that an 
apology would indeed restore the relationship between perpetrator and victim in this 
situation.  
 In Chapter 3, I investigated how specific types of transgressions shape the 
willingness of a perpetrator to apologize and a victim’s desire to receive an apology. This 
chapter was aimed at investigating how the intentionality of the transgression (i.e. 
intentional vs. accidental) shapes the willingness to apologize and to receive an apology. 
Second, I investigate the congruence of these apology needs between victims and 
perpetrators. In order to understand the influence of intentionality on apology needs, I 
investigated how different emotions that are experienced by victims and perpetrators after 
a transgression shape the need for apologies. More specifically, I hypothesized that guilt 
would be an important emotional catalyst for the perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. 
The intentionality of the transgression was expected to have an important influence on 
whether perpetrators experience guilt and thus, through guilt, on their willingness to 
apologize for the transgression. I expected that perpetrators would mainly feel guilty after 
unintentional transgressions and not so much after intentional transgressions. In contrast, I 
expected that anger would drive the need for an apology for victims. However, the 
relationship between intentionality and anger is opposite to the relationship between 
intentionality and guilt. Anger is more strongly experienced after intentional than after 
unintentional transgressions. 
Because I expected that the willingness to give an apology and the desire to 
receive an apology would be driven by anger (victims) and guilt (perpetrators), and that 
anger and guilt are differentially influenced by the intentionality of the transgression, I 
expected a mismatch between a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize and a victim’s desire 
to receive an apology. I expected that perpetrators would mainly want to offer an apology 
after accidental transgressions because they feel a strong sense of guilt, while victims, who 
are less likely to experience anger after unintentional transgressions, would not have a 
strong desire for an apology. On the other hand, after an intentional transgression, victims 
were expected to feel anger about the transgression and would thus have a strong desire for 
an apology while perpetrators, who are less likely to feel guilty about the transgression, 
would not be willing to offer an apology as they do not feel guilty.  This would thus 
constitute a mismatch because perpetrators mainly want to apologize when victims do not 
have a strong desire for an apology (i.e. after unintentional transgressions), while 
perpetrators do not want to apologize when victims have a particularly strong desire for an 
apology (i.e. after intentional transgressions).  
Across three experiments, I showed that perpetrators and victims have indeed 
different apology needs depending on the intentionality of a transgression. In experiment 
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3.1 I used a free recall task (asking participants to remember a situation in which they were 
either perpetrator or victims of either an accidental or intentional transgression) and asked 
about the associated emotions and apology needs. In experiment 3.2 I used a scenario of a 
transgression of which participants were either victim or perpetrator. By using a scenario 
methodology I was able to exclude that systematic differences in transgressions caused our 
proposed effects. Finally, in experiment 3.3 I tested my hypothesis again with a free recall 
task among employees in a work setting (rather than students) and we also measured 
subsequent apology behavior and forgiveness. The results were in line with the hypotheses. 
Victims mainly wanted to receive an apology after intentional transgressions while 
perpetrators mainly wanted to offer an apology after unintentional transgressions. the 
reason for these differing need was indeed that the emotions of guilt and anger are 
oppositely affected by the intentionality of a transgression. 
This chapter adds to our understanding of apologizing by showing the importance 
of guilt in a perpetrators willingness to apologize. Likewise, for victims anger is a reliable 
predictor for the desire of an apology. I showed a mismatch between the perpetrator’s and 
victim’s need for apologies after these types of transgressions. This illustrates how 
different perceptions of post-transgression behavior can lead to further conflict, especially 
after intentional transgressions. These studies are among the few that have looked at 
victims and perpetrators simultaneously, showing that the desires to reconcile and make 
amends can often be mismatched after a conflict. Indeed, these conflicting desires can add 
to conflict escalation due to different motivations of the parties involved.  
 In Chapter 4, I zoomed in on the type of relationship that a perpetrator has with 
the victim. Based on the Valuable Relationship Hypothesis, I predicted that the willingness 
of a perpetrator to apologize should be contingent on the relational closeness between 
victim and perpetrator. As apologizing is a means for a perpetrator to restore a broken 
relationship, whether or not a perpetrator is motivated to restore that relationship should be 
depended on whether the perpetrator considers that relationship valuable. Across 3 
experiments, using both free recall and scenario methodologies, different populations 
(students and employees) and different measures and manipulations of relational closeness, 
I indeed found relational closeness to be a reliable predictor of the willingness to 
apologize. As in Chapter 3, the effect of relational closeness on the perpetrators 
willingness to apologize was mediated by feelings of guilt. Perpetrators feel guiltier when 
they transgress against a close, rather than a distant other and the guiltier they feel, the 
higher their willingness to apologize. These data thus provide more support for the role of 
apologies as a mechanism to maintain valuable relationships in the aftermath of a conflict 
or transgression. Moreover, it provides more evidence for the role of guilt as an emotion 
that motivates people to take relationship restoring action. 
 Finally, in Chapter 5 I zoomed in on an important intrapsychological cause that 
can predict a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize, namely the aversiveness of 
apologizing itself. Despite the often cited positive effects of apologies on victims, 
perpetrators hold strong negative associations with apologizing. But are these associations 
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accurate? Is apologizing as aversive as perpetrators expect it to be? Based on the literature 
on affective forecasting, I predicted that perpetrators overestimate the aversiveness of 
apologizing. Across two lab experiments and two organizational field studies, I indeed 
found that perpetrators overestimate the aversiveness of apologizing. These results show 
that perpetrators may underuse apologies due to how they misconstrue the act of 
apologizing. Indeed, this forecasting error may lead to perpetrators refraining to apologize 
because they misconstrue the act of apologizing itself. Withholding an apology in the 
aftermath of a transgression may cause a conflict to escalate. This thesis thus shows that 
interpersonal, situational, and intrapersonal factors can all influence the willingness to 
apologize for a transgression. 
 
 
6.2. Theoretical implications 
 
This thesis provides some new insight into the current ideas on reconciliation and trust 
repair. A prevalent model in reconciliation is the apology-forgiveness cycle.  The apology-
forgiveness cycle is a rudimentary model on forgiveness that assumes that a perpetrator 
takes initiative to reconcile (i.e. apologizes) and a victim reciprocates with forgiveness. 
Based on this research in this thesis, it seems there are some problems with this model. 
First, in Chapter 2 we show that the causality assumed in the model (from apology to 
forgiveness) can also work the other way around. That is, signs of forgiveness can also 
encourage apologies. As such, the relationship between apologies and forgiveness is much 
more complicated than the apology-forgiveness cycle would suggest. Moreover, Chapter 3 
shows that apologies are mainly offered after transgressions of which the victim is not 
particularly angry in the first place, and such quiet forgiving. This shows that the 
relationship between apologies and forgiveness is at least in part explained by the type of 
transgression that has been committed: in situations in which an apology is offered, victims 
are already quiet forgiving. 
 A second implication that the current thesis has for research on reconciliation and 
trust repair consists of the function of apologies. The function of an apology is said to 
come from reaffirmation to certain moral norms (Gill, 2000; Tavuchis, 1991). This 
prevents the perpetrator from being excluded from the moral community but also ensures 
the victim and the community that the moral standards that they live by will by upheld in 
the future. My research shows that at least for perpetrators, apologies do not seem to have 
this moral function. A number of research findings do not support this view on apologies. 
First, perpetrators apologize less after intentional than after unintentional transgressions. 
Arguably, intentional transgressions pose a stronger threat to moral norms than 
unintentional transgressions. Thus, perpetrators do not apologize more when there is a 
greater threat to the moral status quo. Second, the relationship between the victim and 
perpetrator matters in the perpetrators willingness to apologize. The relationship between 
the victim and perpetrator should not matter according to this moral perspective, what 
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matters is the transgression itself. Nevertheless, I find differences depending on the 
relationship closeness between victim and perpetrator, among the same transgressions. 
Finally, the victim’s reaction to a transgression, in which a stronger negative reaction 
towards the perpetrator could be indicative of the moral outrage associated with a 
transgression, influence perpetrators to apologize less. As such, these reactions do not aid 
in restoring moral order and perpetrators are not motivated by these reactions to apologize. 
As such, these perspectives on apologies (apology-forgiveness cycle and the moral 
function of apologies) do not provide a good theoretical framework because they either do 
not provide any predictions on when perpetrators are willing to apologize (i.e. the apology-
forgiveness cycle) or the predictions are not supported by the current research findings (i.e. 
the moral perspective on apologizing). 
Below, I offer a alternative theoretical perspective on apologizing. I do this for 
two reasons. First, I hope that this will contribute to theory building on apologizing and 
reconciliation in general. There are very few theories and/or models developed on 
reconciliation (e.g. Kim et al., 2009; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) and in order to advance this 
field, we need to have theories that provide us with testable hypotheses. Perspectives like 
the apology-forgiveness cycle and the moral functions of apologies do not offer testable 
predictions, nor are they in line with the current set of studies. Second, a comprehensive 
theoretical model may help to provide insight into the question why humans, like other 
kinds of other primates or other species such as hyenas for that matter (Schino, 2000), have 
developed mechanisms to cope with conflict and to initiate and accomplish reconciliation. 
As such, this theory does not only provide the answers to the ’when’ question (when do 
people apologize?) but also to the “why” question (why do people apologize?). 
This perspective is based on the Valuable Relationship Hypothesis (De Waal, 
2000). The Valuable Relationship Hypothesis originated from primate research on 
reconciliation. It states that reconciliation will be especially likely to occur when there is a 
conflict between two parties of which the relationship represents a high social or 
reproductive value (De Waal, 2000). This idea is based on the fact that primates live in 
groups and that they are dependent on others for survival and reproduction (Brewer, 2004; 
De Waal, 2000).  Social relationships provide benefits and conflict threatens these benefits. 
Therefore, a mechanism, which we now call reconciliation, was developed that help to 
preserve these relationships in the wake of a conflict. As such, reconciliation is functional, 
or as De Waal (1996) describes it: “The goal of conflict settlement is not peace per se; it is 
the maintenance of relationships of proven value” (p. 231).  
While the Valuable Relationship Hypothesis originates from research on 
primates, these processes are obviously applicable to human reconciliation as well. 
Humans also are social animals and rely upon social relationships for their safety, 
wellbeing, and reproduction. These needs and benefits are also threatened whenever 
conflicts emerge. This is particularly the case when conflicts occur within valuable 
relationships. Individuals are not equally dependent on everybody in their group (strangers 
vs. friends for instance); some relationships are more valuable to them than others. For 
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individuals, it is important to maintain those relationships that are valuable to them. This 
means that when a conflict arises people should be most motivated to reconcile when that 
relationship is valuable to them. For perpetrators, an apology is a means to reconcile. Thus 
applying this Valuable Relationship Hypothesis to the willingness to apologize (or more in 
general, to reconcile) leads to the hypothesis that perpetrators should be more willing to 
apologize when they have transgressed in a valuable relationship. As such, it is the value 
of the relationship between perpetrator and victim that should be predictive of whether a 
perpetrator is willing to apologize to a victim.  
 
Can we reinterpret the findings in this thesis in terms of the Valuable Relationship 
Hypothesis? Chapter 4 is obviously the most direct test of this idea, showing that 
perpetrators do indeed initiate reconciliation at higher rates in close compared to more 
distant relationships. As close relationships are considered to be more valuable to people 
than more distant relationships, it is to be expected based on the Valuable Relationship 
Hypothesis that perpetrators would initiate reconciliation at a higher rate towards close 
rather than distant relationships. This indeed shows that apologizing serves the function of 
preserving valuable relationships in the aftermath of conflict. 
Chapter 3 also provides a test, although more indirect. As explained in chapter 3, 
intentional transgressions cause less guilt than unintentional transgressions because the 
relationship with the victim is deemed to be less important to the perpetrator. The damage 
to the relationship is, in a way, taken into account when committing an intentional 
transgression. With unintentional transgressions this is not the case. Unintentional 
transgressions cause a relationship to become under strain without the perpetrator 
intending, or even anticipating. Indeed, is seems hard to imagine to intentionally transgress 
in a relationship that is deemed valuable to the perpetrator. Therefore, the intentionality of 
the transgression can be seen has indicative of the value that the perpetrator assigns to the 
relationship. While accidental transgressions can happen in both valuable and less valuable 
relationships, intentional transgression are more diagnostic, being more prevalent among 
less valuable relationships. Indeed, because intentional transgressions are planned, and the 
perpetrator is aware of the damage that an intentional transgression does to the relationship 
beforehand the final decision to actually commit the transgression means that the 
perpetrator is prepared to damage the relationship. As such, the finding that perpetrators 
are more willing to apologize after unintentional transgressions can be explained within the 
Valuable relationship hypothesis framework as the types of relationships that one 
transgresses in intentionally are generally less important to the perpetrator than the 
relationships that one transgresses in unintentionally. 
What about chapter 2? A forgiving reaction of a victim implies that the victim is 
still interested in having a cooperative relationship with the perpetrator. Indeed, in this 
experiment, relational value may have been communicated by the victims by means of an 
(un)forgiving response of the towards the perpetrator. Previous research has indeed 
established this relationship between relational value and forgiveness, showing that 
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forgiveness is more likely to follow in a relationship that is valuable to the victim (e.g. 
McCullough et al., 2010). Forgiving communication is thus a sign that a relationship is 
valuable, and perhaps more importantly, an unforgiving reaction shows that the 
relationship is no longer valuable to the victim. Perpetrators thus act on this information 
and incorporate this in their willingness to reconcile. After all, why would a perpetrator 
invest in a relationship that in all likelihood will cease to exist? This line of reasoning is 
supported by research of Exline and colleagues (Exline et al., 2007) who show that 
perpetrators regret offering apologies when they were not reciprocated by forgiveness and 
as such did not lead to reconciliation. This shows again that perpetrators do not apologize 
for the sake of apologizing (or perhaps to reaffirm certain social or moral norms that 
usually guide our behavior, but were broken in the case of a transgression). It does 
however support the relational repair function of apologizing as the decision to apologize 
or not is contingent upon the relational repair that an apology elicits. 
Thus, the current set of studies provides results that one would expect based in the 
valuable relationship hypothesis framework on apologizing. As such, this framework can 
be applied to human reconciliation behavior (in this case apologizing) and has predictive 
value on when initiation of reconciliation is more likely. 
 
 
6.3 Future research 
 
Future research should be aimed at expanding this framework on apologizing and 
valuable relationships. The valuable relationship hypothesis provides a theoretical 
framework which helps to predict when people apologize, namely when a conflict 
threatens a relationship that is valuable to them. Is also helps us to understand why people 
apologize, namely to maintain relationships that are valuable to them. This framework 
opens up new avenues for future research. I will discuss these for research on 
reconciliation on both perpetrators and victims. 
 
 
6.3.1 Future research on the perpetrator 
 
As mentioned before, the basic premise of the valuable relationship framework is 
that perpetrators are more motivated to reconcile when a relationship is valuable to the 
perpetrator. It should also be noted that this concept of relational value can be applied to a 
host of variables that all shape relational value. When is a relationship valuable? I define 
relational value in terms of interdependence between two parties involved in the conflict 
(Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). The more dependent someone is on outcomes that another 
person can provide through the relationship, the more ‘costly’ a conflict is for that person 
and the more motivated that person should be to reconcile. Interdependence in turn is 
shaped by three factors, namely satisfaction level with the relationship, quality of 
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alternatives to the current relationship and the investment size in the relationship (Rusbult, 
Martz, & Agnew, 1998). As these variables shape the interdependence between (at least) 
two parties, so should be the willingness to reconcile after a conflict. This straightforward 
prediction has a wide array of applications such as in close relationships, social dilemmas 
and power differences. For instance, power differences may shape relational value. Power 
is defined as: ‘the capacity to alter others’ states by providing or withholding resources and 
administering punishments’ (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003, p. 267). As such, for 
perpetrators in a relatively low power position the relationship is likely to be more valuable 
compared to a high power position because the low power person is more dependent on the 
high power person. Initiation for reconciliation is as such more likely when the perpetrator 
holds a relatively low power position compared to the victim.  
 
 
6.3.2 Future research on victims: Victim initiated reconciliation 
 
The valuable relationship hypothesis can also be expanded to provide new 
hypotheses about the role of victims in the reconciliation process. Although in most 
research – and also in the minds of most people - on reconciliation, it is the perpetrator 
who is expected to take the initiative to reconcile, victims have likewise an incentive to 
reconcile. Indeed, most research today on reconciliation and trust repair has investigated 
(the effects of) tactics that perpetrators use to restore the relationship. In fact, it has 
implicitly (or explicitly) been assumed that perpetrators should take the first step in the 
reconciliation process, and not victims. Nevertheless, in case of conflict, both victims and 
perpetrators often have an incentive to restore a damaged relationship. After all, conflicts 
can harm the interest of both the perpetrator and the victim and are stressful for both 
parties (Aureli, 1997). This is especially the case when someone has been victimized in a 
valuable relationship. Victims, like perpetrators can also take the initiative for 
reconciliation (e.g. Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991). I call this concept 
victims initiated reconciliation. 
Victim initiated reconciliation is any behavior, displayed by a victim, aimed at 
restoring the relationship between victim and perpetrator after a conflict took place. As 
such, it differs from forgiveness. Forgiveness is a rather passive response to experienced 
injustice. It is defined as the absence of revenge or avoidance motivations of the victim 
towards the perpetrator (McCullough et al., 1997). Victim initiated reconciliation is an 
active response as it implies that victims take active steps to reconcile (Aquino, Tripp & 
Bies, 2006). These responses include constructive behavioral responses towards the 
perpetrator, aimed at preserving the relationship and can be categorized as voice or loyalty 
responses (Rusbult et al., 1991). Voice is an active, constructive response, aimed at 
discussing the problem with the perpetrator and looking for ways to prevent similar 
conflicts from happening in the future. Loyalty is a constructive response characterized by 
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forgoing a destructive response to a conflict, and instead behaving cooperatively, aimed at 
preventing any further relational deterioration.  
Based on the valuable relationship hypothesis, I expect that both perpetrators and 
victims are more willing to take initiatives for reconciliation when the relationship is 
valuable to them. Research on victims initiated reconciliation is important for a number of 
reasons. First of all, it is important to understand how conflicts can be reconciled. Conflicts 
are an inevitable part of social and organizational life so we need to understand the 
dynamics of conflict reconciliation in order to manage them. Research on conflict 
resolution has mainly investigated the victim perspective of conflicts, conceptualizing the 
victim as a rather passive receiver of trust repair tactics. The assumption underlying this 
perspective usually is that perpetrators are the ones to take the first step in the 
reconciliation process. Nevertheless, perpetrators are often reluctant to do so (e.g. 
Leunissen et al., 2012). Victims however may also have an incentive to repair the broken 
relationship. It is therefore important to understand what victims can do themselves about 
the conflicts they are faced with and when they are likely to do something about it. This 
idea has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, this research would 
advance our understanding of conflict resolution by taking a dyadic perspective on conflict 
resolution, something that is ignored to a large extent in current theorizing on this topic 
(Leunissen et al., 2013). In order to truly understand when reconciliation takes place, we 
need to take into account the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator and the 
motivations of both parties after a conflict emerged. The idea that it is relational value that 
drives reconciliation, and not morality or social norms, provides a novel perspective on 
conflict resolution. Although this idea has a long standing in primate research on 
reconciliation (e.g. De Waal, 2000) is has been largely ignored in research on human 
conflict resolution. The valuable relationship hypothesis provides however clear 
predictions on how reconciliation at the dyadic level should unfold. 
 
 
6.4 Practical implications 
 
Apologies have a very tangible effect in the real world. Not only in private settings are 
apologies effective but they also form an important part of more formal mediation efforts 
and restorative justice conferences. For instance, Cohen (1999) describes an interesting 
case on the Veteran Affairs Medical Center in Lexington, KY. Like most hospitals in the 
US, this medical center too had huge legal costs battling medical malpractice law suits. 
Previous to 1987, they had a policy not to disclose any medical errors, and when an error 
came to light, they followed the usual route through their lawyers. In 1987, after two 
particularly costly law suits they adopted a radically new policy. Now, when an error was 
discovered, they took initiative to inform the patient, explained what happened and 
apologized for the mistakes that were made. The results in terms of lawsuits were 
substantial. The number of law suits dropped significantly and even when a case went to 
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court, the average amount of settlement dropped substantially. The results are explained by 
pointing to the desires of victims after a medical mistake. Victims were mainly interested 
in what went wrong and in an acknowledgement of their damages as a result. Money (a 
lawsuit), was not that important and was usually fueled by the secrecy and lack of empathy 
from the hospital. This is an excellent case to show both the positive effects of apologies 
(more satisfied victims and lesser costs for the perpetrator) and the negative effects of not 
apologizing (the pre-1987 period with extensive legal costs with the hospital). 
What can this research teach us that we can use to fully benefit from the positive 
effects that apologies may have? It is first important to understand and acknowledge that 
perpetrators have their own motivations to apologize and that these motivations are fueled 
by their own situational characteristics. It is not necessarily the case that when victims 
desire an apology that perpetrators are motivated to apologize. In mediation efforts, 
practitioners need to take this into account. 
The emotion of guilt has been shown to be a reliable predictor of apology 
behavior. Indeed, certain types of transgressions (accidental; chapter 3) and relationships 
(e.g. close relationships; chapter 4) cause more feelings of guilt which in turn lead to a 
higher willingness to apologize. So guilt provides one mechanism which lead to apologies. 
This also means that a fruitful strategy for victims to receive an apology is to make 
perpetrators feel guilty, the techniques of which were studied by Vangelisti and colleagues 
(Vangelisti, Daly, & Rudnick, 1991). 
 It is also important to manage how victims react to a transgression during 
mediation. My research shows an important influence on the willingness of perpetrators to 
apologize is the reaction of the victim to a transgression. Apologies can have negative 
social effects for perpetrators such as an impaired social image in the eyes of others (see 
chapter 5) and perpetrators may already be concerned about their public moral image after 
they committed the transgression (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). As such, the willingness to 
apologize is also contingent upon the likelihood that a victim will accept the apology and 
reciprocate with forgiveness. This also means that when victims desire an apology, it is 
advisable not to react to angry or communicate strong feelings of injustice or intentions for 
revenge. This will not motivate a perpetrator to apologize, but rather will make the 
perpetrator more defensive and cautious. 
On a more general level, this research shows the importance of valuable 
relationships as a determinant of apologizing. This once again underlines the importance to 
create positive work environments in which coworkers have high quality relationships and 
are interdependent on each other. Creating these work conditions will lead to an 
environment in which perpetrators are motivated to apologize whenever they have 
wronged a coworker.  
Finally, the present findings highlight the importance of addressing false beliefs 
about apologizing. We have shown that forecasting errors regarding the aversiveness of 
apologies shape a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. Perpetrators tend to focus too 
much on the negative side of apologizing leading to a biased view of the effects of an 
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apology. This in turn leads to an underuse of apologies and thereby to further conflict 
escalation (Cohen, 1999; Ohbuchi et al., 1989). It is therefore important to inform 
perpetrators about the true nature of apologizing. 
 
 
6.5 Concluding thoughts 
 
In his 2000 article, De Waal remarks that ‘Ironically, research on how animals 
spontaneously make up after fights was for a long time ahead of how humans accomplish 
the same goal’ (De Waal, 2000, p. 589). Although research on reconciliation and trust 
repair has become more prevalent during the last 15 years and has increased our 
understanding of this important part of social life, the work is far from over. This is mainly 
exemplified by the lack of research on the perspective of the perpetrator. 
This is unfortunate because in most cases, it is the perpetrator who is at least 
expected to initiate reconciliation. Whether they actually do this, or perhaps when victims 
do this is, of course, open to empirical investigation. Nevertheless, in order for us to truly 
understand reconciliation we need to have more knowledge on the motives and 
determinants of a perpetrator’s willingness to reconcile. Apologies provide one of the most 
important reconciliation tools that perpetrators have at their disposal and therefore research 
on apologizing can provide a fruitful approach to this caveat in our understanding. I hope 
that this thesis provides both the theoretical underpinnings and the methodological tools 
that will aid in future investigations on this topic. 
 
74 
 
75 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Ajzen, I. & Fishbein, M. (1977). Attitude-behavior relations: A theoretical analysis and 
review of the empirical research. Psychological Bulletin, 84, 888-918. 
Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1998). Experimentation in social 
psychology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of 
social psychology,  4th ed. (Vol. 1, pp. 99-142). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Aquino, K., Tripp, T. M., & Bies, R. J. (2006). Getting even or moving on? Power 
procedural justice and types of offense as predictors of revenge, forgivness, 
reconciliation and avoidance in organizations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 
653-668. 
Aureli, F. (1997). Post-conflict anxiety in nonhuman primates: The mediating role of 
emotion in conflict resolution. Aggressive Behavior, 23, 315-328. 
Aureli, F., Cords, M. & Van Schaik, C. P. (2002). Conflict resolution following aggression 
in gregarious animals: a predictive framework. Animal Behaviour, 64, 325-343. 
Baumeister, R. F. (1999). Evil: Inside human violence and cruelty. Holt Paperback: New 
York, N.Y. 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E. Finkenauer, C. & Vohs, K. D. (1991). Bad is stronger 
than good. Review of General Psychology, 5, 323-370. doi: 10.1037/1089-
2680.5.4.323 
Baumeister, R. F. & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal 
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 497-
529. 
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M. & Wotman, S. R. (1990). Victim and perpetrator 
accounts of interpersonal conflict: Autobiographical narratives about anger. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 994-1005. 
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: an interpersonal 
approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 243-267. 
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1995). Personal narratives about 
guilt: Role in action control and interpersonal relationships. Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology, 17, 173-198. 
Bachman, G. F. & Guerrero, L. K. (2006). Forgiveness, apology, and communicative 
responses to hurtful events. Communication Reports, 19, 45-56. 
Bennett, M. & Dewberry, C. (1994). “I’ve said I’m sorry, haven’t I?” A study of the 
identity implications and constraints that apologies create for their recipients. 
Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 13, 10–20. 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games 
and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142. 
Berkowitz, L. & Heimer, K. (1989). On the construction of anger experience: Aversive 
events and negative priming in the formation of feelings. Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 22, 1 -37. 
76 
 
Betancourt, H. & Blair, I. (1992). A cognition (attribution)-emotion model of violence in 
conflict situations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 343-350. 
Blount, S. (1995). When social outcomes aren’t fair: The effect of causal attributions on 
preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63, 131-144. 
Bottom, W. P., Gibson, K., Daniels, S. E., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002). When talk is not 
cheap: Substantive penance and expression of intent in rebuilding cooperation. 
Organization Science, 13, 497-513. 
Brewer, M. B. (2004). Taking the social origins of human nature seriously: Toward a more 
imperialist social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 107-
113. 
Burnette, J. L., McCullough, M. E., Van Tongeren, D. R., & Davis, D. E. (2012). 
Forgiveness results from integrating information about relationship value and 
exploitation risk. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 
Clark, M. S., & Mils, J. (1993). The difference between communal and exchange 
relationships: What it is and is not. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 
684-691. doi: 10.1177/0146167293196003 
Cohen, J. R. (1999). “Apologies and organizations: Exploring an example from medical 
practice”. Fordham Urban Law Journal, 27, 1447-1482. 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G. & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple 
regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd Ed.). Mahwah, New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Cryder,C.E., Springer, S., & Morewedge, C.K. (2012). Guilty Feelings, Targeted Actions. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 607-618. 
Dana, J., Cain, D. M., & Dawes, R. M. (2006). What you don’t know won’t hurt me: 
Costly (but quietly) exit in dictator games. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 100, 193-201. 
Darby, B. W., & Schlenker, B. R. (1982). Children’s reactions to apologies. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 742–753. 
Darley, J. M. & Pittman, T. S. (2003). The psychology of compensatory and retributive 
justice. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 324-336. 
De Cremer, D. (2010). To pay or to apologize? On the psychology of dealing with unfair 
offers in a dictator game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31, 843-848.   
De Cremer, D., Pillutla, M. M., & Reinders Folmer, C. P. (2010). How important is an 
apology to you? Forecasting errors in evaluating the value of apologies. 
Psychological Science, 22, 45-48. 
De Cremer, D., & Schouten, B. 2008. When apologies for injustice matter: The role of 
respect. The European Psychologist, 13, 239–247. 
De Cremer, D., Snyder, M., & Dewitte, S. (2001). ‘The less I trust the less I contribute (or 
not)?’ The effects of trust, accountability and self-monitoring in social dilemmas. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 93-107. 
77 
 
De Waal, F. B. M. (2000). Primates – A natural heritage of conflict resolution. Science, 
289, 586-590. 
De Waal, F. B. M. (1989). Peacemaking among primates. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA. 
Desmet, P. T. M., De Cremer, D., & Van Dijk, E. (2011). In money we trust? The use of 
financial compensations to repair trust in the aftermath of distributive harm. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 114, 75-86. 
Elangovan, A. R. & Shapiro, D. L. (1998). Betrayal of trust in organizations. Academy of 
Management Review, 23, 547-566. 
Exline, J. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Expressing forgiveness and repentance: Benefits 
and barriers. In M. E. McCullough, K. Pargament, & C. Thoresen (Eds.), 
Forgiveness: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 133-155). New York: Guilford. 
Exline, J. J., Deshea, L., & Holeman, V. T. (2007). Is apology worth the risk? Predictors, 
outcomes and ways to avoid regret. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 26, 
479-504. 
Ferrin, D., Kim, P. H., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2007). Silence speaks volumes: The 
effectiveness of reticence in comparison to apology and denial for responding to 
integrity- and competence-based trust violations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
92, 893-908. 
Feeney, J. A. & Hill, A. (2006). Victim-perpetrator differences in reports of hurtful events. 
Journal of Social and personal relationships, 23, 587-608.  
Fincham, F. D. (2000). The kiss of the porcupines: From attributing responsibility to 
forgiving. Personal Relationships, 7, 1-23. 
Fischer, A. h. & Roseman, I. J. (2007). Beat them or Ban them: The characteristics and 
social functions of anger and contempt. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 93, 103-115. 
Fukuyama, F. (1995) Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York: 
The Free Press.  
Gayannée, K., Berthoz,S., Wessa, M., Hilton, D., & Martinot, J-L. (2008). An Agent 
Harms a Victim: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study on Specific 
Moral Emotions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 1788-1798. 
Gilbert, D. T., Lieberman, M. D. Morewedge, C. K. & Wilson, T. D. (2004). The peculiar 
longevity of things not so bad. Psychological Science, 15, 14-19. doi: 
10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.01501003.x 
Gilbert, D. T., Morewedge, C. K., Risen, J. L. & Wilson, T. D. (2004). Looking forward to 
looking backward: The misprediction of regret. Psychological Science, 15, 346-350. 
doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00681.x 
Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, T. D., Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T. P. (1998). 
Immune neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 617-638.  
Gill, K. (2000). The moral functions of an apology. The Philosopical Forum, 31, 11-27. 
78 
 
Goffman, E. (1971). Relations in public: Microstudies in the public order. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Gonzales, M. H., Manning, D. J., & Haugen, J. A. (1992). Explaining our sins: Factors 
influencing offender accounts and anticipated victim responses. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 958-971. 
Haesevoets, T., Reinders Folmer, C., De Cremer, D., & Van Hiel, A. (2013). Money isn’t 
all that matters: The use of financial compensation and apologies top reserve 
relationships in the aftermath of distributive harm. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 35, 95-107. 
Hayes, A. F. (2012). PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed variable 
mediation, moderation, and conditional process modeling [White paper]. Retrieved 
from http://www.afhayes.com/public/process2012.pdf 
Hertwig. R. & Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental practices in economics – A 
methodological challenge for psychologists. Behavioral & Bain Sciences , 24, 383-
451. 
Howell, A. J., Dopko, R. L., Turowski, J. B., Buro, K. (2011). The disposition to 
apologize. Personality and Individual Differences, 51, 509-514. 
Jaccard, J. (2001). Interaction effects in logistic regression. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage. 
Jones, E. E. (1998). Major developments in five decades of social psychology. In D. T. 
Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology,  4th 
ed. (Vol. 1, pp. 3-57). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Karremans, J. C. & Aarts, H. (2007). The role of automaticity in determining the 
inclination to forgive close others. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 
902-917. 
Kellerman, B. (2006). When should a leader apologize--and when not? Harvard Business 
Review, 84, 72-81. 
Kelner, D. & Haidt, J. (1999). Social functions of emotions at four levels of analysis. 
Cognition and Emotion, 13, 505-521. 
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D.H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, Approach and Inhibition. 
Psychological Review, 110, 265-284. 
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., & Cooper, C. D. (2009). The repair of trust: A dynamic bilateral 
perspective and multilevel conceptualization. Academy of Management Review, 34, 
401-422. 
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., Cooper, C. D., & Ferrin, D. L. (2006). When more blame is better 
than less: the implications of internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust 
after a compentence- vs. integrity-based trust violation. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 99, 49-65. 
Kim, P. H., Ferrin, D. L., Cooper, C. D. and Dirks, K. T. (2004). “Removing the shadow of 
suspicion: The effects of apology versus denial for repairing competence- versus 
integrity-based trust violations”. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 104-118. 
79 
 
Komorita, S. S. & Parks, C. D. (1995). Interpersonal relations: Mixed-motive interaction. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 46, 183-207. 
Knack, S. & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-
country investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1251-1288. 
Komorita, S.S., & Parks, C.D. (1995). Interpersonal relations: Mixed-motive interaction. 
Annual Review of Psychology 46: 183–207. 
Kramer, R. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring 
questions. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 569-598. 
Lazare, A. (2004). On apology. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Leary, M. R., Springer, C., Negel, L. Ansell, E. & Evans, K. (1998). The causes, 
phenomenology, and consequences of hurt feelings. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 74, 1225-1237. 
Leunissen, J. M. De Cremer, D., & Reinders Folmer, C. (2012). An instrumental 
perspective on apologizing in bargaining: The importance of forgiveness to 
apologize. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33, 215-222. 
Leunissen, J.M., De Cremer, D., Reinders Folmer, C.P., & Van Dijke, M. (2013). The 
Apology Mismatch: Asymmetries Between Victim’s Need for Apologies and 
Perpetrator’s Willingness to Apologize, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
49, 315-324. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2012.12.005 
Leunissen, J.M., De Cremer, D., Van Dijke, M., & Reinders Folmer, C.P. (under review). 
Sorry Seems to be the Hardest Word: Forecasting Errors in the aversiveness of 
Apologizing. British Journal of Social Psychology.  
Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Social utility and decision 
making in interpersonal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 
426-441. 
Mallavarapu, S., Stoinski, T. S., Bloomsmith, M. A., & Maple, T. L. (2006). Postconflict 
behavior in captive western lowland gorrilas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). American 
Journal of Primatology, 68, 789-801. 
Malle, B. F. & Knobe, J. (1997). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 101-121. 
Malle, B. F. & Nelson, S. E. (2003). Judging Mens Rea: The Tension between Folk 
Concepts and Legal Concepts of Intentionality. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 
21, 563-580. 
McCullough, M. E., Fincham, F. D., & Tsang, J. (2003). Forgiveness, forebearance and 
time: The temporal unfolding of transgression-related interpersonal motivations. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 540-557. 
McCullough, M. E., Luna, L. R., Berry, J. W., Tabak, B. A., & Bono, G. (2010). On the 
form and function of forgiving: Modeling the time-forgiveness relationship and 
testing the valuable relationship hypothesis. Emotion, 10, 358-376. 
McCullough, M. E., Worthington, E. L., & Rachal, K. C. (1997). Interpersonal forgiving in 
close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 321-336. 
80 
 
McGraw, K. M. (1987). Guilt following transgression: An attribution of responsibility 
approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 247 – 256. 
Meijer, A.J. (1998). Apologies: What do we know? International Journal of Applied 
Linguistics, 8, 215-231. 
Mikula, G., Athenstaedt, U., Heschgl, S., & Heimgartner, A. (1998). Does it only depend 
on the point of view? Perspective-related differences in justice evaluations of 
negative incidents in personal relationships. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 28, 931–962. 
Miller, D.T. (2001). Disrespect and the experience of injustice. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 52, 527-553. 
Monin, B. & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 33-43. 
Ohbuchi, K., Kameda M., & Agarie, N. (1989). “Apology as aggression control: Its role in 
mediating appraisal of and response to harm”. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 56, 219-227. 
Okimoto, T.G., Wenzel, M. & Hedrick, K. (2013). Refusing to apologize can have 
psychological benefits (and we issue no mea culpa for this research finding). 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 22-31. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.1901 
Park, H. S. & Guan, X. (2009). Culture, positive and negative face threats, and apology 
intentions. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 28, 244-262. 
Preacher, K. J. & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing 
and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research 
Methods, 40, 879-891. 
Quigley, B. M. & Tedeschi, J. T. (1996). Mediating effects of blame on feelings of anger. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 1280-1288. 
Reeder, G. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1979). A schematic model of dispositional attribution in 
interpersonal perception. Psychological Review, 86, 61–79. 
Regan, J.W. (1971). Guilt, Percieved Injustice, and Altruistic Behavior. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 124-132.  
Risen, J. L., & Gilovich, T. (2007). Target and observer differences in the acceptance of 
questionable apologies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 418–
433. 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: 
A cross discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23, 393-404. 
Rusbult, C. E., Martz, J. M., & Agnew, C. R. (1998). The investment model scale: 
Measuring commitment level, satisfaction level, quality of alternatives and 
investment size. Personal Relationships, 5, 357-391. 
Rusbult, C. E. & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2003). Interdependence, interaction and 
relationships. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 351-375. 
81 
 
Rusbult, C. E., Verette, J., Whitney, G. A., Slovik, L. F., & Lipkus, I (1991). 
Accommodation processes in close relationships: Theory and preliminary empirical 
evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 53-78. 
Schimmack, U. (in press). The ironic effect of significant results on the credibility of 
multiple-study articles. Psychological Methods. 
Schino, G. (2000). Beyond the the primates: Expanding the reconciliation horizon. In F. 
Aureli & F. B. M. De Waal (Eds.), Natural Conflict Resolution, (pp. 225-242). 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
Schlenker, B. R., & Darby, B. W. (1981). The use of apologies in social predicaments. 
Social Psychology Quarterly, 44, 271-278. 
Schonbach, P. (1990). Account episodes: The management or escalation of conflict. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Scott, M. B. & Lyman, S. M. (1968). Accounts. American Sociological Review, 33, 46-62. 
Scott-Philips, T. C., Dickins, T. E., & West, S. A. (2011). Evolutionary theory and the 
proximate-ultimate distinction in the human behavioral sciences. Perspective on 
Psychological Science, 6, 38-47. 
Shnabel, N. & Nadler, A. (2008). A needs-based model of reconciliation: Satisfying the 
differential emotional needs of victim and perpetrator as a key to promoting 
reconciliation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 116-132. 
Shnabel, N., Nadler, A., Ullrich, J., Dovidio, J. F., & Carmi, D. (2009). Promoting 
reconciliation through the satisfaction of the emotional needs of victimized and 
perpetrating group members: The needs based model of reconciliation. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 1021-1030.  
Silk, J. B. (2002). The form and function of reconciliation in primates. Annual review of 
Anthropology, 31, 21-44. 
SimanTov-Nachlieli, I., & Shnabel, N. (in press). Feeling both Victim and Perpetrator: 
Investigating Duality the Needs-Based Model. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 
Smith, N. (2008). I was wrong: The meaning of Apologies. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Stouten, J., De Cremer, D., & van Dijk, E. (2006). Violating equality in social dilemmas: 
Emotional and retributive reactions as a function of trust, attribution, and honesty. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 894-906. 
Struthers, C. W., Eaton, J., Santelli, A. G., Uchiyama, M., & Shirvani, N. (2008). The 
effects of attributions of intent and apology on forgiveness: When saying sorry may 
not help the story. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 983-992. 
Tavuchis, N. (1991). Mea Culpa: A sociology of apology and reconciliation. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Taylor, S. E. (1991). Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events: The 
mobilization-minimization hypothesis. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 67-85. doi: 
10.1037/0033-2909.110.1.67 
82 
 
Tazelaar, M. J. A., Van Lange, P. A. M. & Ouwerkerk, J. W. (2004). How to cope with 
“noise” in social dilemmas: The benefits of communication. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 87, 845-859. 
Tsang, J-A. (2002). Moral Rationalization and the Integration of Situational Factors and 
Psychological Processes in Immoral Behavior. Review of General Psychology, 6, 
25–50. 
Van Dijk, E. & De Cremer, D. (2006). Tacit coordination and social dilemmas: On the 
importance of self-interest and fairness. In D. De Cremer, M. Zeelenberg, & J. 
Keith Murnighan (Eds.), Social Psychology and Economics (pp. 141-154). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Van Dijke, M. & De Cremer, D. (2011). When social accounts promote acceptance of 
unfair ultimatum offers: The role of the victim’s stress responses to uncertainty and 
power position. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32, 468-479. 
Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004). The interpersonal 
effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 86, 57-76. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.86.1.57 
Van Lange, P. A. M., De Cremer, D., & Van Dijk, E., & Van Vugt, M. (2007). Self-
interest and beyond: Basic principles of social interaction. In A. W. Kruglanski & 
E. T. Higgings (Eds), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles, 2nd 
Edition, (pp. 540-561). New York: Guilford. 
Vangelisti, A. L., Daly, J. A., & Rudnick, J. R. (1991). Making people feel guilty in 
conversations: Techniques and correlates. Human Communication Research, 18, 3-
39. 
Wagatsuma, H. & Rossett, A. (1986). The implications of apology: Law and culture in 
Japan and the United States. Law & Society Review, 20, 461-498. 
Wallace, H. M., Exline, J. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Interpersonal consequences of 
forgiveness: Does forgiveness deter or encourage repeat offenses? Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 453-460. 
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2003). Affective forecasting. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), 
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 345–411). San Diego, 
CA: Academic Press. doi: 10.1016/S0065-2601(03)01006-2, 
Wilson, T. D., Wheatley, T., Meyers, J. M., Gilbert, D. T., & Axsom, D. (2000). Focalism: 
A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78, 821–836. doi: 10.1037/W022-3514.78.5.821 
Yamagishi, T. (1988). The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and 
Japan. Social Psychology Quarterly, 51, 265-271. 
Yamagishi T. & Yamagishi M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and 
Japan. Motivation and Emotion, 18, 129-165. 
Zechmeister, J. S. & Romero C. (2002). Victim and offender accounts of interpersonal 
conflict: Autobiographical narratives of forgiveness and unforgiveness. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 675-686. 
83 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Conflict and transgressions are an inevitable part of living and working on groups. After a 
transgression there is often a strong need for the conflicting parties to reconcile and to 
restore trust. An apology is one of the most common ways for a perpetrator to initiate the 
reconciliation process. Indeed, numerous studies have shown the positive effects of an 
apology on the reconciliation process. However, contrary to the large body of research on 
the effects of an apology, almost no research has investigated when perpetrators are 
actually willing to offer such an apology. This is surprising, given the fact that an apology 
can only elicit its positive effects on reconciliation when a perpetrator is willing to offer 
one. In this dissertation, I have investigated the willingness of perpetrators to apologize in 
four lines of research. 
In the first line of research (Chapter 2), I investigated how a victim’s reaction to a 
transgression influences the perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. Here, I claim that 
apologizing is a socially risky strategy for a perpetrator. Apologies may have positive 
effects for a perpetrator, such as being forgiven. However, by admitting blame, a 
perpetrator risks the possibility of a host of aversive social consequences such as rejection, 
humiliation and punishment. Based on the instrumental approach to apologizing, I 
predicted that perpetrators would thus be influenced by how likely they think it is that a 
victim will reciprocate an apology with forgiveness. Cues like how the victims reacts 
towards a perpetrators after a transgression are likely to influence how likely a perpetrator 
thinks it is an apology will be reciprocated with forgiveness. Additionally, because 
perpetrators have to trust the victim to reciprocate their apology with forgiveness, we 
expected that dispositional trust would moderate the effect of a victim’s reaction to a 
transgression on the willingness to apologize. While people high in dispositional trust 
generally expect that others are trustworthy and willing to reciprocate cooperative 
behavior, people low in dispositional trust base their expectations more on environmental 
cues of a person’s trustworthiness. As such, I expected that the effect of a victim’s reaction 
to a transgression would be particularly pronounced among people low in dispositional 
trust. The results showed that perpetrators were indeed more willing to apologize when it 
was likely that the victim would reciprocate with forgiveness. Moreover, this effect was 
particularly pronounced among participants low in dispositional trust, and not among those 
high in dispositional trust. We also found evidence of our proposed mechanism. The 
moderated relationship between a victim’s reaction to a transgression and the willingness 
to apologize was mediated by the perception that an apology would indeed restore the 
relationship between perpetrator and victim in this situation.  
 In a second line of research (Chapter 3), I investigated how specific types of 
transgressions (intentional and unintentional transgressions) shape the willingness of a 
perpetrator to apologize. Second, I investigate the congruence of the apology needs of 
victims and perpetrators. In order to understand the influence of intentionality on apology 
needs, I investigated how different emotions that are experienced by victims (anger) and 
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perpetrators (guilt) after a transgression shape the need for apologies. The intentionality of 
the transgression was expected to have an important influence on whether perpetrators 
experience guilt and thus, through guilt, on their willingness to apologize for the 
transgression. I expected that perpetrators would mainly feel guilty after unintentional 
transgressions and not so much after intentional transgressions. However, the relationship 
between intentionality and anger is opposite to the relationship between intentionality and 
guilt. Anger is more strongly experienced after intentional than after unintentional 
transgressions. Because anger and guilt are differentially affected by the intentionality of 
the transgression, I expected an ‘apology mismatch’: perpetrators would mainly want to 
offer an apology after accidental transgressions while victims would not have a strong 
desire for an apology. On the other hand, after an intentional transgression, victims were 
expected have a strong desire for an apology while perpetrators, who are less likely to feel 
guilty about the transgression, would not be willing to offer an apology as they do not feel 
guilty. Across three experiments, I showed that perpetrators and victims have indeed 
different apology needs depending on the intentionality of a transgression. 
 In the third line of research (Chapter 4), I zoomed in on the relationship between 
perpetrator and victim. Based on the Valuable Relationship Hypothesis, I predicted that the 
willingness of a perpetrator to apologize should be contingent on the relational closeness 
between victim and perpetrator. As apologizing is a means for a perpetrator to restore a 
broken relationship, whether or not a perpetrator is motivated to restore that relationship 
should be depended on whether the perpetrator considers that relationship valuable. I 
indeed found relational closeness to be a reliable predictor of the willingness to apologize. 
The effect of relational closeness on the perpetrators willingness to apologize was 
mediated by feelings of guilt. Perpetrators feel guiltier when they transgress against a 
close, rather than a distant other and the guiltier they feel, the higher their willingness to 
apologize. 
 Finally, in a fourth line of research (Chapter 5), I zoomed in on an important 
intrapsychological cause that can predict a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize, namely 
the aversiveness of apologizing itself. Despite the often cited positive effects of apologies 
on victims, perpetrators hold strong negative associations with apologizing. But are these 
associations in fact accurate? In this line of research, I showed that perpetrators 
overestimate the aversiveness of apologizing. These results show that perpetrators may 
underuse apologies due to how they misconstrue the act of apologizing. Indeed, this 
forecasting error may lead to perpetrators refraining to apologize because they misconstrue 
the act of apologizing itself. Withholding an apology in the aftermath of a transgression 
may cause a conflict to escalate. 
 Taken together, these results show that a perpetrator’s apology behavior can be 
influenced by a number of factors: the victim itself, the type of transgression, the 
relationship between perpetrator and victim and how the perpetrator construes the act of 
apologizing. I conclude by giving an overarching theoretical account of the findings, based 
on the Valuable Relationship Hypothesis.  
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
Een verontschuldiging kan een belangrijke rol spelen in het oplossen van conflicten die 
ontstaan in de nasleep van een normovertreding. Veel onderzoek naar verontschuldigingen 
heeft zich gericht op het slachtoffer, dus op de partij die een verontschuldiging ontvangt. 
Dit onderzoek heeft gekeken naar onder welke omstandigheden een verontschuldiging 
effectief is en welke mechanismen ervoor zorgen dat een verontschuldiging effectief is 
(bijvoorbeeld de oprechtheid van de verontschuldiging). In tegenstelling tot het onderzoek 
naar de effecten van verontschuldigingen op slachtoffer, is er opvallend weinig onderzoek 
gedaan naar de daders, dus de partij die zijn/haar verontschuldigingen aanbied. Er is dus 
weinig kennis over wanneer daders bereid zijn om hun verontschuldigingen aan te bieden. 
In het onderzoek, dat ik presenteer in dit proefschrift, heb ik getracht meer inzicht te geven 
in de situationele en persoonlijkheidskenmerken van daders die voorspellen of een dader 
meer of minder bereid is om zijn/haar verontschuldigingen aan te bieden na een 
normovertreding. 
In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik onderzocht hoe de reactie van een slachtoffer na een 
normovertreding invloed heeft op de bereidheid van een dader om zijn/haar 
verontschuldigingen aan te bieden. In dit hoofdstuk stel ik dat een verontschuldiging 
aanbieden voor een dader een sociaal risicovolle strategie kan zijn. Het aanbieden van een 
verontschuldiging kan positieve effecten hebben voor een dader in de zin dat de dader 
makkelijker vergeven wordt en de relatie met het slachtoffer kan worden herstelt. Aan de 
andere kant, behelst een verontschuldiging ook een erkenning dat de dader iets fout heeft 
gedaan. Dit kan leiden tot verstoting uit de relatie met het slachtoffer, neerbuigendheid 
richting de dader en eventueel het opleggen van een straf. Een verontschuldiging 
aanbieden is dus risicovol omdat het kan leiden tot vergeven maar ook kan leiden tot een 
situatie waarin de dader slechter af is dan wanneer degene niet zijn/haar 
verontschuldigingen zou hebben aangeboden. Ik voorspel dat daders instrumenteel om 
zullen gaan met dit risico. Op basis van deze instrumentele benadering verwachtte ik dat 
de dader meer zijn/haar verontschuldigingen aan zal bieden wanneer de dader het idee 
heeft dat de verontschuldiging zal leiden tot vergiffenis en minder zijn/haar 
verontschuldigen aan zal bieden wanneer de dader denkt dat dit onwaarschijnlijk is. Een 
reactie van een slachtoffer kan informatie geven over of het slachtoffer bereid is om een 
verontschuldiging te accepteren of niet en te reciproceren met vergiffenis. 
Naast de invloed van de reactie van een slachtoffer op een normovertreding, heb 
ik ook gekeken wat de invloed is van dispositioneel vertrouwen hierin. Een dader moet 
erop vertrouwen dat een positief gebaar van zijn/haar kant, namelijk het aanbieden van een 
verontschuldiging, zal worden gereciproceerd met vergiffenis. Dispositioneel vertrouwen 
heeft waarschijnlijk een invloed op in hoeverre daders denken dat dit gebaar inderdaad 
wordt gereciproceerd. Mensen die van nature anderen vertrouwen (mensen hoog in 
dispositioneel vertrouwen) gaan ervan uit dat anderen hun positieve gedrag zullen 
reciproceren. Echter mensen die van nature anderen weinig vertrouwen (mensen laag in 
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dispositioneel vertrouwen) laten hun gedrag meer afhangen van situationele informatie 
waaruit zij kunnen opmaken dat hun positieve gedrag zal worden gereciproceerd. Ik 
verwachtte dan ook dat vooral mensen die laag in dispositioneel vertrouwen zijn zich 
zullen laten leiden door de reactie van een slachtoffer na een normovertreding. Mensen die 
hoog in situationeel vertrouwen zijn gaan ervan uit dat mensen hun gedrag zullen 
reciproceren en zullen zich dus minder sterk laten leiden door de reactie van een 
slachtoffer na een normovertreding. 
Om deze hypothesen te toetsen hebben we een nieuwe  computer procedure 
ontwikkeld waarbij. Omdat mensen alleen hun verontschuldigingen aanbieden nadat ze 
een normovertreding hebben begaan moesten we een lab procedure ontwikkelen waarbij 
het waarschijnlijk was dat de dader een normovertreding zou begaan (voor de details zie 
2.2.1). Nadat de dader de normovertreding had begaan, kregen zij een bericht van het 
slachtoffer van de normovertreding. In dit bericht hebben we gemanipuleerd of het 
waarschijnlijk was dat het slachtoffer de dader zou vergeven of niet. De resultaten van dit 
experiment waren in lijn met de verwachtingen. Wanneer daders een bericht ontvingen van 
een relatief vergevingsgezind slachtoffer, waren zijn meer bereid om hun 
verontschuldigingen aan te bieden dan wanneer zijn een bericht ontvingen van een relatief 
niet vergevingsgezind slachtoffer. Dit effect werd vooral gevonden onder mensen die laag 
in dispositioneel vertrouwen zijn. 
In hoofdstuk 3 heb ik onderzocht hoe de intentionaliteit van een normovertreding 
de bereidheid van een dader om zich te verontschuldigen beïnvloed. In dit hoofdstuk 
vergelijk ik deze bereidheid met de behoefte van een slachtoffer om een verontschuldiging 
te ontvangen. In dit onderzoek kijk ik naar emoties die daders en slachtoffers ervaren na 
een normovertreding en hoe deze emoties de behoefte aan een verontschuldiging 
beïnvloeden. Voor daders verwachtte ik dat schuldgevoelens een belangrijke emotie 
zouden zijn die de bereidheid om een verontschuldiging aan te bieden zou kunnen 
verklaren. Schuld is een emotie die mensen motiveert om relatie herstellend gedrag te 
vertonen. Aangezien een verontschuldiging een mechanisme is waarmee een dader een 
relatie na een normovertreding kan herstellen, verwachte ik dat naarmate een dader zich 
schuldiger zou voelen over een normovertreding dat ze meer bereid zouden zijn om hun 
verontschuldigingen aan te bieden. Voor slachtoffers verwachte ik dat boosheid een 
belangrijke emotie zou zijn in de behoefte om een verontschuldiging te ontvangen zou 
beïnvloeden. Boosheid is een emotie die mensen ervaren wanneer zij gevoelens van 
onrecht ervaren. Deze emotie drijft een behoefte aan compensatie en erkenning van 
onrecht. Aangezien een verontschuldiging gezien kan worden als een psychologische 
compensatie voor het onrecht dat is ontstaan na een normovertreding verwachtte ik dat 
slachtoffers naarmate ze bozer waren over een normovertreding ze een sterkere behoefte 
zouden hebben om een verontschuldiging te ontvangen. 
De intentionaliteit van een normovertreding heeft een effect op zowel de 
schuldgevoelens die daders ervaren als de boosheid die slachtoffers ervaren. Daders voelen 
zich schuldiger wanneer zij per ongeluk een normovertreding hebben begaan dan wanneer 
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zij intentioneel een normovertreding hebben begaan. Slachtoffers worden echter bozer 
wanneer zij het slachtoffer zijn van een intentionele normovertreding dan over een 
normovertreding die per ongeluk was. Als zodanig willen daders dus vooral een 
verontschuldiging aanbieden na een normovertreding die per ongeluk was (omdat ze zich 
dan relatief schuldig voelen) terwijl slachtoffers vooral een verontschuldiging willen 
hebben na een normovertreding die intentioneel was (omdat ze dan relatief boos zijn). Dit 
leidt tot een asymmetrie tussen wanneer daders een verontschuldiging willen aanbieden en 
slachtoffers er een willen hebben. 
Deze verwachtingen heb ik getoetst in 3 experimenten. In twee experimenten (een 
onder studenten en een onder werknemers) heb ik aan mensen vraagt om een situatie te 
herinneren waarin ze een normovertreding begaan hadden (dader) of iemand een 
normovertreding naar hun toe hadden begaan (slachtoffer). Ik vroeg dan naar een 
normovertreding die of per ongeluk, of intentioneel was. Daarna vroeg ik in hoeverre ze 
zich schuldig voelden over de normovertreding, dan wel boos waren over de 
normovertreding en in hoeverre ze een verontschuldiging wilden geven of wilde krijgen. 
Daarnaast heb ik een experiment gedaan waarbij ik een normovertreding beschreef die 
geschreven was vanuit een slachtoffer of daderperspectief en die of intentioneel of per 
ongeluk was (in deze studie was de normovertreding dus steeds hetzelfde). De resultaten 
van deze drie experimenten lieten consistent zien dat daders inderdaad bereid zijn om hun 
verontschuldigingen aan te bieden op momenten dat slachtoffer weinig behoefte hebben 
aan een verontschuldigingen (na een normovertreding die per ongeluk ging) terwijl daders 
weinig bereid zijn om hun verontschuldigingen aan te bieden wanneer slachtoffers een 
sterke behoefte hebben aan een verontschuldiging (na intentionele normovertredingen). De 
verklaring voor deze asymmetrie is inderdaad dat de intentionaliteit van de 
normovertreding de emoties schuld en boosheid op een tegengestelde manier beïnvloed. 
In hoofdstuk 4 heb ik de onderzocht hoe de relatie tussen dader en slachtoffer de 
bereidheid tot verontschuldigen beïnvloed. In dit onderzoek baseer ik me op de 
Waardevolle Relatie Hypothese (De Waal, 1989; 2000). Deze hypothese stamt uit 
onderzoek naar verzoening onder primaten. De basis van de hypothese is relatief simpel: 
naarmate een relatie belangrijker is voor de betrokkenen van een conflict wordt de kans dat 
er tot verzoening wordt overgegaan groter. In dit onderzoek hebben we onderzocht of dit 
ook opgaat voor mensen. Aangezien een verontschuldiging een belangrijk instrument voor 
een dader is om een relatie te herstellen, verwachtte ik dat naarmate de waarde van een 
relatie zou toenemen de bereidheid van een dader om zich te verontschuldigen ook zou 
toenemen. Daarnaast heb ik, net als in hoofdstuk 3, onderzocht of de bereidheid om te 
verontschuldigen inderdaad wordt gedreven door schuldgevoelens. Schuldgevoelens leiden 
tot relatie herstellend gedrag. Als mensen meer gemotiveerd zouden zijn om belangrijke 
relaties te herstellen dan impliceert dit dat mensen zich schuldiger zouden moet voelen na 
een normovertreding wanneer de relatie met het slachtoffer van de normovertreding 
belangrijker is voor de dader.  
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Ik heb dit onderzocht in drie experimenten. In de eerste heb ik mensen gevraagd 
een normovertreding die zij begaan hadden te beschrijven. Daarna heb ik gemeten hoe 
belangrijk de relatie met het slachtoffer voor de dader was en of zij hun 
verontschuldigingen hadden aangeboden na de normovertreding. In een tweede studie heb 
ik een normtransgressie beschreven waarin ik de waarde van de relatie heb gemanipuleerd. 
Tot slot in een derde studie heb ik normtransgressies op het werk onder werknemers 
onderzocht. Ook hier heb ik gekeken naar de waarde van de relatie met het slachtoffer voor 
de dader. De resultaten waren in lijn met de verwachtingen. Daders waren inderdaad meer 
bereid hun verontschuldigingen aan te bieden wanneer zij een normovertreding hadden 
begaan waarbij de relatie met het slachtoffer belangrijk voor hun was. Dit effect werd 
gedreven door schuldgevoelens. Daders voelen zich schuldiger wanneer ze een 
normoverteding begaan naar iemand die belangrijk voor heb is dan naar iemand die minder 
belangrijk voor hen is (ook na dezelfde normovertreding voelen mensen zich schuldiger 
naarmate de relatie met het slachtoffer belangrijker voor hen wordt). Dit onderzoek laat 
zien dat de relatie tussen dader en slachtoffer van belang is in de bereidheid van daders om 
zich te verontschuldigen. Daders gebruiken een verontschuldiging na een normovertreding 
om relaties die belangrijk voor hen zijn te herstellen. 
In mijn laatste empirische hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 5, kijk ik naar een 
intrapsychologisch effect in de bereidheid van een dader om een verontschuldiging aan te 
bieden. In hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 heb ik steeds onderzocht hoe situationele kenmerken een 
invloed hebben op de bereidheid to verontschuldigen (bijv. hoe het slachtoffer reageert). In 
dit hoofdstuk heb ik gekeken naar een intrapersoonlijk proces dat de bereidheid om te 
verontschuldigen beïnvloed. Dit onderzoek was gebaseerd op de observatie dat daders aan 
de ene kant sterke negatieve associaties hebben met het aanbieden van een 
verontschuldiging maar ook positief terug kijken op verontschuldigingen die zij hebben 
aangeboden. Het lijkt er dus op dat daders inschatten dat het aanbieden van een 
verontschuldiging erg negatief is maar dat wanneer ze het eenmaal gedaan hebben dat het 
wel meevalt. Deze observatie zou verklaard kunnen worden aan de hand van de affectieve 
voorspellingsfout. Onderzoek naar de affectieve voorspellingsfout laat zien dat mensen 
over het algemeen erg slecht zijn in het voorspellen van hun affectieve reacties op 
toekomstige gebeurtenissen. Zo overschatten mensen hoe blij ze zullen zijn wanneer hun 
favoriete voetbalteam wint en overschatten mensen hoe lang ze zich rot voelen nadat een 
romantische relatie uit gaat. Aangezien mensen dus erg slecht zijn in het inschatten van de 
affectieve reacties van hun toekomstige handelingen zou er dus ook toe kunnen  leiden dat 
daders overschatten hoe negatief het is om hun verontschuldigingen aan te bieden. 
We hebben dit idee getoetst in drie studies. In een eerste lab experiment lieten we 
mensen op een experimentele wijze een normovertreding begaan. Aan de ene groep 
mensen vroeg we om zich voor te stellen om zich hiervoor te verontschuldigen en vroegen 
we hoe negatief het zou zijn om hun verontschuldigingen aan te bieden; aan de andere 
groep vroegen we om hun verontschuldigingen aan te bieden en vroegen we ze om aan te 
geven hoe negatief ze het aanbieden van een verontschuldiging vonden. Mensen die zich 
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voorstelden om zich te verontschuldigen overschatte inderdaad hoe negatief het zou zijn 
om hun verontschuldigingen aan te bieden vergeleken met mensen die het echt gedaan 
hadden. Dit effect hebben we nog twee keer gerepliceerd in twee veldstudies. De resultaten 
laten zien dat daders zich in hun keuze om zich wel of niet te verontschuldigen ook laten 
leiden door hoe zij zich voorstellen dat het zal zijn om een verontschuldiging aan te 
bieden. 
  In het afsluitende Hoofdstuk 6 geef ik eerst een samenvatting van de 
onderzoeksbevindingen van hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 5. Vervolgens geef ik hier een 
theoretische integratie van de onderzoeksbevindingen van hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5. Ik maak 
hier gebruik van de Waardevolle Relatie Hypothese (De Waal, 2000). Specifiek 
beargumenteer ik dat de uiteindelijk functie van het aanbieden van een verontschuldiging 
voor een dader is het behouden van relaties die waardevol zijn voor de dader. Of een dader 
zijn verontschuldigingen aan zal bieden is dus afhankelijk van de waarde die de dader 
toeschrijft aan de relatie met het slachtoffer. De waarde van de relatie kan gekenmerkt 
worden door de hechtheid of kwaliteit van de relatie met het slachtoffer (hoofdstuk 4), het 
type normovertreding dat een dader begaat (Hoofdstuk 3). Namelijk bij intentionele 
normovertredingen wordt de schade van de normovertreding aan de relatie ingecalculeerd 
door de dader. Dit betekent dat intentionele normovertredingen vooral gebeuren in relaties 
die relatief weinig waarde hebben voor de dader. Tot slot heeft ook het slachtoffer invloed 
op de waarde die een dader toekent aan een relatie (hoofdstuk 2). Een niet 
vergevingsgezinde reactie van een slachtoffer communiceert dat het slachtoffer nog weinig 
waarde hecht aan de relatie met de dader. Daders nemen dit mee in hun beslissing om hun 
verontschuldigingen aan te bieden. Dit leidt ertoe dat daders minder bereid zijn om hun 
verontschuldigingen aan te bieden wanneer het slachtoffer een weinig vergevingsgezinde 
indruk maakt vergeleken met een meer vergevingsgezind slachtoffer. Ik sluit af met een 
aantal suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek op basis van dit theoretische kader. 
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ON THE WILLINGNESS OF PERPETRATORS TO APOLOGIZE
Conflict and transgressions are an inevitable part of living and working on groups.
After a transgression there is often a strong need for the conflicting parties to reconcile and
to restore trust. An apology is one of the most common ways for a perpetrator to initiate
the reconciliation process. Indeed, numerous studies have shown the positive effects of an
apology on the reconciliation process. Contrary to the large body of research on the effects
of an apology on a victim, almost no research has investigated when perpetrators are
actually willing to offer such an apology. Given that an apology can only elicit its positive
effects on reconciliation when a perpetrator is willing to offer one, it is imperative to
understand when perpetrators are willing to do so.
This dissertation is the first to systematically investigate the situational and persona -
lity determinants of a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. In this dissertation, I investi -
gate how victims can influence the willingness of perpetrators to apologize. I show how
different types of transgressions influence the both the willingness to apologize and the
congruence between a perpetrator’s willingness to apologize and a victim’s desire to receive
an apology. I also focus on how the type of relationship between victim and perpetrator
influences the willingness to apologize. Finally, in this dissertation, I show how perpetrators
often biased towards overestimating the aversiveness of apologizing can have an important
effect on their willingness to apologize.
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